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2Abstract
This thesis is a study of local administration in the 
former British leased territory of We-ihaiwei in the north­
eastern Chinese province of Shantung from I898 to 1938. The 
first seven chapters deal mainly with the years 1898 to 1930  
during which time Weihaiwei was administered first, briefly, 
by British military officials and then, beginning in 1902, 
by Colonial Office staff. One of the central themes in these 
chapters is the fact that those who served in the highest ad­
ministrative positions at Weihaiwei consistently chose, wher­
ever possible, to maintain traditional Chinese governmental 
institutions, even to the point of modeling their own be­
havior on that of local district magistrates. Considerable 
attention is given to the important role of village headmen 
in managing local affairs and their relationship with Brit­
ish officials.
In spite of a conservative administrative approach, 
foreign occupation of this nearly three hundred square mile 
area of rural China for thirty-two years naturally brought 
with it a good deal of economic, social, and political change. 
The thesis attempts to analyze how these changes took place 
as well as the impact of major events occurring elsewhere.
A point emphasized throughout is that while Weihaiwei was 
administered by Britain during these years, its inhabitants 
remained Chinese citizens, continued to view themselves as 
such, and were by no means unaffected by events outside the 
territorial borders.
The final two chapters of the thesis deal with the 
period beginning with Weihaiwei*s retrocession to China in 
October 1930 and ending in March 1938 when the area was
3occupied by Japan. A comparison is made between the ad­
ministrative methods of the Western-trained, reform-minded 
representatives of the Nanking regime and their British pre­
decessors. Although some welcome progress was made at this 
time, notably in the field of education, there were also 
numerous complaints that government was "interfering" too 
much in the daily lives of villagers as it superimposed a 
large and complicated bureaucratic structure on top of tra­
ditional institutions. Thus, it is concluded, that in their 
haste to "modernize" rural China, Kuomintang officials often 
ignored the most viable and useful aspects of their nation’s 
governmental heritage and in the process lost the confidence 
of local people.
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9Introduction
In the opening lines of his classic study of local 
government in China under the Ch'ing, Ch'tt T'ung-tsu wrote 
in 1962 that there were at that time no "systematic and com­
prehensive" works which dealt with the functioning of chou 
an<^  hsien administrative units in imperial China. As he 
observed: "The few available studies on Chinese government
have dealt either with the central government or with pro­
vincial government, which merely exercised a supervisory
1
function over the administration of local government." Now, 
some twenty years later, it could still be said that the 
situation is much the same both for the late imperial period 
which was Ch'tt's concern and for the Republican period which 
followed. This is despite a widespread recognition among 
scholars that an understanding of Chinese local government 
is essential to an understanding of the Chinese political 
system as a whole.
One of the reasons for the dearth of such local level 
political studies has been the difficulty in locating pri­
mary sources of sufficient detail over a long enough period 
of time to provide a basis for analysis. It was the hope of 
discovering such a source that led me to investigate my 
friend James L. Watson's suggestion regarding British records 
on the leasehold of Weihaiwei in Shantung province. My first 
visit to the Public Records Office, then housed at Chancery 
Lane, was indeed a memorable one. One of the archivists I 
consulted there actually provided the first hint that I was 
on to a collection of considerable size when he looked at 
me with mild amusement and asked if I was sure I wanted to 
begin such a research project. When I then proceeded to
10
examine the indexes for Weihaiwei which listed nearly eight 
hundred separate entries for the commissioners1 files alone,
I began to understand his question. It was only later, how­
ever, when I actually was able to read a sampling of docu­
ments from these files that their full depth and range be­
came apparent to me. It was also obvious from the haphazard 
way in which some of the papers were arranged that probably 
no one had consulted them since they were returned from 
China in the 1930s.
What I had in fact rediscovered was a vast collection 
of literally thousands of documents covering a period of more 
than thirty years, from 1898 to 1938* during much of which 
British military and colonial officials administered a rural 
territory roughly the size of a small Chinese hsLen# or dis­
trict. In addition to the commissioner's own files on every 
conceivable topic concerning the day-to-day governing of Wei­
haiwei, there were also additional record classifications 
which included correspondence between the commissioner and 
his superiors in Peking and London and supplementary classi­
fications from consular officials in the nearby treaty port 
of Chefoo (Yen-t'ai). I soon found that each new file con­
sulted held out the possibility of exciting discoveries 
since one could never be sure just what it contained. At 
times there were original Chinese materials, including local 
newspapers, personal letters, petitions, and propaganda pub­
lications which added another perspective and greater depth 
to the collection as a whole.
What makes the quality of the British documentation 
so unusually high is the fact that much of it was written 
by two colonial officials, James Stewart Lockhart and Reginald
11
Johnston, who began their careers as young men in the Hong 
Kong service and who studied the Chinese language, history, 
and culture with a diligence unsurpassed by any of their 
colleagues. What became clear in the course of my research 
was the extent to which their admiration of traditional Chi­
nese society led Lockhart and Johnston to imitate the behav­
ior of conscientious hsien magistrates in their roles as 
commissioner and district officer. In addition, their efforts 
to preserve, as much as possible, the existing social and 
political structures at Weihaiwei meant that when rendition 
took place in 1930 the new Nationalist administrators found 
much about life in the area basically unchanged since the 
late Ch'ing period. Such a situation enables one to make 
some significant comparisons between the traditional admin­
istrative methods of rural Chinese officials and those of 
the reform-minded Republican period who followed them. Since 
the British continued to maintain a consular post at Weihai­
wei up to and even beyond 1938 when the Japanese occupied 
the area, it is possible to combine Foreign Office materials 
with official Chinese reports regarding government policy 
in the former leasehold to build up a reasonably complete 
picture of life there following the British withdrawal.
In addition to the British and Chinese sources just 
mentioned, there were also several sets of private papers 
which proved valuable in this study. Unfortunately, Reginald 
Johnston had chosen to destroy all of his personal papers, 
but those of his friend and colleague, James Stewart Lock­
hart, were readily accessible in Edinburgh. They too had 
only rarely been consulted and never for the purpose of un­
derstanding local government in China. Again, I found a
12
mass of information, more than seventy volumes in all, which 
contained a great deal of personal correspondence, both Chi­
nese and English, numerous photographs, newspapers clippings, 
and other extremely interesting items from Lockhart*s career 
in the colonial service.
Perhaps one of the most important insights gained in 
the course of researching this thesis was the recognition 
that a great deal of primary source material on China remains 
largely untouched in official and private archives around 
the world. If the material in these archives on Weihaiwei 
is any guide, then those collections will not only be of use 
to students of diplomatic history, but also to those con­
cerned with the monumental changes which occurred in Chinese 
politics and society during the early decades of the twen­
tieth century.
* * *
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to the various institutions and individuals who helped to 
make this thesis possible. First, I would like to thank 
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for the advice and encouragement they offered at various 
stages in the research. I must also thank my supervisor, 
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in the spring of 1981. I would like to thank those who at­
tended the seminar for their comments and criticisms at that 
time. A special thank you also goes to Mrs. Mary Stewart 
Lockhart, Sir James Stewart Lockhart*s daughter, for some 
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ies, the National Library of Scotland, the United Society 
for the Propagation of the Gospel, the United States National 
Archives, the Hoover Institution, Toyo Bunko, the Institute 
for Humanistic Studies of Kyoto University, the Humanities 
Library of Kyoto University, the Academia Sinica in Nan-kang, 
Taiwan, and the National Taiwan University.
Perhaps my greatest debt, however, is to my husband,
Dr. William S. Atwell, for his unfailing patience, friendly 
advice, and firm support through the long and at times try­
ing process of thesis preparation.
Notes to Introduction
^Ch'tt T'ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the 
Ch* ing (Cambridge, MassTT^I^^TT^pT^cTI
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Chapter 1 
The British Come to Weihaiwei
Early Administrative History
During a state dinner in Berlin in May 18q 8, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II remarked to the British ambassador that the recent 
leasing1 of Weihaiwei would, he thought, "be a useless expense 
and indicated a departure from that practical common sense
i
with which Englishmen were usually credited," The Kaiser 
was not alone in this judgment. Many Englishmen also ques­
tioned the wisdom of acquiring such a distant piece of terri­
tory, while the vast majority could certainly not have said 
where it was. One might well ask, then, how and why Her Maj­
esty's Covernment had managed to become involved in the dip­
lomatic maneuvering which led to this acquisition.
Before turning to those questions, however, it is impor­
tant to begin with the location of Weihaiwei, for in fact 
geography was the major reason it had been a place of some 
significance to the Chinese from as early as the Ming dynasty. 
The town of Weihaiwei and its harbor are strategically well 
located on the northern coast, about thirty-one miles from 
the eastern extremity of the Shantung peninsula, and just 
eighty-nine miles across the Culf of Chih-li, or Po-hai, from 
Port Arthur, Pacing each other as they do, Weihaiwei and 
Port Arthur form the two pillars of a kind of gateway to the 
Culf and thus to Peking. The harbor at Weihaiwei is large, 
some six miles wide and three to four miles long, and contains 
within it the island of Liu-kung which serves both to protect 
it from strong northeast winds and to form the harbor's two 
entrances.
16
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One can trace the administrative history of this region
back to Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (r. 221-210 B.C.) who divided the
whole of the empire into thirty-six chttn, or provinces. At
that time the modern district of Wen-teng, including what is
now Weihaiwei, formed part of the province of Ch'i which took
its name from the Chou dynasty kingdom of Ch'i. It was not
until the Han dynasty in 201 B.C., however, that a Chinese
magisterial district was founded in the eastern peninsula for
the first time with its administrative center at a place called
Pti-yeh-ch'eng. This district, which contained the area later
to become Weihaiwei, was assigned to Ch'ang-kuang prefecture
and given the' name of Wen-teng-shan hsien. Around 581 Ch'ang-
kuang prefecture was abolished and Wen-teng became part of
^ung-lai prefecture. Many more changes occurred after this
which it is not necessary to list here except to say that in
1376 the prefecture of Teng-chou was created and Wen-teng hsien
was assigned to it, remaining so down to the time the British
2arrived on the scene m  the late Ch'ing period.
Weihaiwei under the Ming
As its name suggests, the town of Weihaiwei was origi­
nally a guard station, or wei, having been created as such 
in the thirty-first year of Ming T'ai-tsu (13Q8).^ Like 
Ch' eng-shan-wei, 120 Li east of Wen-teng-hsien, and Ching- 
hai-wei 110 li south of Wen-teng-hsien, which were granted 
the same status at this time, Wei-hai-wei was garrisoned and 
fortified to protect the Shantung promontory from attacks by 
both Chinese and Japanese pirates. From the time of the 
Northern Wei dynasty (A.D. 386-53*0 onwards various Chinese 
governments had found it necessary to protect the Shantung
13
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coastline, with its many small coves and inlets, from pirates, 
During the political and economic chaos of the late fourteenth 
century, however, the farmers and poor fishermen of the area 
begged for further assistance and Ming T'ai-tsu (r. 1368-13Q8) 
responded by establishing several wei.
A wei was a special defense outpost which constituted 
more than a mere fort or even a fortified town for it implied 
"the existence of a military colony and lands held by military 
tenure embracing an area of some scores of square miles.
Under this system bands of soldiers were allowed to occupy 
agricultural land and found families under the command of var­
ious leaders, the chief of whom was known as chih-hui. These 
chieftains were not regular military officers and the wei were 
not part of the general Chinese civil and military administra­
tion. It was the chih-hui, however, who was given responsi­
bility for overseeing both the civil and military affairs of 
the wei and its "soldier-colonists,
At first Weihaiwei was provided with a garrison of 2,000 
soldiers but the number was gradually increased and a wall was 
built around the town in 1^03 for additional security.^ The 
efforts to repel pirate attacks met with only partial success, 
however. During the Chia-ching period (1522-1566), for ex­
ample, a particularly ruthless Chinese pirate seized the is­
land of Liu-kung and built houses there for himself and his 
band in order to have a permanent base for attacking the junks 
entering and leaving the harbor. They were finally driven 
off the island by a formidable imperial censor who then pro­
ceeded to make a careful survey of the arable land on Liu- 
kung in order that it could be cultivated by soldier-farmers. 
In 1619 the local prefect continued this cultivation project
The walled town of Wei-hai
Source: Wei-hai-wei chih, 10 chtian (1?42 ed., revised and
reprinted, 1929).
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by admitting a few immigrants to the island and making them
g
subject to the land tax.
The last years of the Ming were a difficult time in 
many parts of China as governmental authority disintegrated 
and bands of armed robbers, many of them ex-soldiers, pil­
laged the countryside. The troops at Weihaiwei became so 
disorderly that the civilian population was forced to flee 
to the hills and the chih-hui himself deserted his post. It 
was not until several years later that peace was restored 
under the new Ch'ing dynasty.
Changes under the Ch'ing
Though the Ch'ing rulers recognized that eastern Shan­
tung still needed its fortifications and troops to defend 
against troublesome pirates, they also recognized that the 
existence o-f separate military districts free of interference 
from civil magistrates was perhaps only justifiable as a tem­
porary measure under abnormal conditions. Thus, after care­
ful investigations were made by both a provincial governor 
and a governor-general, it was decided in 1735 to abolish 
several wei on the promontory, Weihaiwei returned to its 
former place under the jurisdiction of the Wen-teng magistrate 
and Ch'en^-shan-wei was converted into a new magisterial dis­
trict called Jung-ch’eng hsien. In the years to come the 
British leasehold of Weihaiwei would encompass territory 
largely drawn from Wen-teng hsien but would also include a 
small section of Jung-ch'eng hsien. The name Weihaiwei for 
the leasehold was, however, something of a misnomer since 
the area it encompassed was much larger than the original 
wei and by that time the military district as such had long
22
since ceased to exist. Nor by the terms of the convention 
did British jurisdiction extend to the walled town known as 
Weihaiwei,^
Although Weihaiwei lost its independent status as a 
military district during the eighteenth century, its strategic 
location and excellent harbor made it a logical choice for 
further development as a naval base when China, somewhat be­
latedly, struggled to strengthen her military forces. Defeat 
at the hands of the French in 1885 stimulated considerable 
official interest in matters of national defense, including 
the establishment of several new naval training centers. In 
1886 a naval school was established at Liu-kung Island under 
Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang who was later to figure dramatically 
in the Sino-Japanese War of 189^-95. One English observer
noted that the new institution comprised both a gunnery school
10and an Imperial Naval College, or Hai-chttn Hstleh-t' ang.
Not surprisingly, Li Hung-chang was the central figure 
responsible both for the drive to reorganize China's military 
training activities and to build new fixed shore fortifica­
tions in north China at Port Arthur, Talien Bay, and Weihai­
wei. The installations on the Gulf of Chihli were indeed
massive. It was estimated that the facilities at Port Arthur
11were worth about six million pounds sterling. Weihaiwei's
fortifications, though not as costly as Port Arthur's, were
also impressive. Rawlinson describes the results of this
reconstruction effort begun in the late 1880s under foreign
supervision:
Here was an excellent harbor with islands 
so placed across its entrance (Liu-kung,
Kwang, and Jih islands) that ships could 
enter only by a western pass right under 
the Liu-kung and westshore forts. On the
23
islands and in the hills around the har­
bor were seventeen forts, mounting fifty- 
five guns, from four to ten inches, some 
of them quick-firers. Four of the island 
guns were of the latest disappearing type.
The suns bore only to seaward. The water 
entrances were guarded by a quintuple bank 
of torpedoes, a quadruple series of sunken 
magnetic mines, and a massive boom made up 
of three strands of three-inch steel cable 
floated on heavy timber balks, well anchored 
to the bottom.
There was also a machine shop at Weihaiwei where arms could 
be manufactured.
Armstrong reported that all of this construction activ­
ity brought in many more people to Weihaiwei, Within five 
years the population of Liu-kung Island and the area around 
the harbor had grown considerably and a village of about five 
hundred families had sprung up outside the wall of the town. 
Other villages emerged near each fort or camp. With this in­
flux came various types of tradesmen and some beggars. Dur­
ing the herring season a large number of fishing vessels
operated out of Weihaiwei and the Peiyang Fleet wintered
13there,  ^ The area appeared to have a promising future.
The Sino-Japanese War
It should not be forgotten, however, that Li Hung-chang 
faced continual opposition to his "self-strengthening" efforts 
from an ultra-conservative Ch'ing court, Vast sums of money 
received from the provinces, ostensibly for the navy, were 
diverted to other projects. Consequently, in the lBQOs while 
Europe and Japan were rapidly building up their naval forces, 
no additions were made to the Peiyang Fleet, Then, in spite 
of the fact that Li was anxious to avoid any confrontation 
with the Japanese, the two countries found themselves at war 
over Korea on August 1, 1 8 9 4.
24
By mid-September the Chinese forces under Admiral Ting 
Ju-ch'ang had already been soundly defeated off the mouth of 
the Yalu River and the last major battle of the war took 
place at Weihaiwei between 30 January and 12 February 1 8 9 5.
Once again the Chinese fleet suffered bitter defeat with cap­
tured guns on the mainland actually being used against their 
ships trapped inside the harbor and the admiral and five of
14
his officers committing suicide.
According to the harsh terms of the Treaty of Shimono- 
seki signed on 1? April I8 9 5. Japan, in addition to many other 
things, was to be allowed to occupy Weihaiwei until indemnity 
payments had been made by the Chinese. Alarmed by Japan’s 
surprising defeat of China, however, the three European powers, 
Russia, France, and Germany, lost no time in forcing the war- 
weakened Japanese to give up the Liaotung peninsula in ex­
change for additional indemnities. In spite of this "Triple
Intervention," however, Weihaiwei was to remain occupied un-
1 5til the war payments had been made.
The Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath were crucially
significant to the events which unfolded in the closing years
of the nineteenth century and, indeed, to those much later
in the twentieth. The war demonstrated China’s weakness and
Japan's strength, but it also served to involve the latter
16
in an intense and bitter rivalry among the world powers.
Meanwhile, Great Britain was finding herself increasingly
isolated in the Far East with her long-standing monopoly of
political and economic power in China threatened, The British
had chosen not to join the other European powers in their in-
1.7tervention against japan. The problem facing the prime 
minister, Lord Salisbury, and his ministers was a straight-
25
forward onei "to defend in an age of competition that which
18Great Britain had obtained in an age of monopoly."
The Scramble for Concessions
One of the immediate problems facing China at the con­
clusion of the war was how to pay the enormous indemnity she 
owed to Japan, a debt amounting to some 230 million taels, 
or approximately 35 million pounds. The powers wasted no 
time in making use of this newly-acquired lever for obtaining 
concessions as they competed with one another to grant loans 
to the Chinese government and to build railways across Chi­
nese territory. It was at this time, for example, that the 
Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway Company was formed 
in the north, while the French exerted pressure to win conces­
sions in the south, Britain quickly followed suit by demand-
19ing and receiving counter-concessions. 7 All of this intense 
diplomatic maneuvering demonstrates the kind of rivalry which 
existed among the great powers in the late 1 89 0s, but an 
event which took place in November I898 served to initiate 
a qualitative change in the scramble for concessions.
Although they were somewhat late in joining the imper­
ialist competition, the Germans from the late 1880s onward
began to exhibit a desire for a more adventurous policy in 
on
China. The Chinese initially refused to grant their re­
quests for a naval and coaling station, but the Germans con­
tinued to investigate possible sites and finally decided upon 
Kiaochow Bay on the southeast coast of Shantung as the best 
choice.^ The murder of two German missionaries in another 
part of Shantung in November I897 provided the opportunity
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the Kaiser had been seeking; and he immediately ordered his 
Par Eastern naval squadron to Kiaochow, On ^ January'1 8 9 8, 
the Chinese agreed to lease the bay and its surrounding; ter­
ritory for ninety-nine years.
Meanwhile, this new German presence in north China gave 
the Russians an additional pretext for occupying Port Arthur 
and Talienwan in December and seeking twenty-five year leases on 
both ports. By this time the British were becoming alarmed
and some officials began to argue for a territorial counter-
22poise and further commercial concessions from China. On
2 5 February 1898, Ambassador MacDonald advised London that,
according to Sir Robert Hart, the Chinese government, in an
attempt to counter-balance Russian pressures in the north,
would be prepared to grant Britain the lease of Weihaiwei if
28it appeared their offer would be accepted, J Yet, despite 
rumors that Germany was likely to take the port, Salisbury 
declined the offer, fearing that any such action would immed­
iately lead to the Russian seizure of Port Arthur. Even at 
this late date, in spite of an enraged British public, the
prime minister was hopeful of avoiding further territorial
oh.
carving up of the Chinese melon.
On 7 March, however, it was reported in The Times that 
Russia was threatening to send troops to Manchuria in order 
to enforce her demands for the lease of Port Arthur and Ta­
lienwan. Lord Balfour, at the time in temporary charge of
the government in Salisbury's absence, decided that MacDonald
2 ^should seek first refusal on a lease of Weihaiwei. J Fur­
thermore, it became clear in the days which followed that 
Russia olanned to occupy Port Arthur as a closed and forti­
fied port. A move of such grave political and strategic sig­
27
nificance called for a searching reappraisal of British for­
eign policy.
mhe Leasing of Weihaiwei
Lord Balfour was by no means the first person to focus
on Weihaiwei as a possible counterpoise to Russian and German
advances in north China. As early as December 1897, Lord
Curzon, then serving as under-secretary for foreign affairs,
warned of these incursions and suggested that Britain should
remain ready to occupy a piece of Chinese territory in the
2 6area if necessary. ' It was not until Russian intentions in 
Manchuria became even clearer, however, that Curzon was taken 
seriously and asked to draw up a more detailed statement of 
his position regarding Weihaiwei for submission to the Cabi-
4- 27net.
Paced with no less than a Russian seizure of Port Arthur 
and what would appear to have been a breach of faith with re­
spect to their intentions there, the British Cabinet was 
faced with some difficult decisions when it met on 15 March'
1898. The choice seemed clearly between allowing the Russians 
to lease Port Arthur and at the same time leasing Weihaiwei 
as a "makeweight," or insisting that they refrain from leas­
ing Port Arthur and promising not to interfere with Manchuria.
The latter alternative, of course, would require that Britain 
was willing to go to war with Russia, and possibly France and 
Germany, in order to force the evacuation of Port Arthur.
Acauiring Weihaiwei, on the other hand, would signify a com­
plete abandonment of the policy which called for maintaining 
Chinese territorial integrity and perhaps initiate a general 
free-for-all among the powers with respect to privileges in China.
28
However, the Admiralty had reservations about Weihaiwei's
2 fiviability as a naval base. Others, such as Francis Bertie,
in charge of the China Department at the Foreign Office,
though, argued that Weihaiwei would counter Russian and Ger-
2 o
man influence in the north.
In the end the British fleet was ordered to Weihaiwei 
and on 25 Inarch, after a long Cabinet debate, MacDonald was 
told to obtain "'in the manner you think most efficacious 
and speedy, the refusal of Weihaiwei on the departure of the 
Japanese.'" It was further stipulated that the terms should 
be similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur. In 
order to ensure German acquiescence, however, it was neces­
sary to make an official declaration on 20 April that:
England formally declares that in estab­
lishing herself at Weihaiwei she has no 
intention of injuring or contesting the 
interests of Germany in the Province of
Shantung or of creating difficulties for
her in that province. It is especially 
understood that England will not construct 
any railway communication from Weihaiwei 
and the district leased herewith, into 
the interior of the province.31
It would appear that Weihaiwei's commercial future was 
to a large degree sealed with this declaration, Yet, inter­
estingly enough, Baron Monk Bretton of the Colonial Office 
observed in a memorandum on Weihaiwei dated 1902 that there 
were certain parallels in this case with Hong Kong since ini­
tially there had been no railroad between the mainland of
that colonv and the province of Kwangtung either. Hong Kong's 
status as a free port, however, greatly enhanced its commer­
cial value, ^hus, he refused to rule out all possibility of
commercial development for Weihaiwei despite the assurances
22given to both Germany and the United States. We shall have
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occasion to examine this argument in the chapters which fol­
low.
One might well ask at this point how China was react­
ing to all of these territorial seizures. It is impossible 
to be absolutely certain what was in the minds of the Chinese 
officials called upon to negotiate the leasing of Weihaiwei. 
Earlier we have seen that the" Territory was actually offered 
to the British at a time when the Chinese were under severe 
pressure from the Russians with respect to Port Arthur and 
no doubt thought they could possibly play one side off against 
the other. When MacDonald finally did ask for the concession, 
however, he found a change of attitude. Writing to Salisbury 
on 2B March, he said:
At an interview lasting three hours I 
pressed request for lease of Wei Hai Wei,
Yamen greatly fear counter-demands of 
other Powers. They also state lease of 
Wei Hai Wei leaves them without a suitable 
harbour for their ships recently launched 
in England and Cermany, Would it be pos­
sible to meet latter objection by any agree­
ment for the use of the place by" Chinese 
men-of-war? Yamen showed, what is now pre­
vailing feeling here, great desire for Eng­
land's friendship and support against Russia, 
and if we could hold out any encouragement 
it would prevent the change of feeling which 
will be produced if we have to gain our end 
by force. I am to see them again in four 
days' time when I have requested final answer, ^
Salisbury did not object to this request but still the Chin­
ese stalled for time. MacDonald reported on another meeting 
of 31 March:
I saw Yamen today and gave them till Satur­
day for final answer, telling them that if 
not affirmative matter would be placed in 
Admiral's hands. I believe that if I could 
have a few days' more time I could obtain 
lease but that they will not grant it so 
nuickly. ^
Bv 3 April, however, the Chinese did agree to the lease.
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What can we make, then, of E-tu Zen Sun's belief, based 
on her reading of the Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao and 
other sources, that the leasing of Weihaiwei was neither the 
result of "muddle-headed diplomacy" on the part of the Brit­
ish nor a complete disaster for the Chinese? First, she main­
tains that Weihaiwei, far from being a useless spot, had quite 
a good harbor, ranking second only to Port Arthur, and the 
British decision to lease it was not a random one, Second, 
she points out that the proposal was not a novel one to the 
Ch'ing court, One group of Chinese high officials had even 
honed to establish more friendly relations with Britain and 
Japan in order to ward off the continental powers. These in­
cluded Chang Chih-tung, Liu Kung-yi, and Sheng Hsttan-huai, 
Chang was especially interested in having the British train 
the Chinese navy, Thus, Professor Sun states that the nego­
tiations were concluded in a matter of days and:
, , . we can be safe in our general deduc­
tion that when the British minister pre­
sented his demand for the lease of the 
harbor, the high officials at Peking were 
cognizant of certain sentiments in the 
country in favor of the lease and that 
the British were far from uncertain of the 
outcome of the negotiations,35
It should be noted here, however, that the situation 
may not have been quite as straight-forward as Professor Sun 
describes. Certainly the British ambassador was not overly 
confident that the Chinese would give in to his government’s 
demands. In a telegram to Bertie at the Foreign Office on 
1 April MacDonald complained about not having sufficient time 
to work out an agreement: "I will do my best but time is so
infernally short, Russia took 30 days. Cabinet give me 
seven," Furthermore, when the Yamen finally did consent
31
it was only after MacDonald had threatened them with mili­
tary action. Obviously, it would have been impossible for 
the Ch*ing government at that point to hold out against such 
overwhelming pressure. The negotiations were completed
quickly, but this does not in itself mean that the Chinese
. . . . . 37were pleased to have the British occupy Weihaiwei,
Ch'ing officials did succeed in having provisions 
written into the agreement regarding the right of Chinese 
warships to use the harbor and it was understood that Brit­
ish officers would help drill the men of these ships, Pro­
fessor Sun asserts that " . . .  this was considered more than 
a naval expedience by the officials who negotiated the lease 
with the British. The Tsungli Yamen regarded it as a success­
ful achievement in bringing the British closer to the dynas-
7 8
tic government."^ While this may be true, it must still be 
remembered that both Britain and China were being compelled
by the force of events to make the best of a difficult situa-
+. • 3ot i o n ,
One can agree with Professor Sun, however, that the 
British decision to lease Weihaiwei was by no means an arbi­
trary one. It was in fact the only suitable harbor in north 
China which they could have taken given the Russian presence 
at Port Arthur. Nor was the decision made hastily when one 
considers the lengthy Cabinet debates on the matter and the 
fact that the idea did not originate in March, Still, Lord 
Salisbury in particular would have preferred not to have used 
China as an arena for settling the issue of Britain’s inter­
national prestige. His desire was to keep China "in a peri­
pheral position where differences could be settled pacifi­
cally as a regional issue.
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Members of Parliament and the British press were in­
clined to see the acquisition of Weihaiwei as even worse 
than "muddle-headed diplomacy," however. The task of de­
fending the Cabinet's decision in the Commons fell to Arthur 
Balfour, Salisbury's deputy at the Foreign Office. In a 
Parliamentary debate in late April, Balfour responded to cri­
ticism that the occupation of Weihaiwei had been too little 
too late by saying that even if it remained unfortified it 
could be of great diplomatic value in Peking during times of 
peace and of strategic value in times of war. To the charge 
that Britain was abandoning the sacred principle of main­
taining China's territorial integrity he replied that there 
was a distinction between a sphere of influence and a sphere 
of interest and that the latter was legitimate. With respect 
to the assurances given to Germany, he responded that these
had been a matter of practical politics since Weihaiwei had
A 2
been taken for military purposes alone. Parliamentary
opinion on Weihaiwei appears to have been divided and could
be summarized as Lord Curzon did when writing to his wife:
"'General reception of our case fair, not enthusiastic.*"
Public opinion on the issue of Weihaiwei also seems
to have been divided if one reads letters to the editor of
^he ^imes published during this period. Commercial opinion
varied from those who saw the acquisition as a positive step
toward restoring British prestige to those who thought it
A 5
did not go far enough. * The Anglican bishop, Charles P,
Scott, however, was inclined to see it as very helpful for
L6missionary efforts m  China.
In the end one must conclude that Lord Salisbury’s gov­
ernment saw itself as having little choice but to acnuire
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Weihaiwei faced as it was by a threat to its diplomatic 
prestige, its military presence in China, and its commer­
cial position. If it was to have any influence on Peking 
with respect to north China given the new acquisitions made 
by Germany and Russia, a counterpoise in the north was re­
quired. Perhaps the most telling argument as far as Lord 
Salisbury was concerned, however, was the fact that an "en-
kn
raged English public opinion might demand war with Russia." 
Taking Weihaiwei, though it meant participating in the 
assault on Chinese territorial integrity, did prevent war 
and was seen as the lesser of two evils. It remains now to 
describe what Britain had actually acquired and what she in­
tended to do with it.
takeover from the Japanese
On 9 May 1 8 9 8, the Chinese government paid the final 
installment of its indemnity obligation to Japan for the war 
of 189^-95. Shortly thereafter, on 2k May, Japanese troops 
were evacuated from Weihaiwei and the Union Jack was raised 
to signal its takeover by Great Britain. The following is 
a description of the ceremony which took place that day to 
mark an occasion which happened to coincide with Queen Vic­
toria's birthday:
Then the British flag was hoisted alongside 
the Chinese already flying, the force pre­
senting arms, the Commissioners and all 
officers and men on the ground saluting, 
and the band claying 'God Save the Queen.'
This done, the Chinese National Anthem was 
played with the same formalities, and the 
ceremony ended with three cheers for Her 
Majesty the Queen and one for the Emperor 
of China.
Thus, with typical British formality, a small piece of 
Chinese territory became part of the Queen's empire. It
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should be remembered, however, that a careful distinction 
was made between Weihaiwei as a leased territory and a colony 
which would have been incorporated into the Dominions. Wei­
haiwei remained part of a foreign country within which Brit­
ain exercised legal jurisdiction but it was not a colony and 
the Chinese living there were not British citizens. The 
British government was anxious to preserve the myth of Chi­
nese territorial integrity and not set any precedent which 
might be followed by the other powers. Furthermore, it was 
stipulated in the convention that Weihaiwei was to be leased 
from the Chinese for as long as the Russians occupied Port 
Arthur. There was, then, a certain ambiguity in the lease 
which made the length of British tenure at Weihaiwei indefi­
nite and dependent upon Russian intentions in north China. 
This uncertainty was to remain a stumbling block to the eco­
nomic development of the Territory for thirty-two years.
In terms of size the leasehold consisted of 288 square 
miles of territory, although a British sphere of influence 
extended for an additional 1 ,5 0 5 square miles, from about 
halfway to Chefoo (Yen-t'ai) on the west to the Shantung 
promontory on the east. Britain had the right to erect for­
tifications and station troops in this area but it never had 
occasion to do so and its administrative jurisdiction was 
confined to the leasehold proper. In another respect the 
British acquisition was somewhat less significant than those 
of the Russians and Germans for they were granted no special 
mining or railroad concessions along with their new terri­
tory, As has been noted, however, the British were not the 
first foreigners to occupy Weihaiwei
35
According to several reports in the North China Herald,
during the three years Japanese forces were in the area the
occupation was extremely businesslike and military discipline
generally excellent. After describing a minor altercation
which occurred in November 1 8 9 6, one reporter wrote that*
, . . the above scene is not a common one 
here. During the occupation of Weihai by 
Japanese troops the writer has never before 
seen a squabble between the two nationali­
ties. The soldiers mingle in the streets 
and the market with the Chinese and very 
little friction occurs —  thanks to the 
good discipline of the soldiers and the 
easy-going nature of John C h i n a m a n . 50
It should be remembered, though, that the Japanese had in­
stilled considerable fear in the local population in January 
1895 when large numbers of troops marched along the coast
through villages and fields all the way from Jung-ch'eng to 
. 51Weihaiwei. That fear no doubt helped them maintain order
*52
m  the area m  the post-war period.
From the available evidence it seems highly unlikely 
that the Japanese continually encountered fierce resistance 
from the local people during their three years there or that 
it was this resistance which forced them in the end to leave 
as is suggested in one article published in the People's Re­
public of China.^ It appears rather that they maintained a 
relatively "low profile" at Weihaiwei, busying themselves with 
surveying the roads and the location of towns and villages 
in the area. Some suspected they intended to claim Shantung
as their own upon the break-up of China and were gathering
54-information that would assist them when that day arrived. 
Meanwhile, the countryside as far as 200 li from the walled 
town was apparently safe enough for some Japanese merchants
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to travel about selling their wares unconcerned about a 
hostile reception from the villagers, ^
It must have come as quite a shock to the local inhab­
itants when the Japanese left Weihaiwei and were replaced 
with yet another set of foreign intruders. Earlier in 1897 
when many Japanese troops were removed from the area, rumors 
circulated that they would soon leave altogether, that the 
old forts would be rebuilt, and that Chinese soldiers would 
occupy them as before. Farmers were even concerned that they 
should perhaps stop cultivating the land near these forts 
as they might soon be forced to anyway.^ Then in November 
of that year, after the Cermans had seized Kiaochow Bay, it 
was thought that the Japanese certainly had a good reason
for maintaining their hold on Weihaiwei and would most likely
57remain for some time to come. Yet this was not to be either. 
As we have seen, on 24 May 1898, the Japanese flag was 
lowered and the Union Jack raised to fly for a time along­
side the Chinese flag. In terms of numbers of troops, how­
ever the British presence on the mainland was miniscule com­
pared to the original 7,000 Japanese soldiers stationed there. 
In fact, the mainland was initially declared off-limits to 
the men of the fleet anchored at Liu-kung Island, As a pre­
cautionary measure in June it was decided to put 800 men ashore 
on the mainland carrying rifles with fixed bayonets, hauling 
two field guns, and led by a brass bandi The entire group 
then spent a day marching through the villages surrounding 
the town of Weihai as a means of "overawing" the people with
their superior military strength. Afterward they returned 
58to the island.
Again, in order to gradually, but effectively, assert
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their authority the British officials allowed the Chinese 
flag to fly on the mainland at Weihaiwei until 15 July at 
which time it was lowered and the Union Jack officially 
raised in its place, At the same time, both a British and 
a Chinese ship saluted the new flag and 300 British seamen 
were landed on the mainland as a signal that the Territory 
was indeed under Her Majesty1s jurisdiction.' Still, the 
local people remained unconvinced that these newcomers would 
in fact stay for very long. As one observer remarked; "Even 
intelligent men in Weihaiwei itself think and say; 'Oh, 
these English will only stay here for a short time. They 
intend to get the money for the buildings that are being 
pulled down, then they will up with their anchors and steam 
away not to return, No one would have guessed that this
was just the beginning of an occupation that was to last for 
thirty-two years.
Location and Physical Features
One of the first things a newcomer to Weihaiwei might 
have done upon arrival was to familiarize himself with its 
location. Looking at a map of Shantung, one can see that the 
entire area east of the leasehold to the tip of the promon­
tory was part of Jung-ch'eng hsien, while on the south it 
was bounded by Wen-teng hsien. The Territory was created 
from a strip of land ten miles wide along the coast and amounted 
to 288 square miles. It also included the Bay of Weihaiwei 
and adjacent waters and all of the islands in these waters. 
mhe boundary line was drawn from a point towards the south 
of the bay and continued in a semi-circle to the east and 
west. That section of the leasehold proper which originally
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belonged to Jung-ch' eng hsien was located east of a line 
drawn from the sea near the village of Sheng-tzu to the 
southern British border. The rest of the Territory had been 
part of Wen-teng hsien. Weihaiwei itself could be consid­
ered roughly equivalent in area to a small hsien or district
magistracy since each of the 107 hsien in Shantung averaged
6 1
about 520 square miles.
One of the first British officials to visit Weihaiwei
noted in a rather unfavorable report that it appeared to him
6 2to be a "colder Aden,"’ Indeed, if one had considered only 
the coastline as it might have looked from a ship anchored 
in the harbor, this would have been a fairly accurate descrip 
t.ion. The island of Liu-kung presented a particularly unin­
viting and barren landscape as its rocky hillsides had, over 
the centuries, been stripped almost bare of trees by the 
local population. It was 2^ miles in length, 7/8 of a mile 
in width at its widest point, and had a circumference of 5^ 
miles. On the southern, landward side of the island there 
was some arable land with a small town of about 300 houses 
and a population of approximately 1,500, mostly fishermen.^ 
As has been mentioned, it is the island of Liu-kung which 
actually creates the harbor at Weihaiwei and its two entrance 
^he total surface area of the harbor was estimated to be 
eleven square miles, could hold a large number of vessels of 
moderate size, and was considered easily accessible.
The coastline of the leasehold was quite extensive and
rocky in places, being some 72 miles long and featuring many
6 ^small sheltered coves. 0  The Territory also contains several 
ranges of rugged hills though none rises more than 1,700 feet 
A short distance over the border, however, in the Ku-yti hills
Source: Reginald f , Johnston, Lion and Dragon in Northern
China (London, 1910).
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to the southwest there are some peaks which rise above 3»000 
feet. Many of the hills in the northern portion of the Ter­
ritory and along the coast had at their summits the remains 
of stone-built signal stations where fires had once been 
lighted in times of war.
To the south of this range and opposite the area the 
British called Narcissus Bay there is a section of relatively 
flat land on which is found the town of Weihai. More moun­
tains extend south of the town and all of them are primarily
formed of granite and a kind of limestone used for building 
66purposes. They also contained white quartz, mica, and 
mineral deposits, including some gold, silver, lead, tin, 
iron, nickel, and copper. These deposits at first led to 
great excitement among early British visitors who saw possi­
bilities for mining. In the vicinity of the village which 
was to become Port Edward, site of the British Territorial 
headquarters, there were also natural sulphur springs developed 
by the Japanese and providing an added attraction for summer 
visitors to the area.
As Weihaiwei was a rather mountainous area with no 
extensive tracts of good agricultural land, it could be con­
sidered to have been fairly densely populated. The Terri­
tory^ approximately 315 villages, none of which could be 
called large, were not evenly distributed but were located 
in the valleys between hills and averaged three for every 
two square miles.^ Evidently, the interior of the Terri­
tory was a pleasant contrast to the barrenness of the island. 
Although trees grew abundantly only in the vicinity of vil­
lages or numerous burial-grounds, "the streams /were/ often 
lined with graceful willows and large areas on the mountain
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slopes ^/were7 covered with green vegetation in the shape of
68
scrub oak," There were hundreds of tiny streams through­
out Weihaiwei, some of which could become raging rivers dur-
69m g  periods of heavy rainfall, spreading sand over the soil. 7 
But, generally speaking# the area suffered from a lack of 
running water as these short streams were only swollen a 
few days a year and even then the water quickly ran into 
the sea. In winter and spring some of them disappeared al­
together. , ,
Climate
One of Weihaiwei*s chief assets is its exceptional cli­
mate, often regarded as the finest on the China coast. It
suffers neither severe temperature fluctuations nor oppressive
70humidity and averages about nineteen inches of rain per year. 
The rainy season extends through June, July, August, and part 
of September while the coldest months of the year are January, 
February, and March. Even then, though, the temperature 
rarely falls below 6° F. and the annual snowfall is usually 
very small. The hottest months of the year are June, July, 
and August but the temperature seldom rises above 9^° In
spite of this generally fine climate, Weihaiwei does frequently 
experience strong northerly gales which can last as long as 
three days. Likewise, the variability of rainfall, as else­
where in north China, makes agriculture always a gamble.
Principal Towns and Villages
As we have seen, there was a village situated to the 
southwest on Liu-kung Island where the British administrative 
offices were at first located. An Anglican missionary, the
^3
Reverend Roland Allen, wrote the following after his visit
there in 1898:
On the island close to the sea there is a 
fairly large village with several foreign- 
built houses fringing a long straggly wind­
ing street unevenly paved with stone. Of 
the houses some are held by Chinese store­
keepers, many are deserted, most dilapidated, 
a few practically ruins.
^he early administrators thought the only solution to these
unsightly and unsanitary conditions was to simply pull down
72most of the old houses. By 1902 the town had undergone
other changes as well. The parade ground doubled as a cricket-
pitch and the former Chinese yamen served as “Queen's House"
containing government offices, the Eastern Extension Telegraph
78Company, and the British post office, - The principal shops 
in the town included naval and military compradors and Japa­
nese souvenir shops and most were run either by Cantonese or
7kby Japanese shop-keepers. There was a new road in town 
which led from Queen's House and ran along the shore to the 
eastern end of the island, passing the nine-hole golf course, 
and ending at the East Battery where a new rifle range had 
been constructed. The marine camp where permanent barracks 
were to be erected was located to the west of the village 
seDarated by the cricket ground. Along the "bund" there were 
a few foreign business firms situated in small, two-storied 
houses and some newly-constructed bungalows for summer visi­
tors . ^
Across the bay on the mainland and to the north was the 
small fishing village of Ma-t'ou which had served as the port 
for the walled town of Weihai before the British came, but 
later became their administrative center and was renamed Port 
Edward, In 18Q8 this village of approximately 2,000 inhabi-
rp ^
tants was not considered very attractive. Reverend Allen
wrote:
Ma-t'ou is not a pleasing village. Its 
situation is pleasant, but it is dirty, 
smelly, and disreputable. It has only 
one long, straggling street, without in­
terest or beauty of any kind, inhabited 
mainly by sampan men; the Sampan Guild 
reckons seventy boats, used chiefly for 
fishing. Of late a few have been plying 
about the harbour to and from the fleet 
and the island,'
In contrast to those on the island, however, the houses in
Wa-t'ou were well built of stone with thatched roofs and
appeared more comfortable.
There were also some foreign residences at Ma-t*ou and 
the headquarters of the Chinese Regiment which had been formed 
in the summer of 189Q. The Regiment itself became an impor­
tant feature of life in the town as it "marched almost daily 
through the main street to the parade ground outside the east 
gate of the /walled7 city,"^ By 18QQ the Plymouth Brethern 
missionaries owned a Gospel Hall inside the village and next 
door a boarding house to which they hoped to attract foreign 
visitors, though Ma-t'ou was well located on the southwest 
side of the harbor where it was sheltered from storms, the 
water off-shore was too shallow for anything larger than sea­
going junks or small coastal steamers to anchor. Eventually 
there would be a ferry operating several times a day over the 
mile stretch of water between the mainland and the island.
In the early days, however, the Royal Navy assisted with trans­
portation between Ma-t'ou and Liu-kung Tao.
The largest mainland settlement was the Chinese walled
\
"city” of Weihai which remained outside Eritish jurisdiction
Rn
and contained approximately 3,500 people. As it was built 
on a hill, the well-preserved town walls were visible from the
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island and measured about four miles around, enclosing an 
area with considerable open space devoted to growing vege­
tables. One early observer noted that the "decaying" town 
contained only a few poor shops, some two to three hundred
small private houses, a temple, and the offices of a police
R1
magistrate and a minor military officer. It was certainly 
not a very prosperous place and remained a thorn in the side 
of successive British administrators as it sheltered numerous 
brothels, gambling and opium dens, and assorted disreputable 
characters,
Markets
^he Territory of Weihaiwei was very much an agricultural
Qp
area with a population in 1902 of around 128,000. Reginald 
Johnston, who served at Weihaiwei as a colonial official for 
sixteen years, notes that the British initially divided the 
Territory for administrative purposes into north and south divi­
sions. The north contained about 100 square miles and 84 vil­
lages while the south had 200 square miles and 231 villages, 
^here were six market centers all of which, except the town 
of Weihai, were located in the south.^ It was at these mar­
ket towns that the villagers sold their agricultural produce 
and purchased clothing, cooking utensils, and other household 
items. Foreign cloth and other imports had only a very limited 
market. Some farm animals were also bought and sold on regu­
lar market days, although it was at the annual fairs, or hui, 
where they changed hands in largest numbers. These fairs 
were important social and religious occasions for the villagers
where a great deal of incense-burning and exploding of fire-
84crackers took place.
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Judkins by the remarks in 1901 of one of Weihaiwei's 
earliest commissioners, Colonel A, Dorward, the walled town 
of Weihai was the "social and commercial centre of the Terri­
tory" and undoubtedly held the largest of the weekly markets, 
"thousands of the country people" were said to assemble there 
on market days and, as Dorward somewhat ruefully admitted,
were thus "continually reminded that Chinese jurisdiction has
83not entirely disappeared from their midst," ^ Over the years
a rather antagonistic marketing relationship had evolved be- . ,
tween the merchants of the walled town and Ma-t'ou and the
country folk. In a report made by Captain Johnson of the
Chinese Resiment and an Anglican missionary, Reverend H. J.
Brown, in 1^02 after a tour of the Territory it was noted that
the country people complained of being dealt with unfairly
by these merchants:
. , , for instance when the produce of the 
neighbourhood of these places and bought up
by the merchants was selling in the case of
beans at 300 cash a picul, the same beans 
from the country for rather tendered for sale
by a country man as opposed to a merchant of
Ma-t'ou), would only fetch 270 cash a picul.
Hence the well-known terms 'Weihai lang' and 
'Weihai yang* -- the 'Weihai wolves' being 
the inhabitants of Weihai, Ma-t'ou and the 
neighbourhood, who prey upon the 'Weihai 
sheep' or country people who are fleeced by 
them.86
The monotonous toil of Weihaiwei's farmers was relieved 
only by the annual fairs, local holidays, and occasional thea­
trical performances held in village pavillions or temples. 
Wandering troupes of actors could be hired at such times and 
the expense was met either by an individual who was enjoying
o 7
financial success or an entire village eager for entertainment.
k?
Local Crops and Industries
As has been noted, the amount of arable land in Weihai­
wei was relatively small and the local farmers were, therefore, 
extremely careful in cultivating it. The principal grain 
crops were wheat, millet, maize, barley, and buckwheat. Wheat 
was harvested around the end of June and beginning of July 
and this land then immediately replanted with beans. Most 
fields were farmed so as to yield three crops every two years 
and seldom allowed to lie fallow, though crop rotation was 
well understood. Vegetables were also grown extensively, in­
cluding: asparagus, onions, cabbage, garlic, celery, spinach, 
and sweet potatoes. Some fruit was cultivated such as apples, 
reaches, apricots, plums, pears, and melons. The diet of the 
local people was primarily vegetarian though supplemented by 
both dried and fresh fish and some pork. Rice was considered 
a luxury food.
Pishing was an important industry in Weihaiwei, Several
early military observers remarked: "Doubtless fishing is a
source of considerable profit to the inhabitants and in the
sheltered bays around the coast, acres of ground are to be
seen covered by nets, showing that this industry is extensively 
88pursued." In fact, when the British arrived at Weihaiwei 
its chief export product was salt fish which was sent by junk 
princioallv to south China.
There was very little in the way of handicraft industry, 
though salt-making, rope-making, boat-building, lime-making, 
and stone-cutting could be found on a limited scale. There 
was also a very small production of silk worms raised on the 
leaves of scrub oak to be found on the hillsides surrounding 
Weihaiwei. The cocoons were sent to Chefoo where they were
^8
manufactured into a coarse silk for which this part of Shan­
tung was known. For the most part, these other occupations 
were merely supplementary to a family*s normal farming activ­
ities. Thus, the British had come to occupy an area very 
much at the pre-industrial level of development. Their sub- 
seouent efforts to encourage trade will form one of the themes 
of this thesis.
In 1898 the Territory could hardly have been called 
flourishing, yet there are somewhat contradictory reports as 
to the degree of its poverty. Sir Frank Swettenham, who served 
as a colonial official in the relatively more prosperous Fed­
erated Malay States, stated emphatically that there was only 
one well-to-do family living in the Territory and that eastern 
Shantung was the poorest part of a very poor province. Large 
numbers of laborers, he said, owned no land and were simply
Qq
employed by other landowners for six or eight cents per day. ' 
Another observer from the Malay States, G. T, Hare, also com­
mented on Weihaiwei's extreme poverty which forced thousands 
to emigrate every year to Korea and Manchuria.^
Sir James S, Lockhart, who became commissioner at Wei­
haiwei in 1901, formed quite a different impression. Writing 
in 1^03, he said: "In my opinion the people though not wealthy
are far removed from poverty stricken, In my journeys through 
the Territory I have been struck by the healthy and well-
nourished appearance of adults and children and by the almost
°1entire absence of beggars," Lockhart had served as a colo­
nial officer for many years in Hong Kong and was not unfamiliar 
with conditions elsewhere in China, He was also unable to 
find evidence of large-scale emigration from Weihaiwei. Reg­
inald Johnston, another long-time resident of China, also
^9
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noted an absence of poverty at Weihaiwei.
The extremely healthy climate meant a generally low 
incidence of disease which certainly contributed to the fav­
orable appearance of the local citizens, Weihaiwei was also 
blessed in not lying close to the Yellow River which wrought 
havoc in the lives of those inhabiting western Shantung.
Though one could not consider the people here well-to-do, 
they did not seem to be subjected to the extreme conditions 
of poverty which affected so many other parts of China, 
Johnston characterized life in the Territory a s ,"quiet and
humdrum" with "no manorial system, no 'villeinage,' no land-
qq
lordism, no rack-renting."
Village Organization
Title deeds and tombstones in Weihaiwei villages indi­
cated that many of the people living there were direct descen­
dants of families who originally settled in the Territory as 
far back as the Sung, Yt5an, and Ming dynasties. Many vil­
lages still bore the names of these early families. Johnston 
comments: "As a rule we find in Weihaiwei either that each
village is exclusively inhabited by the people of one name, 
who are all inter-related and address each other as brothers 
and uncles and nephews, or that one 'surname' is in numbers,
wealth, and social influence greatly predominant over the 
o 4
others." Owing to the way in which Weihaiwei was settled, 
however, there were also descendants of immigrants who had 
come from other parts of China as military colonists or who 
had been transferred there by the government as a result of 
some political, social, or military problem.
Within single surname villages each family usually owned
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its own lands and also had rights to a common tract of pas­
ture land. It was expected to contribute to the maintenance 
of an ancestral temple, its tablets, a family burial ground, 
and any other land which had been reserved for the expense 
of religious ceremonies. If there were several surnames with­
in the village there would be several temples, burial grounds, 
and plots of sacrificial land. Individuals who wished to 
disnose of their land or mortgage it were obligated by long­
standing custom to first obtain the consent of their rela­
tives. These relatives, in order of seniority, had first 
option to purchase the land and, prior to the British occu­
pation, it was rare for any outsider to be allowed title to 
it. In fact, absolute sales of land in general were rare 
in Weihaiwei before the British arrived. It was assumed 
that no one would actually want to sell his land, and that hav­
ing to do so was unfortunate and perhaps even reprehensible. 
Deeds of sale, therefore, stated in detail the reasons for 
the transaction and bore the names of the village headmen 
and the lineage members who acted as witnesses and had been 
consulted throughout the negotiations even to the point of 
setting the price, Mortgages of land were much more common 
in Weihaiwei and usually resulted in subsequent redemption 
of the property by the owner. Here, too, the lineage mem­
bers played a ma.ior role, at times assuming the right of re­
deeming the land from an outsider even in the absence of the 
original mortgagor. Johnston discusses at length the liti­
gation with which he frequently had to deal in such cases.
Within each village a small group of elders under the 
leadership of a headman was responsible for village affairs 
but there was no regular village council. These elders were
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the most respected members of their community but their num­
ber could vary, Johnston writes:
When important matters arise, affecting 
the interests of the whole village, they 
discuss them in the headman’s house, or 
in a temple, or in the village street under 
the shade of an old tree. Nothing is dis­
cussed with closed doors. The whole vil­
lage, including the women and children, may 
as a rule attend a meeting of elders, and 
any one who wishes to air his views may do 
so, irrespective of his age or position in 
the village. The elders have few privileges 
that their fellow-villagers do not share, and 
the headman himself is only primus inter pares.
His authority, like that of the elders, is 
chiefly derived from his position as head of 
the family or clan.°6
Prior to British administration, the villages were sub­
ject to the local district magistrate who appointed a ti-pao, 
a sort of constable or watchman, for each village or group 
of villages and he served as the official representative of 
the government but received little pay and had virtually no 
power. He was in turn responsible to the village elders who 
actually managed local affairs. The elders were sometimes 
selected by the rest of the community, or nominated by the 
larger landowners, or occasionally self-appointed. They were 
not necessarily the wealthiest men in the village, nor those 
with the most education but supposedly demonstrated a certain 
native ability for the job. They received no salaries but 
were given small amounts of money by virtue of their role as 
collectors for religious ceremonies and for other services. 
Also among their duties were the imposition of fines, col­
lection of land tax, regulation of fairs, repairs to temples 
and wells, arranging transport for visiting officials, up­
keep of river banks and roads, and the organization of groups
97of crop-watchers.
52
The role of the ti-pao must have been very minor in­
deed, confined almost exclusively to making arrangements 
with the runners sent annually from the magistrate's yamen 
to collect the land tax. G, T. Hare remarked: "In this
part of Shantung the tribunals of the village elders have
practically no link with the district authorities and are
q 8
entirely self-governed."'’ It is interesting to compare 
this situation with that which James Hayes described in cer­
tain villages in Hong Kong. Here, too, the local people 
seemed perfectly capable of managing their own affairs with­
out interference from government officials As we shall 
see, this made the job of policing and administering the 
Territory considerably easier for the British.
Local management even extended to the promulgation of 
certain police regulations, or ts’un kuei, by the local el­
ders. These rules, which were usually kept in the ancestral 
temple or headman's house, did not carry any legal sanction, 
but depended on village enforcement for their authority. They 
varied considerably as to penalties but the offenses were 
much the same everywhere in the Territory and included such 
things as desecration of graves, usurping portions of the 
common pasture land, stealing crops or fuel, and other minor 
c r i m e s . M o r e  serious offenses such as housebreaking, 
assault, or murder, of course, were referred to a higher author­
ity for punishment.
In sharp contrast to the turbulent conditions existing
in so many areas of south China where banditry was common
and feuds often broke out among lineages, Weihaiwei was by
all accounts an extremely peaceful region and there was sel-
101dom any need to refer to these higher authorities. Though
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there was no official police force in any of the villages,
all of the adult males acted in a sense as policemen. As
Johnston observed: "The bonds of family and village life
are such that every male villager finds himself directly or
indirectly responsible for the good behaviour of someone
else. The bad characters of every village soon become marked 
102men." In serious cases a person could actually be expelled
from his lineage. Understandably, in such a closely-knit 
community an outsider was looked upon with considerable sus­
picion and even hostility until his intentions were determined. 
The British themselves were soon to be the object of this 
suspicion as we shall see in Chapter 2.
Weihaiwei, Chefoo, and the Economy of Shantung
Having briefly examined the internal social and eco­
nomic organization of the leased Territory, it might be well 
at this point to discuss its position within the economic 
structure of the province as a whole. As might be expected, 
this structure was to a large extent determined by the trans­
portation network available at any given time. For example, 
David Buck has described the economic geography of Shantung 
in the early nineteenth century as consisting of four trad­
ing regions with centers at the cities of Chi-ning, Lin-ch'ing 
("both along; the ^rand Canal), Tsinan, and Wei-hsien. Prior 
to 1850 the inland areas around Chi-ning and Lin-ch'ing were 
the most populous as well as the most prosperous areas in 
Shantung. In the second half of the century, however, several 
factors resulted in a shift of resources away from these
areas, especially Lin-ch'ing, and a stimulus to the economic
1 0 Bdevelopment of the Wei-hsien region in the east.
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The northwestern city of Lin-ch'ing suffered tremen­
dous devastation in April 1854 when it was taken by the Tai- 
ping rebels and then retaken ten days later by Ch'ing forces. 
Perhaps even more serious for the economy of the region than 
the fighting, however, had been the Taipings' closing of the 
Grand Canal to regular tribute grain shipments in 1853. As 
a result, many of the thousands of unemployed workmen turned 
to banditry as a means of survival and at times joined bands 
of Nien rebels active in the area until 1867. Complicating 
the matter even further was the fact that the Yellow River 
changed its course in 1855 flooding the wheat and cotton 
fields of northwestern Shantung. This, of course, caused 
great hardship but it also created new difficulties for trans­
port with much of the Grand Canal effectively blocked for 
most of the period up until 1950. The economy of north­
western Shantung was crippled by all of these events, al­
though Chi-ning and the southwest region where the Canal re-
104mamed open did not suffer as heavily.
Meanwhile, other factors were operating to stimulate 
the economy of the Wei-hsien trading system. This city lay 
in a rich and fertile portion of the North China plain and 
produced wheat, cotton, soybeans, coal, and silk. The hand­
icraft industry of the area was especially well known and 
included fine embroidery work and articles made of strawbraid. 
Other exports included glass, vermicelli, and bean cake which 
was used as fertilizer in the Lower Yangtze Valley. There 
was also an extensive coastal trade in salt and fish. In 
the late 1850s the town of Chefoo on the north coast of the 
Shantung peninsula was made a treaty port and the presence 
of foreigners by 1862 increased the demand for handicraft
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goods which had been adapted to Western standards. The com­
ing of the foreigners also meant improved coastal transport 
and this greatly aided the vermicelli and bean cake indus­
tries.10  ^ Both of these factors undoubtedly had an effect
on Weihaiwei. at least in creating a larger demand for wild 
106silk cocoons.
Indeed, some of the areas near Chefoo must have been
regular thoroughfares for an expanding volume of trade in
the late nineteenth century. As one observer remarked:
In this inn-yard of Laichow-fu /just to 
the west of Chefoo7 I counted forty-five 
animals at one time. There were carts, 
large and small, laden with goods of all 
kinds. Some were going west with bales of 
piece-goods, Manchester cottons, and woolen 
crloths, Some were en route for Chefoo with
native produce, straw-braid for England and
America, vermicelli for the south of China, 
great quantities of medicinal drugs, barks, 
and roots, and dye-stuffs, the saffron this­
tle, and indigo, besides miscellaneous ar- _ 
ticle.s for home consumption.10?
Another decision taken in the late 1850s also had an
impact on the economic growth of eastern Shantung and this
was the encouragement of Chinese emigration to Manchuria in 
order to offset Russian expansionism in the region. Many 
settlers and migrant workers passed through the port of Che­
foo en route to this new frontier and some undoubtedly came 
from Weihaiwei. As one scholar notes:
The opening of Manchuria . . . meant that 
for the first time during the Ch'ing dy­
nasty the Culf of Chihli became a thorough­
fare of commerce and travel rather than a 
barrier to the outside world. This naturally 
had an impact on the activity in the penin­
sular and eastern portions of Shantung.10®
Buck has observed that in the period under discussion 
Shantung could be described as divided both economically and 
politically along the lines of two ancient kingdoms from the
56
Warring States era (**81-221 B.C.). The area around Chi-ning 
roughly corresponded to the former state of Lu while the 
area around Wei-hsien corresponded to the state of Ch'i.
Ch'i was said to be more progressive than Lu in many ways 
and this could be seen in both political and economic en­
deavors. The fact that Chefoo was a treaty port undoubtedly 
contributed to this tendency toward republicanism, mass popu­
lar education, commercialization, industrialization, and West­
ernization. More than any other part of Shantung, the Ch'i 
region, from the nineteenth century on, experienced improved
transportation, population migration, and growth in both tra-
1 no
ditional and modern forms of commerce.
One must, however, qualify the statement that trans­
portation improved in eastern Shantung in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. The situation there and in the pro­
vince as a whole was still far from ideal, Baron Richthofen 
in his travels through Shantung in the 1880s observed: "’The
most striking reason for Shantung's failure to exploit its 
economic potential was , , . because in no province has trade 
and commerce had to contend with such difficulties of trans­
port and shipment as in this.'"110 Unlike other coastal pro­
vinces, it had few navigable rivers or inland waterways and 
this was especially significant when the Grand Canal became 
partially blocked. Its only important port at this time was 
Chefoo which was handicapped by a relatively shallow, unpro­
tected harbor and the fact that it was cut off from the rest 
of Shantung by a broad band of mountains. A canal dredging 
project between Tsinan and Yang-chiao-kou on the coast which 
was supported by salt merchants, general merchants, and offi­
cials in the lBoOs helped alleviate the problem to some
57
e x t e n t U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  however, the coastal steamer ser­
vice which grew up as a result of these efforts was discon­
tinued during the Sino-Japanese War.
Overland trade in eastern Shantung in the lS90s was 
severely handicapped by primitive roads and the absence of 
a railroad. Products such as bean cake, reed matting, silk, 
and strawbraid were transported by carts, wheelbarrows, and
mules over the 2 50 miles from the interior all the way to
112Chefoo at the rate of two miles per hour. Thus, in the
case of bean cake, for example, the price was doubled by the
time it reached Chefoo, Even the .journey from the major dis-
112tnbution center of Wei-hsien to the coast took six days.
Obviously, the development of Kiaochow Bay by the Ger­
mans beginning in 1398 and their subsequent completion of 
the Tsingtao-^sinan railway in 1904, had an enormous impact 
on the economic life of all of Shantung. Kiaochow, with its 
superior fifteen-mile wide harbor and location a full day's 
journey closer to Shanghai, was to give Chefoo some very 
stiff competition. And the railroad, of course, did much 
to reroute trade in this part of Shantung. In sharp contrast 
to the British at Weihaiwei, as we shall see, the Germans 
were keen to develop the commercial potential of their newly- 
acquired territory and regarded it in every way as a colony 
which they hoped would rival Hong Kong. During their brief 
occupation of the area from 1898 to 1914 they invested heavily 
in the area, transforming it from a tiny fishing village to
a modern city and first-class port. From 1898 to looo alone
114the leasehold received 23,280,000 marks in subsidies,
Those at Weihaiwei who would have been interested in 
promoting trade must have indeed been envious of Tsingtao
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with its far superior transport links. In 1898 the British 
territory was connected with the outside world only by in­
frequent steamer service and unpaved roads which were impass­
able at certain times of the year. The most common mode of 
travel in the interior was mule litter or wheelbarrow and 
transportation was to be a major issue throughout the British 
occupation of Weihaiwei. Having discussed the economic con­
text into which the British had moved in 1898, however, it 
remains now to investigate the political milieu in which they 
found themselves.
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Chapter 2
British Administration, ca. 1900-1910
The year 1^00 was an important one in modern Chinese 
history. Following the Hundred Days of Reform of 1898, the 
Ch'ing court, under the leadership of the Empress Dowager, 
had returned to a pattern of conservative domestic and for­
eign policies. Then in early 1900 a new wave of anti-for- 
eignism swept the country spear-headed by the "Boxers" who 
were even encouraged in their activities by certain authori­
ties in Peking. Interestingly enough, however, though other 
parts of Shantung experienced violent outbreaks of Boxerism, 
there is no evidence of their direct influence in Weihaiwei. 
yet 1900 also proved to be an extremely eventful year here 
as the British for the first time encountered serious local 
resistance to their occupation of the area.
As was noted earlier, the British takeover of Weihai­
wei had been gradual and rather low-key and may in part have 
contributed to the confusion which subsequently arose over 
such matters as the collection of taxes, the demarcation of 
territorial boundaries, and the general question of British 
intentions at Weihaiwei. Trouble began in the spring of 18°Q 
when proclamations were issued by the British forbidding the 
oayment of taxes to Chinese officials. Almost immediately 
counter-instructions were sent by the local Chinese authori­
ties to leading Weihaiwei citizens in private letters and, 
when no action was taken by the British, those authorities 
may have hoped that their opposition had been successful. 
Further incidents followed in which the Jung-ch'eng magistrate 
in particular t^ied to exert his authority over the leasehold, 
and it became necessary for Commissioner Dorward to request
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that local officials not carry their umbrellas of office
2
within the territory, except inside the walled town itself.
Boundary Disturbances
The thorny issue of boundary demarcation was also very 
slow to be resolved. Though it had been arranged in October 
1899 that Shantung's governor, Yttan Shih-k’ai, would appoint 
Chinese boundary commissioners to assist their British coun­
terparts with the project, YUan delayed his appointments un­
til Inarch 1D00, In the meantime, the situation within the 
Territory was deteriorating, In January Dorward issued two 
proclamations informing the people and the neighboring offi­
cials that British administrators had been appointed for the 
leasehold and that Chinese jurisdiction in the area was to 
be confined to the town of Weihai. The people were also told 
that from the beginning of 1°00 land taxes were to be paid 
to the British authorities at the same rate as previously 
and that no arrears would be collected in view of recent hard 
ships,
In March, however, rumors were circulated by "various 
men of the literati class" that the British were about to 
levy all manner of heavy taxes, even on women, pigs, and cows 
and as a result much discussion took place as to the advis- 
ability of refusing to pay. Village meetings followed, 
aooarently with the approval and even encouragement of the 
Wen-ten? and Jung-ch'eng magistrates, at which armed men 
gathered to begin drilling militia units and collecting funds
Li,
for buying arms and ammunition. Dorward broke up one such 
meeting and arrested three of its organizers, afterward hold­
ing his own meeting of village headmen to air grievances and
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restate British intentions.- Dorward wrote to the War Office
that the tone of this meeting was very satisfactory and that
he expected no more militia gatherings as these had been due
to "the ignorance and credulity of the people,"^ Unfortunately
for the commissioner, however, local difficulties were just
beginning. "The neighboring magistrates, for example, were
already busy informing Governor Yttan that the British were
7
collecting taxes far beyond the leasehold territory.
By 11 April the three Chinese boundary commissioners 
finally arrived in Weihaiwei led by Li Hsi-chieh, Tao-t'ai 
of Teng-lai-ch*ing Circuit. Li promptly informed Dorward 
that, acting under instructions from the governor, he had 
summoned a meeting of local leaders to explain to them the 
circumstances under which Weihaiwei had been leased and that 
he wished to await the results of this meeting before fixing 
a date to begin the demarcation. The commissioner* in turn 
told Li that he considered this action highly improper and 
that he at least wished to be represented at the meeting.
Li consented to this request but refused to come to any agree­
ment regarding the collection of taxes in villages along the
a
border, stating that he had no authority to do so.
Dorward subseauently learned that the Chinese commis­
sioners had held a secret meeting of local leaders and terri­
torial headmen in the walled town at which a fabricated treaty 
was produced which said that the British had no right to col­
lect taxes or exercise jurisdiction within the Territory. 
Dorward delivered a severe remonstrance to the commissioners 
for holding this meeting but continued to encounter delaying 
tactics from them when he attempted to set a firm date to be­
gin demarcation. Finally it was agreed that work would begin
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on 25 April, but the project even then had anything but an
auspicious start
At the outset the Chinese commissioners refused the
protection of the sixty soldiers accompanying the British
party and the two groups camped separately -- on opposite
sides of the border. Another indication of the spirit in
which the work was undertaken is the fact that the Chinese
commissioners told Dorward their orders from Governor Ytian
were to mark the bouncferies literally according to the conven-
1 0tion whether or not this meant dividing villages in half.
Both sides no doubt were quite aware of the difficulties 
this might cause, but the British decided to push ahead to 
secure a boundary and work out further adjustments later.
Events took a turn for the worse on 28 April when the 
British camped near the market village of Ts'ao-miao-tzu 
close to the southern border with Wen-teng hsien. People 
from the village began to appear at the camp insisting that 
they would not sell their land and refusing to allow any 
boundary stones to be set in place even when it was explained 
that no land was to be purchased. Six of the more obstrep­
erous villagers were arrested, though soon released, and the
11crowd dispersed. On the twenty-ninth, however, a hostile
mob of about two thousand assembled around the British camp
and the officer in charge, while sending for reinforcements
from headquarters, tried to deal with the people through the
Chinese commissioners who promised to issue a proclamation
12to them. There is no evidence that they did so.
mhousrh the Chinese commissioners at this point urged 
the British not to proceed with the demarcation, the officer 
in charge decided to carry on, feeling that delay implied
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timidity.1  ^ In the meantime, Governor Ytlan had wired Dor­
ward that the project should be stopped, that he would not
recognize the boundary already laid, nor accept responsibility
1^ +for any disturbances which might occur. Shortly afterward, 
on 5 May, the first actual violence took place in which a 
small British party of about fifteen men was attacked by a 
mob of fifteen hundred near the British camp. British rein­
forcements soon arrived, however, and the result was nineteen 
Chinese dead and a number of wounded, while five of the Bri­
tish party were also wounded.
When the British returned to camp, a letter was discov­
ered from the Chinese commissioners which disclaimed any re­
sponsibility for trouble which might arise. It was also be­
ing reported at this time that the commissioners and other 
Chinese officials were being detained in the village of Ta- 
t*ou by local residents who believed them to be cooperating 
in the sale of Chinese territory without government approval,^
From this same village came letters urging people to resist 
1 f
the British. The situation was ripe for further confronta­
tion .
Another attack occurred on a British camp on 6 May,
this time by about two thousand Chinese using firearms and
a small cannon. There were no British casualties but ten
17villagers died in the battle. Meanwhile the British con­
sul at Chefoo recommended that Dorward secure the release of
the Chinese officials and informed him that Chinese troops
18were on their way to the Territory. Fortunately, all of 
this ended without further bloodshed. British troops did 
secure the "release" of the Chinese boundary commissioners 
and avoided confrontation with the four hundred Chinese troops
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sent into the Territory by the governor for that purpose.
The two sets of troops apparently passed one another on the 
road and simply exchanged friendly greetings. The demarca­
tion was eventually completed on 17 May, though without Chin­
ese participation. It was not until early June that Gov­
ernor Yttan finally agreed to accept the boundary as definite 
after reappointing the Chinese commissioners to make an in­
spection ,
Although there is no way to be sure who exactly was re­
sponsible for these violent incidents, one British observer 
felt fairly certain that two influential families in the area 
were behind an effort to delay the demarcation so as to gain 
time to persuade officials in Peking that their districts 
should be excluded from British jurisdiction. When this 
failed, he strongly suspected that these families tried to 
prevent the Chinese commissioners from proceeding with their 
task. He also believed that the commissioners in turn became 
willing prisoners of the villagers and were then conveniently 
unable to assume any responsibility for the disturbances. 
Supporting this theory is the fact that trouble did not occur
until the district of Ts1ao-miao-tzu was reached where one
1 o
of the families lived. '
The available evidence also seems to indicate involve­
ment of the Chinese commissioners in efforts to delay the 
project and to misinform the villagers as to British inten­
tions. Their calling of the secret meeting in the walled 
town was only one of many instances where they were active 
in stirring up trouble. It is also very peculiar that the 
so-called "capture" of the commissioners by the villagers 
just happened to take place at the same time that they had
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written to the British party disclaiming any responsibility
for violence which might occur. Thus, when British troops
arrived to secure their release, the Chinese commissioners
were at first unwilling to leave with them, hoping to be
"rescued" by Chinese forces. At this time the headman of
the village also told the British that the commissioners
20were not being held against their will.
In the end, however, it was the villagers themselves
who suffered the most. They not only experienced the casu­
alties in the disturbances, but were also chastised by all 
of the Chinese officials involved. Some very self-serving 
proclamations were issued after the incident by Governor 
Ytlan and local Chinese officials which accused the people 
of listening to idle stories and causing trouble. One of 
these proclamations read as follows:
If parents make an agreement how should
their children dare to oppose it, I ask 
you villagers of Pao Hsin and Ts'ao Miao 
Tzu did I not frequently exhort you but 
you would not hear and so many of you were 
shot and there is no one to make good the 
loss -- you brought harm on yourselves to 
no purpose. Through listening to idle stor­
ies and received great injury. Surely you 
must know that it is a crime to create dis­
turbances . 21
It does seem strange, however, that no steps were taken by 
the Chinese authorities to bring the "guilty" parties to jus­
tice.
As for Ytlan Shih-kfai, though it is difficult to ascer- 
what he knew in advance of specific events at Weihaiwei, he 
did take part in the effort to delay the demarcation project 
as well as to confuse the situation somewhat by refusing to 
sort out the taxation problem or to instruct his subordinates 
not to collect taxes in the Territory when requested to do
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22so by Dorward m  April. His relationship with the British, 
though maintained with a veneer of politeness, is another 
example of his shrewd method of handling foreigners gener­
ally. His dealings with the Germans at Kiaochow were similar 
and displayed a keen knowledge of legal detail and bureau­
cratic maneuvering.2-^ In addition, as one author has re­
marked* MAn important technique Ytlan used to offset foreign 
power was to encourage gentry and popular activity against 
the foreigners, but he wanted responsible gentry control of 
this activity . . .
Another question which arises here is to what extent 
the Weihaiwei disturbances were related to the Boxer move­
ment. There is no evidence to suggest the existence of any 
Boxer organizations at Weihaiwei, nor was the violence there 
directed against missionaries who were very few in the area 
anyway. But it was anti-foreign and certainly bore some 
Boxer hallmarks such as the raising of local militia and the 
inflammatory role played by officials. It must also be said, 
however, that when the peak of the Boxer movement was reached 
in the summer of 1900, no further trouble occurred at Wei­
haiwei.2^ It does not seem, then, that the Weihaiwei inci­
dents were part of the Boxer movement, but rather were simi­
lar to disturbances which broke out in 1899 in both Kiaochow 
and Hong Kong's New Territories over the issues of boundaries, 
taxes, and land.2^
Early Administrative Structure
After this rather inauspicious start to their admini­
stration at Weihaiwei, the British encountered no further 
difficulties for more than a decade, in the interim,
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the Territory was run efficiently and peacefully with a bare
27minimum of staff and no permanent garrison. Though there 
had initially been elaborate plans to fortify Weihaiwei, it 
was announced in February 1002 that that decision had been 
reversed. The plan now was for the area to be classed as a 
"flyins naval base" which could be rapidly evacuated in time 
of war and in peacetime serve as a training ground, sana­
torium, and recreation area for the fleet,
The major reason for this shift in thinking seems to 
have been that almost the entire Board of the Admiralty as 
well as the Secretary for War had changed since 18Q8. Not 
only was it now regarded as too costly to fortify Weihaiwei, 
but it was also thought that the money could be spent far 
more constructively on ships. As the First Lord of the Ad­
miralty put it: "What we want are more ships, and every
penny that is spent on bricks and mortar and land fortifica­
tion, which could be spent on more ships, is money unneces­
sarily and badly spent. Every garrison that we have to lock
up hundreds and thousands of miles away from this country
28is an evil . . . "  It should be remembered also that this
was a period of considerable anxiety regarding "the German
navy menace" as well as the Russian-French Dual Alliance.
Consequently, there was a rapid rise in British naval exoen-
2Qditures and ship construction.
Initially, Weihaiwei had been under Admiralty control, 
but in lBQQ was transferred to the Army with Colonel A. Dor- 
war d , R.E. serving as both civil and military commissioner. 
Neither the Army nor the Navy was particularly eager to re­
tain control over the leasehold, however, and on 1 January 
1Q01 it was handed over to the Colonial Office, On 3 May 1^02
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James Stewart Lockhart became commissioner. Since he had 
had many years experience as a colonial administrator in 
Hong Kong, it was hoped that Lockhart would be able to de­
velop the revenue-producing potential of Weihaiwei, especially
by persuading Chinese to invest there, and thus lessening
30the burden on the Treasury. In this task he was assisted 
by what can only be described as a minute staff. Until 
1906 there were, in addition to the commissioner, a secre­
tary to the government, a financial assistant, two medical 
officers, three police inspectors and their assistants, one 
civil engineer, a Chinese clerical staff, and a small native 
police force. Obviously, the main responsibility for admin­
istering Weihaiwei remained with the commissioner, whose 
powers were similar to those of a colonial governor: "In
certain respects he was rather more of an autocrat than a 
Colonial Governor, for legislative powers were vested in him­
self alone (subject of course to disallowance by the king) 
and not, as in most colonies, shared with a legislative coun­
cil."^1
The Chinese Regiment
In the early days it had been thought that the defense 
of the territory would be in the hands of the Chinese Regi­
ment. In fact, it had even been envisioned by one officer
that Chinese troops trained at Weihaiwei could be used else-
32where when needed as were Indian recruits. This idea was,
of course, not acceptable to the Chinese government and it
was decided to employ the Regiment only within the leased
territory itself, though an exception was made during the
3 3Boxer uprising when it was sent to Peking and Tientsin.
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During its brief life the Regiment was a fairly con­
troversial organization, severely criticized by some and 
staunchly defended by others. At its peak in 1902 it num­
bered thirteen hundred men, but by 1°03 had been reduced to 
five hundred and by 1906 disbanded altogether. Most of the 
recruits came from Shantung, though several hundred enlisted
3 if . . .
from Tientsin and its vicinity.- The most severe criticism
leveled at the organization was its high desertion rate --
some eight hundred men over a period of three years.
As Commissioner Dorward explained, however, one-third
of these men deserted before the Regiment went to Tientsin
during the Boxer affair and another one-third after active
service there, Those who left before the force was sent to
Tientsin were apparently reluctant to fight against their
own people and feared for the safety of their families as
many had received threatening letters. In general, however,
Dorward found them very trustworthy and to have performed
admirably during the Boxer incident, Of the 385 who served
at that time, 23 officers and men were killed and 18 wounded,
while twenty percent of the force was presented with war 
8 6
medals. Some difficulties did arise in 1902 when the force
was greatly reduced in size and disbanded soldiers who con-
3 7tiuued to live in the area engaged in occasional banditry.
By 190^ 4- it had become increasingly difficult to recruit men 
to the Regiment as better nay could be obtained by emigrating 
to Korea, Manchuria, or even South Africa.
Village Headmen
In 1906 when the Chinese Regiment was completely dis­
banded, the police force in the Territory was expanded from
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twenty-one to thirty-six men. Many of the new recruits were 
former Regiment soldiers. Basically, however, the British 
chose to rely on the traditional system of village headmen 
for policing the Territory rather than scattering police sta­
tions throughout the area. As Lockhart noted in 1Q02, the 
latter system would have meant not only doubling the current 
grant-in-aid, but also having British police inspectors de­
pendent upon interpreters to communicate with the people which 
he felt invariably led to corruption and malpractices. Un­
like the situation in the New Territories of Hong Kong where 
local people, as merchants or laborers, had had some contact 
with the British for fifty years, prior to 18Q8 the villagers 
of Weihaiwei had no understanding whatever of British law or 
administrative methods. Maintaining the existing system of 
village organization for all of these reasons seemed to be 
by far the most practical means of local control.
The institution of village headman was discussed briefly 
in the previous chapter, but it might be well to make a few 
additional observations here since it was an important part 
of the British administrative system at Weihaiwei. As has 
been noted, village unity was based on kinship relationships 
and most of the villages were inhabited by people of a single 
surname. One observer remarked! "The senior representative 
of the senior branch of the family holds as a rule a dual re­
sponsibility; as the head of the family he is the natural 
arbitrator or judge in cases of domestic strife or petty 
crime, and as headman of the village he is held, to a limited 
extent, responsible by Government for the good conduct of 
his fellow villagers.
Before the British arrived at Weihaiwei many of these
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headmen had been "nominated" by the Chinese district magi­
strate to their semi-official positions and he retained the 
power to dismiss them. Normally* it was the senior repre­
sentative of the senior family in the village who would be 
selected but if this family were "passed over . . .  it /wag7 
generally because one of its members had misconducted him­
self or because its wealth and social influence /had7 passed
JL|. 1
to another branch." In theory, then, headmen were either
appointed by the magistrate or chosen by the villagers, but
in practice many of them fell into the position as a result
of their wealth, personality, or social prestige. Those at
Weihaiwei apparently held their positions by virtue of a com-
h.2
bination of these three factors.
The eminent sinologist Hsiao Kung-chuan in a general 
discussion of village leadership in traditional China has dis­
tinguished between official and informal leaders noting that
it was the latter who "had a much better hold on their fel-
_ , kq
low villagers than the ’official' headmen," Official lead­
ers, according to Hsiao were either elected by the villagers 
or appointed by the local government to perform specific 
duties, often acting as an administrative link between the 
village and the government. They were usually indistinguish­
able from their fellow villagers except insofar as they might 
possess more leisure time, a sociable personality, and the
willingness to subordinate themselves both to village gentry
and to local government officials. Informal leaders, on 
the other hand, "emerged into leadership by virtue of their 
special qualifications age, wealth, learning, kin status, 
and personal capacity. They were recognized rather than 
elected." J These peoole were generally treated with more
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deference both by the villagers and government officials
than the "elected" leader who depended upon the government
. . 46for his position,
Martin C. Yang observed that the function of these
two types of leaders often overlapped. At times they would
both deal with other villages or mediate conflicts between
families or lineages, but it was the official leader who al-
47wavs held a subordinate relationship to the informal one,
In fact, vang states: "no villager of social rank or much
self-esteem wanted to be an official, for he would lose face
in dealing with those who outranked him in authority but not
in social status. Besides, no one wanted to be at the beck
47and call of the government or to have to take orders."
It would seem that the clear distinction both Hsiao and 
vang make between official and informal leaders is not strictly 
applicable .to Weihaiwei before the British arrival, The vil­
lage headmen appear to have combined the two roles and to have 
not suffered loss of prestige through their liaison position 
with local government. It should, however, be added that the 
contact these men had with Chinese officialdom prior to the 
British occupation was by all accounts extremely limited. Per­
haps because this part of Shantung was geographically rather 
remote and by no means wealthy, villages were left to run 
themselves, relatively free of government supervision.
Furthermore, there were very few people in Weihaiwei 
who would have qualified as informal leaders by virtue of 
education or wealth,. Records show, for example, that in 
1°0° for the entire Territory of Weihaiwei there were only
90 degree-holders spread among 315 villages, and all but one
48of these held the lowest rank of sheng-yhan. Earlier
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Chinese sources indicate that during the late Ch’ing period 
neither Wen-teng nor Jung-ch’eng hsien had very many chin- 
shih or chu- ,jen degree-holders. From 1876 to 1903. for ex­
ample, there were 2 5 chin-shih in all of Teng-chou fu hut 
Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng had only one apiece. Likewise, 
from 1875-1903 there were 171 chu- .jen from Teng-chou fu hut 
only 7 from Jung-ch’eng and 12 from Wen-teng. This rela­
tively poor part of Shantung simply did not produce very 
many highly-educated people. Only 6% of the entire popula­
tion of roughly 1^6,000 in Weihaiwei in 1911 was even liter- 
60ate. The headmen, too, were "generally unahle to read, or
/had7 forgotten the few ’characters’ they ever l e a r n e d . " ^
We know also that the vast majority of Weihaiwei farmers
were very small landholders. In 1909  only 235 people owned
62property worth $5,000 or more-7 and this was at a time when 
the value of land had increased dramatically over 1898 levels. 
One must conclude, therefore, that the role of headman in 
Weihaiwei villages, which usually was equivalent to lineage 
head, undoubtedly carried with it more prestige than might 
have been the case in a wealthier, better-educated region 
of China.
It was accordingly vital for the new British government 
to establish a good relationship with village headmen. Ini­
tially, the government simply registered all headmen and
thereby officially recognized their leadership role within 
63the village. These men were expected, when called upon to
do so, to produce any villager summoned by the government
and were held generally responsible for the maintenance of
< L\,
peace and good order m  their areas. They were also re­
quired to collect the land tax on behalf of the government,
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to communicate official notices to their fellow villagers, 
and to register deeds of sale and mortgages. J Like the Chi­
nese government at this time, however, the British did not 
pay the headmen for their services. They continued to re­
ceive only a small commission from the people for collecting 
taxes or settling minor disputes. ^
Lockhart was generally pleased with this system, noting 
in 1 9 0 2:
There have been instances in which Headmen 
have not evinced too great an eagerness to 
cooperate with the authorities, but on the 
whole the result of the working of the system 
has justified the favourable anticipation I 
formed regarding it and it is hoped that the'
Headmen may be encouraged to efficiently dis­
charge their duties by rewarding such as dis­
play especial zeal,57
In fact, in 1904 during special Coronation Day ceremonies all 
the village headmen assembled at Port Edward and those chosen 
as most zealous in their work were given medals. The entire 
group was then entertained at a banquet and allowed to in­
spect the fleet anchored in the harbor, ^
The British seem to have been very well aware of tradi­
tional Chinese techniques for maintaining order and encourag­
ing virtuous behavior. Medals or carved complimentary tab­
lets called pien were presented to headmen on other occasions 
such as the rescuing of crews and cargoes from junks wrecked 
on Weihaiwei shores. ' Commissioner Lockhart, however, was 
careful in all cases not to exaggerate the importance of 
these rewards and thus instill an inflated sense of the in­
dividual’s position within the community.^ Ultimate govern­
ment authority remained in British hands, for just as the 
commissioner could bestow rewards on headmen, he could, if 
offended for some reason, also cancel a headman’s official
35
position or withdraw his medal.
An important qualification of the headman system was 
made in 1906 when it was decided to divide the Territory into 
new administrative districts. Under the new plan the two 
main areas known as the North and South Divisions were re­
tained but within these twenty-rsix new subdistricts were 
created. The North Division contained nine of these districts 
as well as Liu-kung Island and Port Edward and was under the 
jurisdiction of the North Division magistrate who was also 
secretary to the government. The South Division contained 
all the rest of the Territory and was administered by the 
South Division magistrate or district officer, a newly-created 
post. This officer's duties were formidable when it is re­
membered that his entire police force for some 2U1 villages 
consisted of a sergeant and seven men, all Chinese. The dis­
trict officer was also assisted by a Chinese clerical staff, 
but during most of the British period at Weihaiwei there were 
no other European officials resident in the entire area.
Perhaps as a means of streamlining the government's 
system of liaison with villagers it was decided at this time 
to establish a new position known as district headman or 
tsung-tung. Each of the twenty-six subdistricts had a district
headman which meant that, upon average, he was responsible
6 2for twelve villages. This man, like a village headman,
was chosen by the villagers in his district and "confirmed"
by the government, receiving a chih-chao or official certifi­
es qcate of his appointment,' Unlike the village headmen, how­
ever, he received a salary from the government of $5 per 
month ‘as well as a small percentage on the sale of govern­
ment deed forms for which a fee was charged. District headmen
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also received "in less regular ways occasional presents, con­
sisting chiefly of food-stuffs, of which the Government /took7 
no notice unless it /appeared/" that he was using his posi-
6ktion as a means of livelihood or for purposes of extortion." 
These men were expected to attend regular quarterly meetings 
with British administrative staff in order to be informed of
government decisions and to communicate their own views as
66well as those of their fellow villagers. J It was hoped that
the new district headmen would identify their own interests
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more closely with those of the government and the custom 
of awarding tablets or medals for outstandingly meritorious 
behavior was extended to include them.
Many of the duties formerly performed by village head­
men were now assigned to the district headmen. They were 
renuired to supervise the collection of land taxes in their 
respective areas, distribute to village headmen copies of 
all notices and proclamations issued by the government, as 
well as retain a copy in a book for themselves, distribute 
deed-forms to purchasers and sellers of property, and to
"use /their7 influence generally in the interests of peace
68and good order and in the discouragement of litigation."
It is not altogether clear whether this modification to the
traditional village authority structure in itself diluted
the prestige of village-headmen. One observer, however, did
note in l^lO!
The position of headman is not altogether 
enviable and there is little or no competi­
tion for the filling of a vacancy. Some­
times, indeed, it is only after a village 
has been threatened with a general fine that 
it will make the necessary recommendation.
This is especially the case since the estab­
lishment of British rule, for Government shows
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-- or did show -- a tendency in Weihaiwei 
to increase the headman's responsibilities 
without giving him any compensating advan­
tages. The headman, as such, has no very 
definite authority over the individuals of 
his village, but every individual is bound 
by rigid unwritten law to conform to the will 
of the major et sanior pars and to fulfill 
his duties to the community even if they in­
volve his own discomfort.69
Thus, it would seem, just as Martin C. Yang observed 
that the closer the relationship between a local leader and
the government, the less prestigious and desirable that lead-
. . 70er's position became. The British at Weihaiwei faced a
kind of subtle resistance to their attempts both to bind the 
local authority figures more closely to government as well 
as to increase their responsibilities. The new system was 
not without its problems. One official noted in 1907, for 
example, that of the twenty-six district headmen appointed 
only nineteen remained in office and several of those removed 
had proved untrustworthy.' Still, it never became necessary 
to abandon the scheme or even to make major changes in it.
The task for the British authorities was to perform a diffi­
cult kind of balancing act. On the one hand, they were de­
pendent upon the traditional headman system to help them main­
tain control in Weihaiwei villages and thus did not want to 
make any dramatic changes which would upset this system. On 
the other hand, British notions of what constituted efficient, 
responsible local government led them necessarily to insti­
tute certain reforms and to attempt to play a bit more active 
role in village life than Chinese officials had apparently 
done in the past. It remains to be seen how successful they 
were in preserving what they regarded as a basically sound, 
even admirable^ traditional way of life while at the same time 
gradually introducing some modern reforms which they thought
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would enhance that way of life and consolidate their own 
authority over it.
The Administration of Justice
One area in which the British quite consciously com­
bined Chinese and Western practices was in the administration 
of justice at Weihaiwei. In this matter the British magi­
strates were guided by the Weihaiwei Order-in-Council of 
July 1001, local ordinances issued by the commissioner, and 
the statute law of England, Though the Order-in-Council pro­
vided that both criminal and civil cases were to be decided 
in conformity with English law, it also specifically stated 
that ". . , in civil cases between natives the Court shall 
be guided by Chinese or other native law and custom, so far
as any such law or custom is not repugnant to justice and 
72morality." In fact, Chinese law and custom were the basis 
for most legal decisions taken in civil cases at Weihaiwei.^
After 1906, as has been mentioned, there were two Brit­
ish magistrates residing in the Territory, one responsible 
for the North Division and one for the South and each pre­
sided over his own independent court. Their duties were ex­
tremely wide-ranging and have been described as follows:
The functions of the North and South Division 
Magistrates are quite as miscellaneous as are 
those of the prefects and district-magistrates 
-- the *father-and-mother* officials -- of 
China, There are no posts in the civil ser­
vices of the sister-colonies of Hong Kong and 
Singapore which are in all respects analogous 
to those held by these officers? but on the 
whole a Weihaiwei magistrate may be regarded 
as combining the duties of Registrar-General 
(Protector of Chinese), Puisne Judge, Police ^
Magistrate and Captain-Superintendent of Police.
^he crime rate at Weihaiwei, especially in the early 
years, was remarkably low with serious crime almost non-
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existent. The district officer and magistrate for the South
Division remarked in 1910 that there had not been a single
case of murder for at least seven years and that most of the
piracies and burglaries in the area were committed by Chinese
7 Snot resident m  the territory, ^ In fact, a good deal of
the police work at Weihaiwei was concerned with minor gam- 
7 ^bling offenses. '
The British magistrates also had unlimited civil jur­
isdiction and it was in this area that their case load steadily 
increased. There were no other regular courts in addition 
to the magisterial ones, although the Order-in-Council had 
provided for a "High Court of Weihaiwei."^  This body very 
rarely sat but when it did it consisted of the commissioner 
and a judge or either of them sitting separately. The assis­
tant judge of the British Supreme Court at Shanghai was the 
person designated to serve at Weihaiwei when necessary, but
from approximately lQO^ f- to 1910 he heard less than ten cases
7 8of either a civil or criminal nature. There simply were 
not sufficient resources to support a resident judge at Wei­
haiwei, though in fact the magistrates themselves were sanc­
tioned by the Order-in-Council as exercising the High Court's
authority and were, therefore, acting as judges whenever they
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made a legal decision.
The Court of Appeal from the High Court of Weihaiwei 
(or, in practice, from the magisterial courts) was the Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong, By 1910t however, not a single appeal 
had been made to that court. The reasons were quite straight­
forward. First, there were no lawyers at Weihaiwei who might 
advise their clients to appeal. Those who were involved in 
a suit had to either present their case orally or by means
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of a written petition. Furthermore, it was up to an indivi­
dual who lost a case to show cause why a rehearing should be 
granted. Second, only a very small number of people in the 
territory could have afforded the cost of an appeal to a 
Hong Kong court. One observer noted: "It is questionable
whether, outside Liukungtao and Port Edward, there are more
than a dozen families that would not be totally ruined if
8 0called upon to pay the costs of such an appeal." The third
reason was simply that very few Chinese in the Territory were
81even aware that it was possible to make an appeal,
A question which immediately comes to mind, then, is 
whether or not the judicial system at Weihaiwei could be con­
sidered adequate to the needs of the community. The former 
Commissioner and District Officer Reginald Johnston was keenly 
aware of his somewhat peculiar position as both judge and 
jury at Weihaiwei. Though he thought the existing system 
worked well enough, he also realized that it was impossible 
for him to decide cases with absolute impartiality since he 
was responsible for doing both the preliminary investigative 
work as well as arriving at the final judgment in each case.
It was always conceivable that a different judge might decide
a case in another way, but it was up to the magistrate to
choose which cases should even be referred to a judge. Clearly,
it was impossible to have him review every decision. The
82paper work alone would have been completely unmanageable,
If one compares the judicial role of the British magi­
strate with that of a Chinese hsien magistrate, however, it 
is clear that their wide-ranging responsibilities were very 
nearly identical. Ch'tl T'ung-tsu has made the following ob­
servations regarding Chinese magistrates during the Ch’ing
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period: "The magistrate heard all cases in his area, civil
as well as criminal. But he was more than a judge. He not 
only conducted hearings and made decisions? he also conducted 
investigations and inquests, and detected criminals. In terms 
of modern concepts his duties combined those of judge, pro­
secutor, police chief and coroner,"^
Both Chinese and British magistrates had difficult 
jobs. Prior to the British arrival at Weihaiwei there had 
been only one court for an area much larger than the entire 
merritory. Petitions at that time were heard only six days
per month and exorbitant fees were charged for even this very
84limited service.' It took very little time for the Chinese 
to recognize that the British were offering them a substan­
tially improved system of judicial administration. Not only 
was the magistrate's court open every day, but it was also 
free. As one observer remarked: "The people have discovered
that even their most trifling disputes are more easily, quickly 
and cheaply settled by going to law than by resorting to the
traditional Chinese plan of invoking the assistance of ’peace- 
R ^
talkers' . . ." These "peace-talkers" were usually elderly 
relatives, village headmen, or neighbors whose efforts had 
to be suitably rewarded with costly food and wine. Further­
more, since there were no lawyers in Weihaiwei and initially 
no court fees, the only expense which a litigant might incur
was the small charge made by a licensed petition-writer for
86drawing up the petition. In 1907, however, after many cases
of bribery and extortion, it was decided to abolish this sys-
. . .  . 87tern and to revoke all of the petition-writing licenses.
Instead, those litigants who were illiterate and had no rela­
tive who could write petitions for them were allowed to plead
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their cases orally.^
As one might imagine* this innovation greatly increased
the British magistrate’s work load for he now had to actually
listen to a large amount of testimony which was often trivial,
80repetitious, or irrelevant. There was also, until roughly 
the year 1913* a considerable backlog of civil cases at Wei­
haiwei due to the costliness and unavailability of judicial 
services prior to 18o8,^° Complicating the matter even fur­
ther was the fact that many title deeds for land had been de-
01stroyed by the Japanese in 1895.' As one district officer 
remarked in 1913* the decline in litigation noted for that 
year was due both to eliminating the backlog and also to the 
growing prosperity which the inhabitants experienced under 
British rule: "Here, as elsewhere, there is no more prolific
breeder of strife and lawlessness than Poverty, and now that 
improved roads and shipping facilities have made the market­
ing of his surplus more certain and profitable for the peasant,
he is less liable than before to suffer destitution and its
92consequent temptation."7
Another factor which undoubtedly contributed to the re­
duction in law suits by this time, however, was the imposi­
tion in 1909 of a $2.00 petition fee. The magistrates had 
found themselves inundated by trivial cases which consumed 
far too much time simply in hearing oral evidence. Thus, it 
was decided to have salaried government petition-writers and
to charge a fee for each petition. In 1Q13 it was neces-
oA
sary to raise the fee to $3.00. Yet even this increased 
amount seems small when it is remembered that prior to the 
British occupation of Weihaiwei a litigant in a hsien court 
might have encountered as many as ten different fees in the
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°5process of having his case heard.''
In addition to reducing the work load, there was another 
important reason for the introduction of fees. The British 
recognized that villagers were bringing all of their dis­
putes to the magistrates’ courts for settlement which was 
in turn undermining the authority of the village elders and 
weakening the entire rural social structure. It seemed essen­
tial, therefore, to discourage excessive litigation and pro­
tracted ouarrels as well as to bolster the traditional vil­
lage authority structure upon which the British were so de- 
06pendent, It is interesting to compare this decision with 
the situation described by Martin G, Yang in Taitou, a vil­
lage near Tsingtao, in the 1930s, Here the Nationalist ad­
ministration sought to "modernize" many aspects of rural life 
by assigning new duties to official leaders and in the pro­
cess inevitably diminished the role of unofficial leaders.
As Yang observed!
The old type of chwang-chang does not fit
the new reauirements, and trained people
are replacing him. This has had its effect 
on the old pattern of subordination to the 
laymen leaders, who observe this change with 
a good deal of resentment. The old assurance 
of their status is gone and in the present 
insecurity lies the core of much of their an­
tagonism to the new government,0?
British success at Weihaiwei undoubtedly owed much to their
efforts to adapt themselves to their Chinese environment rather
than attempting to institute radical change.
Nowhere is this process of adaptation more in evidence 
perhaps than in the role of the British magistrate and dis­
trict officer. As was noted earlier, the duties of these offi­
cers very closely approximated those of a Chinese hsien magi­
strate. They came to carry out their duties in a very Chinese
9k
way and were responded to by the local people almost as if
they were Chinese officials, though, after a time, with con-
Q Rsiderably less fear,- As Reginald Johnston noted:
. , . the chief qualifications necessary 
for a judge or magistrate are not so much 
a knowledge of law and legal procedure as- 
a ready acquaintance with the language, 
customs, religious ideas and ordinary mode 
of life of the people and an ability to 
sympathise with or at least to understand 
their prejudices and points of view.
There is a striking similarity between Johnston's view of
his job and the advice given to local officials in one of
the most famous Ch'ing administrative handbooks, the Tso-chih
yao-yen by Wang Hui-tsu:
The primary study for a legal secretary is 
to know the code, but skill in its applica­
tion depends still more on being in sympathy 
with the ways of the people. Now as customs 
often vary from place to place, it is essen­
tial to find out all about them without pre­
conceptions, and make it your chief concern
to abide by "them. If you never act on a
penal law or an edict without first seeing
that it does not conflict with what local
custom values, then there will be harmony 
between yamen and people, the magistrate's 
fame will spread, and his secretary's pres­
tige will increase accordingly . , ,100
Clearly, the legal secretary's role in traditional
China was an immensely important one. Many scholars have
commented upon the way in which the magistrate was dependent
upon his assistant's more detailed knowledge of the law codes
and the written case summaries that he would provide in ad-
101 . .vance of court hearings. The division of labor at Weihai­
wei between the district officer and his staff was somewhat 
different. Johnston noted that in 1Q04- it became necessary 
for him to remodel the judicial procedure in the Territory 
in order to reduce the opportunities for extortion which ex­
isted for his staff. As he remarked at that time: "The
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greatest vigilance on the part of the Magistrate cannot en­
sure that no money is passing from plaintiffs and defendants 
into the hands of his Chinese subordinates and it is all but 
impossible to make litigants understand that bribery of un­
derlings does not and cannot have the slightest effect upon
102magisterial decisions." He, therefore, insisted that all 
petitions be brought directly to him by the petitioner in 
person and for this purpose he kept his house and his court 
open at all times. The major responsibility for reading peti­
tions or listening to evidence, then, remained with the magi­
strate and not with his Chinese staff. In 190^ he was assisted 
by an interpreter who was also the chief clerk, two Chinese 
writers, and four yamen-runners. In the investigation of 
crime he was aided by a European inspector and his Chinese 
detectives in the rural areas and two European police inspec­
tors who supervised a small police force for Port Edward and 
the island.
Obviously, a thorough knowledge of both written and 
spoken Chinese was a vital prerequisite for anyone serving 
as district officer at Weihaiwei. Court proceedings, for ex­
ample, were all personally conducted by this official and it 
was his responsibility to ferret out the "plain unvarnished 
truth" from witnesses involved. In this difficult task it 
was knowledge and experience of Chinese "peculiarities of 
thought and speech" which proved most important and for a 
foreigner this undoubtedly took time to acquire.
Johnston was especially concerned that the British offi­
cer have time to personally visit the sites of disputes 
brought to his attention so that the Chinese would come to 
view British methods as "rigidly just."10  ^ Conscientious
96
Chinese magistrates, of course, also conducted personal in­
vestigations and in some cases, such as homicide or robbery,
06
were obligated by law to do so. One innovation for which
Johnston was responsible, however, was the petition-box, a
locked letter-box which he set up beside a road in the South
Division so that anyone who was afraid that he would not
otherwise have direct access to the magistrate or who did
not want to openly accuse a neighbor or a relative would feel
107free to address the district officer in this manner.
Since serious crime was uncommon in Weihaiwei, it was 
civil cases which occupied most of the magistrate's time.
^hese cases commonly involved questions of debt, encroach­
ment on land, redemption of mortgages, tombstones and ances-
1 n R
tral tablets, marriage contracts, inheritance, and adoption.
A good deal of the magistrate’s time was also taken up in
resolving relatively trivial family q u a r r e l s , F r e q u e n t l y
he was called upon to give an authoritative decision in such
matters simply because the village headman or friends and
110relatives of the parties involved could not. Again the
British district officer was called upon to serve not as a 
Western administrator carrying out the letter of the law but 
rather as a Chinese "father and mother official" embodying 
Confucian values and promoting harmony among the people.
Thus, for example, he was often involved in taming village 
shrews since wives in Weihaiwei were frequently much older
111than their husbands and the source of considerable difficulty. 
Johnston took his role as teacher of virtue quite seriously 
and, as he observed in 1 9 1 0, "frequently, in delivering 
judgments in both civil and criminal cases, used appropriate 
texts taken either from the Confucian classics themselves or
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from the Sacred Edict, for the purpose of giving /his7 hear­
ers little moral discourses on points suggested by the cases 
before /him/ . " * ' 1' 2
Some of the more difficult cases which arose in Weihai­
wei were disputes over land ownership especially when the 
title deed was missing or not in order. To avoid inflicting 
hardship on those occupying land "illegally" in such cases
the magistrate would often have to refrain from interpreting
111the law strictly, J Here was an important area for the ex­
ercise of magisterial discretion in the interests of justice 
and harmony, both of which were highly valued by traditional 
legal advisers such as Wang Hui-tsu.
Thus, it would appear, judging by the number of cases 
brought forward and the willingness of the Chinese to accept 
the district officer*s decisions, that judicial administration 
was one field in which the British adapted themselves quite 
well to the local environment. In fact, one might even argue 
that the British provided a more efficient and certainly less 
expensive legal system than had the Chinese before them. It 
is interesting that they were able to operate with such a 
tiny staff even while attempting to make the yamen as acces­
sible as possible. Citing a memorial of 1827, Chfti T'ung- 
tsu, for example, notes that in a small hsien in Shantung 
several hundred government runners were employed. In the
11U'rural territory of Weihaiwei in 100^ there were only four.
The British magistrate was in a considerably less vul­
nerable position than his Chinese counterpart and this con­
tributed to his efficiency. The Chinese official, who also 
ooerated without clear legal guidelines for many of his de­
cisions, was constantly in danger of offending someone and
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having ugly rumors circulated to his supervisors regarding
his job performance. As John Watt has noted, he was in a
sense "ringed by ill-wishers" who were "waiting to exploit 
11every mistake." v It is easy to see why some hsien magi­
strates actually feared the entanglements that litigation 
could bring- and preferred to let cases pile up rather than 
risk taking an unpopular d e c i s i o n , I n  this connection, 
as has been mentioned, the British encountered a considerable 
backlog,of civil cases when they arrived at Weihaiwei, The 
British district officer, on the other hand, was accountable 
only to the commissioner, except in the rare cases when his 
legal decisions were appealed to a higher court. Local bul­
lies, corrupt clerks, or influential family leaders, there­
fore, had little power over him and he could feel free to 
handle local disputes with dispatch.
Likewise, one might argue that the British magistrate 
in the Ions: run was perhaps even more familiar with his locality 
than the Chinese magistrates would have been since he stayed 
at his post much longer. Some Ghinese officials were eli­
gible for transfer to another area after serving less than 
117three years, Johnston served at Weihaiwei a total of six­
teen years, while Lockhart served nineteen, and J, H. Walter 
eleven. Their wealth of experience and command of Chinese 
after so many years undoubtedly made the Colonial Office loathe 
to transfer them elsewhere.
Early Fiscal Administration
Like a Chinese magistrate, the British colonial admini­
strator regarded revenue collection as an extremely important 
part of his job. Yet from the earliest days there were never
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any illusions on the part of the British concerning the amount
of revenue they could expect to obtain at Weihaiwei. It was
estimated in 1900 that an annual income of about £ 6 ,0 0 0
could be derived with the introduction of certain new levies,
since the land tax for the area had been fixed at £.1 ,5 0 0 in
the reign of the K'ang-hsi Emperor (r. 1661-1722) and had
118never been increased. Furthermore, the land at Weihai­
wei was considered among the lowest in value of all the
11°assessed land m  China,
Although taxes were assessed in silver, in this part
of China they were paid primarily in copper cash, combined
with the occasional silver tael, Mexican dollar, and small 
120silver coins. In 1901 the British collected the tax at
a rate less than half that at which the. Chinese authorities 
would have imposed simply because they used the market ex­
change rate for converting silver taels to copper cash rather 
than the exchange rate normally used for land taxation. This 
meant that instead of collecting at a rate of 2^00 cash to
the tael, the British collected at a rate of 1100 cash to 
121the tael, Commissioner Lockhart remarked: "One cannot
fail to be struck by the punctuality with which the tax is
paid, ^he issue of a notice by the Government fixing the
date of appointment is all that is required to secure the
tax being paid in full at the appointed time, without any 
172arrears." ~ He believed this to be ample proof of the suc­
cess of the headman system.
Such punctuality, however, was undoubtedly also due to 
the fact that in 1901 the Chinese government, in order to 
pay the huge Boxer indemnity, had doubled the value of the 
silver tael for purposes of land tax collection to h800 copper
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cash. The people of Weihaiwei, therefore, must have been 
delighted at the "bargain" tax rates they experienced under 
the British. They also escaped the increase in salt taxes 
which the Ch'ing authorities levied in 1901 for the same pur­
pose. In December 1903 the land tax was collected in the
territory for the first time at the exchange rate of 2^00
cash to the tael and again the British experienced no diffi-
12h*culty m  doing so.
The land tax at Weihaiwei was assessed in accordance 
with the tax registers handed over by the Wen-teng and Jung- 
ch'eng magistrates at the time the British occupied the area. 
Though it was recognized that these old registers were often 
inaccurate, the high cost of carrying out a cadastral survey 
forced the British to rely on them as their second-best alter­
native. Books were kept by the government which listed each 
headman, the names of the village or villages for which he 
was responsible, and the total tax to be paid by each. When 
oayment was due each headman collected it from his fellow vil­
lagers and took it to Port Edward where he was given official 
receipts to be distributed to the villagers upon his r e t u r n . 1 2 ^  
This system spared the people of Weihaiwei from having to 
pay the additional burdensome charges known as "squeeze" 
which had formerly been extorted by government clerks and
runners at the times of tax collection prior to British occu-
126nation of the area. It should also be noted that there
was a reciprocal agreement between the British and neighbor-
ing hsien officials that taxes collected from anyone owning
land inside the Territory and residing outside would be turned
over to the Chinese official in his place of residence and 
127vice versa.
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In addition to the land tax, the British collected a 
variety of other fees such as rents on land and houses be­
longing to the government (these were mainly located on the 
island), .iunk and wharfage dues (the total of which increased 
considerably as trade expanded), licenses for laundries, 
wine and spirit monopolies, and an opium monopoly, as well
1 O Q
as numerous others. Although Commissioner Lockhart's pre­
ference for establishing a licensed monopoly of opium as 
opposed to an outright ban on the drug was to make control 
easier for the government, he was certainly not unaware‘of 
the financial advantages that such licensing would bring to 
his fledgling administration. Thus, in 1902 he called for
12 Qand received tenders on a one-year opium monopoly for $5 5 0,
In 1904 he decided to solicit new and higher offers from as
far afield as Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements and by
1905 he had received a bid of $5 ,6 0 0 for the annual license. 1 -^ 0
In February 1006, however, Lockhart was instructed by
the Colonial Office to gradually bring his government's policy
into line with that of Hong Kong where opium had been prohib- '■ 
131ited. J On 20 September 1906 the Chinese central government
132issued a new edict to eradicate opium cultivation in China. J
Subsequently, Lockhart was asked for information on the opium
problem at Weihaiwei by an official in Peking and he reported
the existence of twenty opium dens in the Territory and annual
1
sales of 60,000 ounces of the drug. It was not until June
190°, however, that the commissioner informed Weihaiwei*s dis­
trict headmen he planned to cooperate with the Chinese ban
on opium and that henceforth its use would be restricted to
134those with a medical certificate. J Lockhart's long delay 
in abolishing the opium monopoly was undoubtedly due to its
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success in producing much-needed government revenue and is 
one of the more unfortunate aspects of British fiscal policy 
at Weihaiwei at this time.
The road tax, which was instituted to replace the hated 
corvee labor system, represents a more respectable side of 
this policy. Initially the British had intended to make 
each village responsible for the upkeep of a certain portion 
of its nearby roads but this led to considerable difficulty 
with the headmen who were supposed to enforce the system.
Thus, it was decided to have the work done by a private con­
tractor for which an additional tax was levied on landowners. 
This tax was somewhat similar in concept to the Ch'ing labor- 
service tax, or ting yin, which was assessed on all adult 
males in lieu of labor service. After 1725 this tax had been
combined with the land tax in Shantung and the two together
136were known as ti-tmg yin,  ^ Those who owned no land were 
exempted from both taxes. Similarly, in Weihaiwei under the 
British those who owned no land were not expected to pay the 
road tax.
In connection with the general question of government 
revenue at Weihaiwei it should be noted that aside from the 
island of Liu-kung and a small amount of land on the main­
land which had been purchased by the British government for 
military purposes, there was no large program to buy up land 
and then resell or rent it to raise funds. When the Colo­
nial Office took over the administration of the Territory in 
1901, all houses on the island and mainland which were no 
longer required by the military were handed over to the new gov­
ernment and then rented our or sold. In 1902 the rents thus 
derived amounted to approximately 1:235» with some as low as
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300 (Mexican) per m o n t h , A s  for the renting of govern­
ment land for cultivation by Chinese farmers, in 1002 $105
was collected, in 1903 $1^1. and in 190*f $125 for the approx-
139lmatelv 120 mou farmed.
When Lockhart arrived at Weihaiwei in 1902 one of his
staff members noted that land transactions up to that point
had been few, addings "At present and for some time past
the Government has based its value of land on that of the
price realized among the Chinese for plots in the vicinity."
These varied from about $^0 to $150 per mou for land around
Port Edward. Road compensations were granted at $10 per 
140mou. One can say then that, unlike the Germans at Kiao-
chow who implemented an extremely detailed plan for control-
1^1ling land use and speculation, the British carried out 
no cadastral survey in the Territory to determine what addi­
tional rents they might derive nor did they interfere to con­
trol land prices. As we have seen, with a gradual increase
in prosperity at Weihaiwei, land prices also rose and the
« . . lA2Chinese themselves benefited from this.
In one looks at the following government figures for
Weihaiwei from 1901 to 1911 it is possible to see how the
leasehold revenues quickly exceeded early expectations!
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Table l1^
Government Finances, 1901-1911
Year Revenue Expenditure Grant-in-Aid
1901-7 & 2 2 ,2 2 0 $121,187 .ill,250
1902-3 35,456 102,044 1 2 ,0 0 0
1903-4 5 8 ,5 8 6 165,873 9,000
1904-5 00,355 1 6 2 ,2 8 2 6 ,0 0 0
190 5-6 105,934 146,120 3 ,0 0 0
1906-7 76,777 160,899 4,500
1907-8 80,331 173,340 1 0 ,0 0 0
1908-O 83,277 168,740 10,000
1909-10 8 3 ,499 145,687 4,400
1910-11 75,353 145,028 4,400
The sudden sharp increase in revenue between 1904 and 1Q05 
was partly a result of the Russo-Japanese War and the shift­
ing of trade and shipping to Weihaiwei which resulted from 
144it. Likewise, there was a fall-off in revenue in 1906-7
when the war was over and uncertainty over British intentions 
at Weihaiwei discouraged investment for a time.^^ Still, 
the general trend was one of growth in revenue and a gradual 
reduction in the grant-in-aid from the British Treasury. By 
eliminating the infamous "squeeze," improving methods of land 
tax collection, and establishing certain new sources of rev­
enue, such as wharfage dues, the colonial administrators 
were able to reduce their dependence upon the subsidy with­
out greatly increasing the financial burden on Weihaiwei*s 
inhabitants.
^hus, the British found the local Chinese consistently 
raid their taxes on time and without complaint. Of course, 
the importance of the grant-in-aid in maintaining Weihaiwei's 
financial solvency should not be overlooked. The British 
taxpayer in a sense helped keep the leasehold's tax burden
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relatively low. The government at Weihaiwei and, to a cer­
tain extent, the local population also enjoyed relative 
financial stability as a result of this subsidy. Unlike 
most late Ch'ing magistrates who were forced to rely on all 
manner of surcharges and customary service fees to supple­
ment woefully inadequate funding from the central govern­
ment, the British administrators could at least be certain
147that their basic operating expenses would always be met. 
Weihaiwei, being a poor area, had undoubtedly experienced 
this difficulty prior to the British arrival.
Considerable credit should be given to the administra­
tors themselves, however, for keeping expenditures within 
reasonable limits, especially in the wake of the 1904-5 war 
when the Russians were forced out of Port Arthur. It then 
became official Colonial Office policy to restrict govern­
ment activities as much as possible at Weihaiwei and to let 
the villages "run themselves" in order to reduce expenses.
Education
One area in which the British, especially in the first 
few years of their administration, decided not to interfere 
was that of education. As we have seen, there were very few 
local men who had acquired anything more than the most rudi­
mentary level of literacy at Weihaiwei, Most schools which 
did exist in the villages, therefore, must have been confined 
to the traditional variety and undoubtedly only provided ele­
mentary education.
Although the Ch'ine; authorities in 1652 required that 
every rural area establish a school and choose persons of 
"'honest and sincere character*" to serve as teachers, actual
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government involvement in such schools was minimal and the
ma,ior responsibility for them remained with local communi- 
1 ^ 0ties. These schools were usually supported by wealthy
benefactors or by individual lineages and were very loosely 
organized. There were no attendance or achievement records 
and students could come and go according to the agricultural 
chores they had to perform at home. The basic curriculum 
consisted of the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics and
i cr-i
rote memory was the method employed for learning it. In
1O02 it was observed that most of the important villages in
the leased Territory of Weihaiwei possessed schools maintained
by villagers and that students were eligible to compete in
the first level of literary examinations held in Wen-teng
1 *52and Jung-ch’-eng hsien. J As will be seen in later chapters, 
however, the British were eventually to be severely criticized 
for devoting so little of their financial resources to im­
proving educational opportunities in the leasehold.
Relations with the Chinese Walled Town
The stable, smooth-running administration and relative 
tranouility of the leased Territory contrasted sharply with 
conditions which existed inside the Chinese walled town. It 
will be remembered that the town of Weihai had caused con­
cern to the British as soon as they arrived in the area. In 
addition to being a haven for gambling and prostitution, it 
had also been the site of secret inflammatory meetings called 
by the Chinese boundary commissioners in 1900. As one ob­
server remarked in that year:
It must be evident to anyone that this im-
perium in imperio when the imperium is a
squalid Chinese town, the refuge of all 
bad characters, the centre of sedition, the
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focus from which petty Chinese officials 
can send out emissaries to disturb the 
minds of those who will now be British sub­
jects, is a state of affairs which ought 
not to be allowed to c o n t i n u e,153
It was also thought that this town had a bad effect on the
Chinese Regiment and that although it had been allowed to
exist as a face-saving device for the Chinese in 18q8, it
need no longer be so regarded.
As a means of maintaining some sort of control over 
the place the first commissioner at Weihaiwei, Colonel Dor- 
ward, decided to pay the Chinese sub-magistrate in the town 
an allowance of $^0 per month to assist him in carrying out 
his civil duties. He also successfully appealed to the gov­
ernor of Shantung to increase the official's salary. Even 
so he was unable to enforce his orders on the wealthier mer­
chants and opium den-keepers without British assistance. The 
other Chinese official on the scene, a low-ranking military 
man, had received no salary since the war with Japan and was 
dependent on contributions from disreputable businessmen in 
the town who received protection from him in return. Dor- 
ward was concerned that the town also provided the magistrate 
at Wen-teng with an excuse for parading through the Territory 
on his visits there, reminding the villagers of the continu- 
m g  presence of local Chinese authority.
As a remedy for this situation the commissioner sug­
gested that the Weihaiwei Convention be used by the British 
as a basis for claiming the town since it stipulated that
the Chinese could retain jurisdiction only so long as this
1 ^ 6remained consistent with defense requirements. ^ Although 
the matter was raised in 1Q01 with the British minister to 
Peking, Sir Ernest Satow, he felt it was not a politically
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opportune moment to approach the Tsungli Yamen, He sug­
gested rather that local Chinese officials be requested to 
exercise their jurisdiction effectively and that adequate
1 *57funds be provided by the central government for doing so. - 
In the end, the problem resolved itself. The new commis­
sioner, Lockhart, noted that since his arrival the sub­
magistrate in the town had been willing to cooperate with 
the British and his monthly "salary" had been maintained.
He suggested no change in the arrangement as long as it 
proved satisfactory. ^
Anglo-Chinese Relations in Shantung
British relations with Chinese provincial officials 
were also surprisingly good during the first decade of their 
administration at Weihaiwei. Following the boundary dis­
turbances of 1900 which strained relations between Shantung’s 
Governor Yfian Shih-k'ai and the British, one might have ex­
pected considerable time to pass before diplomatic cordiality 
was restored. As we have seen, however, Governor Yfian acted 
swiftly during the summer of that year to issue a proclama­
tion exhorting the local people to create no further diffi­
culties. He reassured them that when the British lease ex­
pired the Territory would be restored to Chinese jurisdic­
tion and in the meantime they should do their duty as loyal
* 1subjects and maintain peaceful relations with the foreigners. J
Many Western scholars have observed that Yfian Shih-k’ai was 
larsrely responsible for a policy of nationalistic resistance
i ^  f\
to foreign imperialism, especially with respect to Germany.
It is highly likely that with this larger threat to Chinese 
sovereignty and economic interests at Kiaochow Bay, Yfian
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preferred to make peace with the British at Weihaiwei.
This policy continued under Yttan's successor to the 
governorship, Chou Fu, who served from August 1902 until Novem­
ber lpO^. In fact, Chou even paid a personal visit to Wei­
haiwei in 1902 which Commissioner Lockhart felt obliged to 
reciprocate in 1903. As the guest of the governor, Lockhart 
was treated with remarkable deference and lavish hospitality.
He was conveyed from Weihaiwei aboard a Chinese cruiser to 
the entrance of the Hsiao-ch'ing Ho canal where he was met 
by an official military escort. His party of ten vessels 
then made its way up the canal to Tsinan with Lockhart sail­
ing in comfort on a houseboat. The final leg of the journey 
was by sedan chair, at the end of which Lockhart received a 
thirteen-gun salute. Governor Chou then proceeded to enter­
tain the commissioner in style. Lockhart noted, for example, 
that at the official banquet held in his honor the governor's
private band "played foreign music throughout dinner and
1^1whenever it had the least excuse, Cod save the King." It
should be noted that Chou was responsible for implementing 
many modern reforms and was especially eager that the Brit­
ish assist in railroad construction so as to offset the Ger­
man diversion of trade to Kiaochow, Lockhart, for his part, 
used the opportunity of contact with the Tsinan Chamber of 
Commerce and leading "gentry" figures to advocate commercial
162investment at Weihaiwei,
Extremely cordial relations between the British and 
Chinese provincial officials continued under Chou's successor, 
Yang Shih-hsiang, who governed from March 1905 to September 
1°07, A^ain visits were exchanged as well as a great deal 
of mutual praise for one another's accomplishments. One of
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the most interesting aspects of these formal visits is that 
they were conducted largely in a traditional Chinese manner. 
Lockhart's visit to Tsinan in 1906 hosted by Governor Yang 
was described in the Shan-tung kuan-pao with generous praise 
for the commissioner’s views on education, especially female 
education. While visiting a school in the capital he ex­
horted students to work for a better China. Likewise, when 
the governor visited Weihaiwei, he was warmly welcomed and 
the two officials exchanged complimentary remarks filled with 
classical allusions. J The Ching-hua jih-pao noted that 
while the governor was very well received at Weihaiwei, he 
was not given similar treatment by the Germans.
Governor Yang's successor, Ytian Shu-hsun, who served 
from October 1907 until July 1909, perhaps because of his ex­
perience as a former tao-t'ai in Shanghai, knowledge of for­
eigners, and support for "modernization" in China, was es­
pecially effusive in his praise of Commissioner Lockhart when 
he was received as a guest at Weihaiwei in 1908. J After 
mentioning Lockhart's "exceptional" knowledge of Chinese, he 
went on in a formal address to remark: "The improvements
which have been made in Weihaiwei reflect great credit on 
his administrative capacity and the contented condition of 
the Chinese under his jurisdiction shows that they are grate- 
ful to him for his kind and sympathetic rule."
Weihaiwei and the Russo-Japanese War
During the years 1900 to 1905 there were major shifts 
in the international balance of power and once again the 
British viewed with growing alarm the extent of Russian am­
bitions in the Far East. The result was an alliance with
Ill
Japan in 1902, later renewed in 1905. The military occupa­
tion of Manchuria by the Russians in the wake of the Boxer 
affair eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War of 190^-5 
and a resounding victory for Japan. Part of the peace agree­
ment provided extensive new rights and privileges for the 
Japanese in southern Manchuria and this was important in the 
history of Weihaiwei for two reasons: 1) because the origi­
nal leasing of Weihaiwei had been contingent upon Russian 
occupation of Port Arthur, and 2) because the British now 
needed to consult their Japanese allies before taking any de­
cisions as to the rendition of the Territory.
From secret British Cabinet documents it is clear that 
the issue of Weihaiwei was being reconsidered at least by 
October 19°5. With the Russians gone from Port Arthur it 
was thought that a fresh lease would have to be negotiated 
with China in order to justify a continuing British presence 
in the north. At the time there were strong arguments put 
forward for returning the place to the Chinese. It was pointed 
out that jtl00,000 had already been spent on naval works there 
which were now not even to be used in view of the additional 
expense required for fortification and the change in Admiralty 
policy regarding permanent advanced bases. Furthermore, 
although there had been a certain amount of growth in trade 
at Weihaiwei, there was as yet no manufacturing industry there 
and no prospects of any developing. Thus, retention could 
not be justified on commercial grounds. It was thought an 
ideal time to return Weihaiwei to the Chinese, both as a ges­
ture of goodwill and as a means of preventing future diffi­
culties from arising. This act could not be regarded as the 
result of fear or an evasion of responsibilities since Britain
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still maintained its essential position in the Far East, es-
167oecially through its alliance with Japan.
The major obstacle to Weihaiwei?s rendition at this
time seems to have been the Japanese who were eager that the
1British remain as a check upon the Germans at Kiaochow,
The Chinese for their part were in a more confident mood in 
IQ06 and were eager for the return of the former base at Wei­
haiwei in order to proceed with naval development. In the 
end, however, the British War Office, Colonial Office, and 
Admiralty all agreed that Weihaiwei should be retained for
its usefulness as a "flying base" and as a check upon further
1 6q
German encroachment in Shantung. No one, however, recom­
mended increased expenditure at Weihaiwei. The Chinese were 
informed that they should regard Britain’s continued occupa­
tion of the leasehold as a protection against the other powers 
and that rendition might be possible at some later date , ^ 0 
The uncertainty over British intentions at Weihaiwei 
had its effect on those living there. On 2k March 1P06 Lock­
hart received a joint petition from the European and Chinese 
merchants in the Territory asking that he secure from the 
Colonial Office a firm commitment to remain in the place as 
trade was paralyzed and no one wished to invest there when 
they could not be sure of British intentions. Lockhart passed 
along: their concern but the only response from the Colonial 
Office was the bland statement that no change was contemplated 
It would appear then that by 1906 the British envisioned 
a kind of diplomatic holding operation at Weihaiwei. They 
were not orepared to abandon their interests in north China 
to the Germans and certainly their Japanese allies strongly 
advised against withdrawal. Furthermore, the Navy found
171
u  3
Weihaiwei, with its fine harbor and healthy climate, to be 
an extremely convenient rest station for the fleet. The 
Colonial Office, however, had no illusions about the lease­
hold's commercial prospects and insisted that expenditures 
be kept to a bare minimum. Thus, one must ask what effect, 
if any, could the British presence have had upon the economic 
and social development of Weihaiwei given such limited objec­
tives, The next chapter will deal with this question for 
the decade preceding the 1911 revolution.
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Notes to Chapter 2
*C0 521/1, Barton to Dorward, May 1900. It should per­
haps be noted that the Weihaiwei area had experienced at 
least one incident involving foreigners even before the Brit­
ish occupation, A British missionary had aroused local hos­
tility in June 1897 and a complaint was lodged with the con­
sul at Chefoo who relayed his concern to the minister in Pe­
king. Apparently, the' governor of Shantung, Li Ping-heng, 
who was well known for his anti-missionary views, had sent 
the consul "an important message and had practically told 
him that the matter did not concern him." He took this atti­
tude in spite of instructions from the Tsungli Yamen to set­
tle the matter as quietly as possible which indicates the 
problems the Yamen faced at this time in enforcing its author­
ity over local officials. See F0 233/^4t (Record Book of 
Interviews with Chinese Authorities, 30 June 1897-31 October 
1 8 0 9), Interview between British Ambassador and Yamen offi­
cials, 30 June 1897, p. 4. This'incident is also described 
in "Shan-tung shih-pao so-tsai chiao-an tzu-liao: Wei-hai 
chiao-an," in STCTSTL, 2:304,
The British later encountered considerable difficulty 
in getting local officials to inform the people of Weihaiwei 
that they actually had been granted a lease by the central 
government. The Tsungli Yamen had supposedly instructed the 
governor of Shantung in July I898 to issue such a proclama­
tion but, according to the British, it was never posted.
They complained again in April 1899 that there was still no 
evidence of any such proclamation and were told that the gov­
ernor had issued it and that perhaps it had been defaced by 
the weather I See F0 233/44, Interview of 31 March I8 9 9, pp. 
480-81; and Interview of 20 April 1899, p. 495. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that a military surveying party was forced 
to "retire before a hostile demonstration of the local people" 
in the western portion of Weihaiwei in May 1 8 9 0. The Yamen
suggested 
the local 
P. 511,
that the British 
authorities. FO
should resolve the matter with 
233/44, Interview of 19 May 1899,
2C0 873/77C>, Dorward to Yen Tao- t*ai., 12 April 1 9 0 0.-
3C0 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900.
4C0 521/1. Dorward to War Office • 6 April 1900 •
5C0 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900,
6C0 521/1. Dorward to War Office * 6 April 1900 •
000-
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Chapter 3
Economic and Social Developments at Weihaiwei 
During the Last Years of the Ch’ing
Improvements in Transportation
Although the British were at first primarily interested 
in Weihaiwei as a naval base and gave clear assurances to 
Germany that they did not intend to contend her interests 
in Shantung, it soon became clear that the Colonial Office 
would welcome any economic developments which did not require 
much government expenditure and might help to offset admini­
strative costs.* It was also recognized, however, that any 
such developments would depend to a very large extent on im­
provements in Weihaiwei's still quite primitive transporta­
tion network. Thus, from the beginning of their administra­
tion of the leasehold, the British gave road construction 
and maintenance a high priority. As early as 1902, for ex­
ample, it was reported that the Territory had a total of 
forty miles of new or improved roads. Moreover, since the 
area was criss-crossed by numerous small streams it was also
necessary to construct many new bridges and to constantly
2repair the entire network.
Local villagers warmly welcomed these public works 
projects, as did foreign travelers who visited the leasehold.J 
One such traveler observed in 1906, for example, that the 
road leading from Chefoo to the Weihaiwei border was a mere 
track in places and impossible for carts to traverse. Only 
pack animals were to be seen carrying goods to and from the 
treaty port. In sharp contrast was the new territorial road 
which he described as follows; "The last ten miles of road
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into Wei-hai Wei are most excellent going* as smooth as a 
billiard table, with not a single rut or loose stone to be 
found on it , . , The last seven miles were even marked by
At
mile-stones." Likewise, when this man made his way south­
ward to Wen-teng hsien he again found the territorial road 
to be excellent with new stone bridges constructed over all 
streams. Once over the border, however, he found himself 
back on a hilly track where there was little traffic aside 
from a few mules and wheelbarrows. In fact, he found condi­
tions equally primitive throughout eastern Shantung all the 
way to Tsingtao,
One can readily understand, then, why cart traffic 
which had been virtually unknown in Weihaiwei prior to I898  
increased dramatically during the first decade of British 
administration and by 1909 was regarded as commonplace.-*
So great was the expansion of this traffic, in fact, that 
the British were soon required to budget an even greater pro- 
portion of funds toward road maintenance. The inhabitants 
of Weihaiwei were so pleased with their new roads that in 
1909 some of them addressed a petition to the commissioner 
urging that the Chinese authorities be requested to construct 
cart roads between Weihaiwei, Jung-ch’eng-hsien, Wen-teng- 
hsien, and Ning-hai. Although the governor of Shantung ex­
pressed approval of the idea, funds were lacking and Lockhart
7
thought the project would be delayed/ The district officer, 
however, suspected that the provincial authorities were actu­
ally not eager to aid Weihaiwei's economic development when
Q
it might be at Chefoo's expense.
Another important change occurred in transportation 
facilities at Weihaiwei with the establishment of a regular
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steamer link between Port Edward, Shanghai, and Tientsin
which meant reliable mail, freight, and passenger services
for the leasehold. The number of steam vessels calling at
Weihaiwei rose from 146 in 1902 to 5^7 in 1909 and junk traf-
o
fic also increased. There was a corresponding increase in 
the export of native produce such as peanuts and salt fish 
and an increase in the import of items such as foreign kero­
sene oil, cotton yarn, sugar, and dyes. In 1902 only 151,809 
tons of freight had been carried in and out of Weihaiwei by 
steamer, but in 1909 this figure had risen to 481,291 tons.*0 
In addition, the increase of exports handled by steamers dock­
ing at Port Edward led several agents working for shipping 
and banking firms to move their headquarters from the island 
to the mainland. Chinese merchants also discovered that by 
utilizing Port Edward's pier facilities they could eliminate
the need for lighters conveying goods across the harbor from
11
the island and thus lower their expenses.
Although the British had as early as 1902 seen the need
for new sea walls and stone piers at both Liu-kung Tao and
Port Edward, they decided to wait to see how much trade would
develop at Weihaiwei before considering the construction of
a pier in deep water off the mainland for the unloading of 
12
steamers. As we shall see in Chapter 5» “the volume of trade 
at Weihaiwei had increased to such an extent by 1915 that 
the new pier did indeed become a necessity.
The ground nut industry is an especially important e x ­
ample of how improved roads and steamer services contributed 
to economic growth at Weihaiwei. In fact, this commodity b e ­
came the Territory's largest export product as can be seen 
from Table 2.
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Table 2
Ground Nut Exports, 1902-191
Year
Ground Nuts
„„ (pj^ uisL...
Ground Nut 
Seeds (piculs)
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
918
10,847
9*832
5,219
24,168
12,294
15*939
39,600
6,893
2,799
2,877
13*505
25*320
60,753
100,700
141,293
475
The fluctuations from year to year, of course, were the re
It is apparent from the figures, though, that the Chinese 
quickly took advantage of Weihaiwei*s free port status and 
an expanding European market to develop the trade in this
It should also be noted that the improvement in Weihai- 
wei*s transport links with the outside world after I898 helped 
local merchants in other ways. The British fleet, for example, 
regularly called there during the summer months and stimulated 
a considerable amount of business. In addition, the lease­
h o l d ’s fine climate also gained a reputation for itself among 
the foreign community throughout China and Weihaiwei soon be­
came a popular resort with hotel and other rented summer ac-
16
commodation facilities.
The Search for Commercial Opportunities
14
suit of weather conditions and the size of the nut crop.
item
Although the British enjoyed some success in their 
efforts to develop Weihaiwei, they were disappointed in a 
number of projects. Commissioner Dorward, for example, wrote
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to the Colonial Office in 1901 that "the want of any capi­
talists" was hampering his attempts to promote the sale of 
locally-made silk in America and the establishment of a bean 
oil factory. The uncertainty over British intentions to r e ­
main at Weihaiwei discouraged both Chinese and Western busi-
17
nessmen for a time from investing in the area.
There was considerable optimism in 1902, however, that
James Stewart Lockhart, with his many contacts in Hong Kong
and experience of the Chinese business world, would be well
equipped to overcome some of Weihaiwei*s handicaps. Indeed,
Lockhart regarded this task as among his highest priorities
and gave it much attention. His efforts were greatly assisted
in 1903 when the Chinese government decided to continue to
treat Weihaiwei as a foreign port where no duties would be
charged on goods imported. In addition, there were to be
refunds on foreign and native goods which had been taxed else-
18
where in China. This gave Weihaiwei a considerable advantage 
over Chefoo and Tsingtao where various types of duties were 
l evied.^ It remained to be-seen, however, whether the lease­
hold could actually attract trade away from the traditional 
outlet at Chefoo or the rapidly developing and well-located 
German port at Tsingtao.
In his attempt to determine which products offered W e i ­
haiwei the best possibility for success, Lockhart dispatched 
Captain Johnson of the Chinese Regiment and the Reverend
H. J. Brown, a local missionary, to make a tour of the Terri­
tory in July 1902 to consult with village headmen on the sub­
ject. They learned that at that time all of Weihaiwei*s 
surplus produce was sent to Chefoo, but it would be marketed
20
m  the Territory if it was thought possible to sell it there.
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It was noted, for example, that the wild silk cocoons sent
to Chefoo could be processed in Weihaiwei if. capital could
be attracted for investment in a filature as there were only
21
a very few looms then operating in the Territory,
Another possible commodity was bean oil. The commis­
sioner's two agents learned that twenty years earlier there 
had been more than ten bean oil and bean cake factories in 
the walled town of Weihai and Ma-t'ou, but that frequent
losses at sea of junks which brought the beans from Manchuria
22
gradually forced the various owners out of business. A l ­
though Lockhart reasoned that as a free port Weihaiwei should 
be able to expand this trade, there was still the problem 
of competing with Chefoo and Newchang for a supply of Man­
churian b e a n s . ^  Another major stumbling block was to con­
vince a local man to invest his money in a factory which 
would not show a profit for at least a year and perhaps longer. 
Lockhart was warned in one report that merchants in North 
China had traditionally preferred to open small establish­
ments with reasonably secure profits rather than to risk all
2/i
of their capital in the hope of great profits in the future.
One industry which seemed to offer brighter prospects 
in terms of supply and smaller operating costs was salt pro­
duction. Although the export of this product had previously 
been banned at Weihaiwei in order to ensure a sufficient 
supply for local fishermen, Lockhart decided to allow exports 
if there proved to be enough salt and to refrain from taxing 
it as well.2 ^ In spite of these measures, however, there 
was little growth in salt production for many years.
Vermicelli made from beans was another commodity which 
was widely produced in eastern Shantung and exported through
Chefoo. Here again, though, there was the difficulty of 
bean supplies and the establishment of a factory to compete 
with the Chefoo trade. Similarly, with the manufacture of 
strawbraid it was feared there was little chance of attract­
ing the industry away from the districts in which it had
2 6
traditionally existed.
For a time tobacco-growing seemed to offer commercial
possiblities at Weihaiwei. In 190^ the British and American
Tobacco Company was experiencing difficulties with Chinese
customs officials at Shanghai in trying to import tobacco
to manufacture cigarettes and had also been forced out of
Japan when the industry became a government monopoly there.
It was hoped, therefore, that the company might be persuaded
by Weihaiwei's supply of cheap labor and excellent climate
to consider relocating, especially if the British government
offered assurances that they intended to retain the leasehold.
It was not until 1913* however, that the firm did finally
make some tentative efforts to encourage local farmers to
28
grow tobacco and met with little success.
In 1898 there had been considerable excitement over 
the prospects for mineral development in the Territory, e s ­
pecially of gold. By 1902 Lockhart had granted several pro­
specting licenses and a firm known as the Weihaiwei Gold M i n ­
ing Company with a capital outlay of $600,000 was seeking
. 29
to attract investors m  Shanghai. 7 There was even concern
in 1903 that the Germans might seek to claim mining rights
within Weihaiwei. One Foreign Office official actually hoped
that they would so that the British would have an opportunity
to withdraw their pledge not to construct a railway connect-
30
ing the leasehold with the rest of Shantung. The Germans
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never did so, however, and the mining efforts at Weihaiwei 
were largely a failure.
Commissioner Lockhart himself proposed a trip to Hong 
Kong in 1903 to make personal contact with those he thought 
might he persuaded to invest in Weihaiwei. It is significant 
that the Colonial Office agreed to pay the expenses for his 
journey but cautioned him as follows* "You will of course 
be careful not to involve the Government in any responsibility 
towards persons who may by your representations be led to in­
vest capital in Weihaiwei,"-^ Lockhart's superiors would 
have been happy for any investment which led to additional 
government revenue for Weihaiwei but were not prepared to 
assume responsiblity for business failures which might also 
occur and require compensation.
So serious was the commissioner in his efforts to foster 
economic development in the leasehold, however, that in 190^ 
he acquired the services of a trained fruit-grower to experi­
ment with agricultural production. Although this expert 
viewed the soil and climate as excellent for certain varieties 
of fruit and successfully cultivated them in government o r ­
chards, it proved impossible to attract sufficient capital, 
either Chinese or foreign, for investment in the scheme and 
the horticulturalist returned to England in 1908. One worth­
while benefit of this project, though, was the introduction 
of new trees on the bare hills around Weihaiwei. Prisoners 
at the jail continued to plant them in large numbers on the
island even after the Englishman left, thus greatly aiding
32
soil conservation and the appearance of the area. Various 
headmen also exhibited interest in fruit-growing, although 
it was to be some time before the project became a commercial
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success. It proved extremely difficult to persuade the 
average local farmer to innovate unless the material advan­
tages were immediately apparent to him and large-scale fruit 
marketing clearly involved considerable investments of time, 
capital, and professional advice.
Another project which seemed somewhat less demanding 
of local expertise was the construction of bonded warehouses 
which were in short supply at all of China*s treaty ports, 
Weihaiwei*s duty-free status seemed to make it a logical 
place for storing such items as coal, kerosene, oil, yarn, 
staple piece-goods, and even opium. There were considerable 
obstacles to this plan, however, including the expense of 
erecting the buildings, the necessity of trading firms e m ­
ploying an agent to clear goods at the port, and the remote­
ness of the area which might discourage dealers from wanting 
to take delivery t h e r e , I n  1912 Commissioner Lockhart wrote 
of his disappointment that this proposal had never material­
i z e d . ^
One unforeseen development which did contribute to eco­
nomic growth for a time in Weihaiwei, however, was emigration 
of Chinese workers to South Africa and Vladivostock, In 1904 
an emigration depot was constructed in the leasehold with 
accommodation for two thousand men en route to the gold mines 
in South Africa, J Although the depot was eventually moved 
to Chefoo, its temporary presence at Weihaiwei meant that the 
laborers were at least spending money in the Territory before 
departing. In addition, those who were residents of Weihaiwei 
sent back some of their earnings to their families and this 
money was then reinvested locally. Emigration to Vladivostock 
in 1907, however, was less successful as many who went there
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were unable to find work.-^ One consequence of foreign r e ­
mittances from overseas laborers was a steady increase in 
the value of agricultural property at Weihaiwei and the r e ­
demption of mortgaged land. One observer felt, however, 
that this manifestation of prosperity was actually a sign 
of economic backwardness since Weihaiwei*s conservative farm­
ers chose only to invest their money in land and not to risk 
it in modern commercial v e n t u r e s . ^
During the years 1898 to 1910 there was no economic 
boom at Weihaiwei, but there was gradual and relatively steady 
growth. Trade figures showed considerable improvement and 
were aided by British efforts to build roads and develop ship­
ping facilities. As trade expanded in the towns of the lease­
hold there was a need for modern banking facilities. In addi­
tion to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Imperial Bank 
of China, and the Russo-Chinese Bank which all had offices
■30
in Chefoo, there were shops in the Territory itself which 
began to issue their own promissory notes around 190^ to facil­
itate the ground nut business. This system was considerably 
more convenient than carrying around heavy coins but it led 
to another problem. In 1907 these shops had issued more 
notes than they could cover with cash and it became necessary 
for a newly-organized branch of the Chefoo Chamber of Commerce 
operating in the walled town of Weihai to provide security 
for them,-^
There were other difficulties at Weihaiwei around this 
time, as in Shantung generally, with the currency system.
In 1906 there was an enormous increase in the production of 
copper coins which dramatically lowered their value and caused 
considerable losses to individuals. In fact, the value of
copper cash fell to the point where the British at Weihaiwei
decided to collect the land tax in silver. Apparently this
ki
was done without causing any local hardship. By 1909 the 
entire Shantung provincial currency system had become un­
stable as a great deal of paper money was issued by banks
and provincial authorities to supplement revenue sources,
Llo
often w i t h o u t ’adequate metallic reserves. Under British 
administration Weihaiwei was somewhat protected from this 
phenomenon. In 190?, for example, as non-secured promissory 
notes began to circulate in the Territory, Commissioner Lock 
hart took steps to regulate t h e m . ^
Although not spectacular, there was enough commercial 
development at Weihaiwei during the early years of the Brit­
ish occupation to attract the attention of S h a n t u n g ’s Gov­
ernor Sun Pao-ch*i. In his search for additional funds to 
promote development efforts in the province, he proposed 
that, in return for abolishing likin charges in Shantung, 
Chinese customs houses be established at Weihaiwei, Chefoo,
and Tsingtao to collect a 2^ percent surtax on foreign im-
kk
ports and native exports. Though the Maritime Customs
Commissioner at Tsingtao was in favor of this proposal, Wei-
h a i w e i ’s Commissioner Lockhart was opposed unless it could
be used as a means of securing the right for Britain to r e ­
lic
tain the leasehold indefinitely. J In the end, the governor 
plan was rejected by the British and Weihaiwei continued to 
enjoy its advantageous duty-free status. Since the lease­
hold was handicapped through geographic location, lack of 
rail links, few natural resources, an absence of local capi­
tal, and the relative indifference of the British Colonial 
Office, this one competitive advantage was indeed crucial
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to its economic growth.
Changes in Education
Along with economic development, Weihaiwei experienced 
a certain amount of social change as a result of the British 
presence, As early as 1901, for example, the government b e ­
gan to take an interest in education. Colonel Dorward r e ­
marked in that year that schools should be established in 
villages where there were none in order that Mcleanliness,
tidiness, good manners, and good attendance" could be incul- 
Ll 7
cated. He estimated that 80 percent of the natives of the 
Territory were illiterate and more than half the villages 
had no schools. In Dorward*s opinion, cheap labor was Wei- 
haiwei*s chief resource and he thought it would be sensible, 
therefore, to educate workers for future industries. In 
1901 the commissioner recommended that matching government 
grants be made whenever private funds were raised for village 
schools. He also thought that scholarships should be pro­
vided for the destitute and that headmen and teachers should
li P
be rewarded for collecting groups of students. Dorward 
was replaced in December 1901 by a new commissioner, however, 
and never had the opportunity to implement his proposals.
In 1902 the Anglican missionary at Weihaiwei established 
an Anglo-Chinese School at Port Edward with nine students.
As he observed s "The scholars are mostly lads belonging to 
tradesmen and well-to-do families resident in the Territory, 
which at once secures to us a connection with some of the 
best people in Weihaiwei . . ."^9 Commissioner Lockhart d e ­
cided that rather than supporting village schools as Dorward 
had suggested, it would be better for the government to en-
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courage the teaching of English and, for the present at least,
leave the local people to provide for their own "native
schools" as they had always d o n e . He noted that most of the
*>0
important villages already had schools anyway. Thus, he 
chose to provide three-year scholarships for five hoys to 
attend the new Anglican school with preference to he given 
to the poor and selection to he made in a competitive exami­
nation. By 1903 attendance at this school had risen to 
twenty-five. Along with courses in Chinese, English was 
also taught, as well as an advanced course in letter-writing, 
commercial correspondence, and book-keeping.-*1
Lockhart held quite a practical view of education in 
Weihaiwei, attempting in 1903» for example, to establish a 
program for training Chinese in Western medicine. Unfortu­
nately, the program was designed in such a way as to exclude 
virtually anyone in the Territory from' participating. It 
was intended to last for five years during which time the 
students would have to provide their own maintenance and upon
graduation promise to work for the government or the local
<2
hospital for a further three years. When it became clear 
that this would cause extreme financial hardship for any 
family whose son came forward, Lockhart modified his proposal, 
suggesting that only two medical apprentices he trained in- 
stead. It proved impossible to attract more than one hoy, 
however, with sufficient English and intelligence to profit 
from the training.
In 190^ the government decided to establish its own 
tuition-free school for Chinese boys at Port Edward in which 
both English and Chinese would be ta u g h t.^ By 1905 it had 
attracted twenty-one students. ^ Lockhart was surprised,
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however, that attendance figures were not higher. When the 
British district officer inquired as to the reasons for this 
some of the leading Chinese merchants told him that people 
were afraid their children might he forced to become Christians 
if they enrolled. Further inquiry revealed that attendance 
at religious;.services was mandatory at the Anglican school 
which was partially government s p o n s o r e d . ^  In 1906 Lockhart, 
therefore, decided to disassociate the government from the 
latter institution by transferring scholarship funds to the 
new free school and in September of that year enrollments 
there had risen to f i f t y - s i x . ^
In 1905 the traditional Chinese examination system was 
abolished by imperial decree and the commissioner was con­
cerned that the school system in the leased territory be 
brought more closely into line with changes taking place in 
neighboring Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng h s i e n . He wanted to en­
sure that local students could continue their education out­
side Weihaiwei if they d e s i r e d ,and thus requested that a 
survey be made to ascertain the availability of educational
facilities in the Territory as well as the level of interest
*58
in their further development. The survey revealed that 
the Territory actually contained 287 village schools with 
3,276 p u p i l s.^ In 1911 the population of boys and girls 
between the ages of 6 and 13 was roughly 26,000. Thus, if 
one includes the 123 pupils attending schools in Port Edward 
and on the island in 1906, this means that roughly 13 percent 
of school-age children in the Territory in that year were 
actually being e d u c a t e d ^ 0
The survey also showed that while people theoretically 
were in favor of educational improvements, they were quite
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reluctant to pay more taxes to provide for them. The excep­
tion to this was a few headmen who were eager to promote 
higher education in their own villages. As the British offi­
cial carrying out the survey observed, however* " . . .  rumour 
has it that their chief object is to gain face (and possibly 
gain) and that the people generally do not care and cannot
61
afford to care about the advantages of higher education."
One headman even went so far as to petition the commissioner 
to assist the new school he had already established in his 
village with seventeen students, nine of whom were studying 
English. The headman's proposal was for far-reaching changes
in education at Weihaiwei which would be financed either by
6 2
the allocation of temple funds or a new house tax. In 
accordance with his general policy of soliciting the views 
of district headmen, Commissioner Lockhart decided to first 
circulate^the-^petition .amongt them: before making a recommenda­
tion on educational policy in the Territory.
Local reactions to the proposal were interesting. Most 
headmen felt, as noted above, that the people would not sup­
port new schools since they saw no immediate gain for them­
selves in education. Nor, it was observed, did young people 
have enough time to spend studying when their help was needed 
at home. The district officer, Reginald Johnston, was 
largely in sympathy with this view and felt that no general 
program of education was needed in the Territory as the people 
were too poor to make use of it and even if they did would 
not be able to find appropriate jobs locally anyway. He 
thought it best to teach them Chinese rather than English 
and to simply develop one secondary school at Port Edward. 
Village schools could be aided by a tax on theatricals and
141
the "best teachers and students could receive some sort of
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government recognition. He was particularly opposed to 
the idea of diverting funds derived from temple lands to sup­
port schools, stating that this would deprive the local
priests of their only source of income as well as lead to a
. . .  66 
good deal of litigation and unrest. ^ In Johnston's opinion,
the maximum income which could be derived from this source
would be $1,000 and it seems his estimate was probably not
far wrong. According to a 1906 report, the Territory con-
66
tained a total of 62 temples supported by 1,765 mou land.
In deciding not to use funds derived from temple lands 
to maintain local schools, the British authorities took a 
different position from some of the new educational promotion 
officers operating at the hsien level elsewhere in China as 
a result of the educational reform movement which began in 
late 1905. Buck has noted that: "The first task of educa­
tional promotion officers was to convert community property
such as academies, temples, and endowed schools (i-hstteh)
6 7
into property of the state school system." ( Such changes 
became common after 1906 and Buck thinks marked a major turn­
ing point in the educational modernization of China since 
many of the nation's local "gentry" leaders thereby signified 
their willingness to let the state assume the responsibility 
of supporting local schools. Yet the change was in some ways 
only symbolic since the actual financing of schools at the 
hsien level and below still remained dependent on local r e ­
sources, not official funds. The chief source of revenue 
was local surtaxes which could only be levied if local lead­
ers, including the new educational promotion officers, were
68
willing to do so. In this respect, as we have seen, the
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situation was not so different at Weihaiwei. Operating on 
a very slender budget, the British administrators decided 
to support the Government Free School at Port Edward but 
offered only limited aid to traditional village educational 
institutions. The local people themselves, with only a few 
exceptions, felt they did not have the resources to improve 
their schools and usually did not even see the need for such 
improvements.
Thus, the British very deliberately chose to maintain
*
the traditional way of life at Weihaiwei by emphasizing a 
classical Chinese education in village schools rather than 
introducing a more modern curriculum incorporating English 
and other Western subjects. One district officer noted that 
most villagers were illiterate and unable to deal with every­
day sorts of documents such as market accounts, adoption 
deeds, mortgages, sales of land, and commercial agreements, 
depending on friends or the local school teacher to help 
them when necessary. He thought, therefore, that a basic 
level of literacy in Chinese would be extremely useful for 
them, especially when they were involved in litigation. What 
they did not need was the modern education being adopted
elsewhere in China. This same officer even felt too much
60
education would lead to discontent. ? Obviously, this view 
carried with it very definite political implications. The 
new educational program which had been proposed by the Chinese 
central government, on the other hand, recommended that each 
school include English in its curriculum. As Buck has noted, 
however, in these early years of the twentieth century through­
out China "the general school system was still composed
70
largely of small schools that were modern in name only."
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It should perhaps also be mentioned that in Weihaiwei,
as elsewhere in China, there was a sharp contrast between
the kind of traditional education favored in the rural areas
and the more modern curriculum available in Port E d w a r d , the
only town of significant size. Evelyn Rawski suggests that
the popularity of these traditional schools in many areas as
late as 1949 indicates the rejection by China's villagers of
a Western-based educational system which did not meet their
71
needs or correspond with their values. Rather than attempt­
ing to radically change those values, the British preferred 
to maintain the status quo in Weihaiwei's village,schools 
in line with their own resources and local preference.
All of Weihaiwei's schools, until 1907 > were intended 
for boys as was true in other parts of China. By 1907, how­
ever, a new anti-foot-binding society, the Tien Tsu H u i , made 
up of local influential citizens, had plans to establish a 
girls' school in Port Edward which would teach the reading 
and writing of Chinese, needlework, and other domestic skills, 
but not English. The school was to be supported by volun­
tary contributions and the government was asked to assist 
by providing a building. The society planned to limit enroll­
ments to twenty "strong and healthy girls" who would be 
charged no tuition fees for the three-year course but would 
be required to buy their own books and to unbind their feet. 
Lockhart decided to encourage this effort by providing a 
rent-free building."^ In 1909 the government granted fu r ­
ther assistance by meeting half of the school's operating
expenses, and in 1910 Lockhart reported that the new insti-
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tution had had another good y e a r , - 7
1^4
It is interesting that the establishment of this school 
at Weihaiwei in 190? occurred just as the Chinese central gov­
ernment was beginning to provide schools for girls else- 
nh.
where in China. By 1909 there were three schools for C h i ­
nese girls at Weihaiwei. In addition to the one mentioned 
above, there was also a mission school where the unbinding 
of feet was compulsory, and a smaller private girls' school.
In 1911 the largest girls' school in the leasehold was the 
mission "Native Girls' Workroom" with thirty-five students 
who were taught reading, writing, mathematics, geography, 
lace-raaking, needlework, and Christian doctrine. The Chinese-
run anti-foot-binding school had by this time grown to
7 6
twenty-five students,(J
It should also be noted that the anti-foot-binding 
society itself achieved a small measure of success with a 
membership in 1907 of fifty people. Unfortunately, however, 
except for some of the pupils at the local school, the major­
ity of these members were natives of other parts of China 
(mainly Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung). The group did 
make an effort to inform local people of its views, though, 
by distributing literature and attempting to get village 
headmen to join the organization. They also made it known 
that a government ban on foot-binding would be welcomed by 
them, but Lockhart decided instead to simply exhort villagers
about the evils of the custom in the hope that it would grad-
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ually die out.
In the m e a n t i m e , interest continued to grow in the 
Government Free School at Port Edward and by 1911 it had 
sixty s t u d e n t s . ^  The curriculum was organized along the 
lines of Chinese government standards so that it would be
1^5
possible for graduates to enter a Chinese upper middle school. 
The British administrators at Weihaiwei were pleased, how­
ever, that there was no tendency among the students at this 
school to form societies for the purpose of "dictating" to 
their teachers. Lockhart also noted:
There is undoubtedly a keen demand among 
the people for English education but it is 
not desirable to encourage this too much 
and to create thereby a class of half-educated 
Babus who disdain the homely trades of their 
fathers and whose sole ambition is to fill a 
government post,?8
Thus, government aid to education at Weihaiwei remained
very limited. Only the free school in Port Edward was wholly
subsidized and even here it was noted that salaries were too
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low"to'attract good teachers. 7 There were a few other pri­
vate schools for Chinese students at Port Edward, as has 
been mentioned, and two schools for European boys and girls. 
In the countryside, however, the only real improvements to 
village schools were the establishment of a book depository 
to supply books at cost price and the raising of a small
amount of revenue, beginning in 1910* through a tax on theat- 
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ricals. All of the large villages maintained schools as
did groups of smaller villages and in 1910 they were attended
by a small "though gradually increasing proportion of the
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village children." In only a few of these schools were 
such new subjects as arithmetic or geography taught. Rote 
memorization of Confucian texts remained the rule for most, 
and the teachers were apparently neither very learned nor
hardworking which is not surprising since they were able to
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earn only a meager living at their profession. As one 
district officer noted with respect to education at this 
time: " . . .  Weihaiwei and the neighbouring regions have
1^ -6
more in common with the Old China that is passing away than
O ' )
with the New China that is coming and to c ome.H J And, in 
the eyes of the government, this was not necessarily a bad 
situation.
Public Health
As has been frequently mentioned, one of Weihaiwei*s
chief assets was its extremely healthy climate. The earliest
British observers noted that despite poverty conditions there
gk
was a remarkable absence of disease in the area. In 1902 
it was noted that the leasehold had managed to escape the 
epidemics which were prevalent in surrounding areas and it 
was free from both enteric and malarial fever,®^ The A d ­
miralty was, therefore, delighted to make use of Weihaiwei 
as a sanatorium and summer recreation area for the fleet.
Yet there was room for improvement in matters of public health 
and the earliest British colonial administrators soon took 
steps in that direction.
Unlike the Germans at Kiaochow who compelled the C h i ­
nese residents of Tsingtao to live in a newly-constructed
86
village separate from the European quarter, the British, 
with a much smaller European population and budget at W e i ­
haiwei, at first simply chose to implement new sanitary r e g ­
ulations and replace those buildings which were considered
87
beyond repair on the island and in Port Edward. ( In addi­
tion, a sanitation officer made regular inspections of pub­
lic buildings, gutters were constructed, and latrines were 
frequently cleaned and whitewashed. In 1902 a new abattoir 
was erected on Liu-kung Tao as well as a market in Port E d ­
ward, while in 1909 two new dairies were built on the island 
and efforts were underway to get wells in Port Edward covered
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and fitted with pumps.
Medical facilities available in the leasehold were also
gradually improved. By 1902 there were free hospitals for
Chinese on the island and at Port Edward, and in 1904 a total
89
of over 5,700 patients were treated at the two institutions,
A free, voluntary smallpox vaccination program was also in­
augurated and over 7*500 people were innoculated in 1905 in 
the hospitals and by vaccinators going from village to v i l ­
lage in the rural areas. In spite of an outbreak of the 
disease in the walled town during that year, there were no 
cases reported in the Territory itself. It was decided, 
however, not to make vaccinations compulsory, but rather to 
try to persuade the local people of their beneficial results 
and thus gradually increase the numbers of those protected 
from the d i s e a s e . ^  In 1911 a further improvement was made 
in medical facilities with the establishment of another free 
hospital in the rural area beyond Port E d w a r d . ^  A serious 
public health problem arose in 1911 with the outbreak of 
plague at Chefoo and a highly effective campaign was launched 
to prevent it^ spreading into the leased territory. In addi­
tion to other measures, every effort was made to keep out­
siders from entering Weihaiwei with guards and village head-
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men posted along the b o r d e r s ,7
Steps were also taken at Weihaiwei to improve public 
health education. As suicides, especially among women, con­
tinued to be a problem the government issued instructions to 
village headmen on how to administer first a i d , ^  In 1909 
Commissioner Lockhart also had free copies of a specially 
printed text on hygiene distributed in the villages and local 
teachers were told to give instruction on the subject in the
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scho o l s .^
In summarizing the economic and social effects which 
the British administration had at Weihaiwei during its first 
decade there, one must conclude that the area was a consider­
ably different place in 1910 from what it had been in 1898. 
Perhaps the most notable improvement was in transport facil­
ities which, in addition to its duty-free status, greatly 
aided Weihaiwei*s economic growth. As we have seen, efforts 
to introduce new agricultural products and industries to 
the leasehold were somewhat unsuccessful due largely to tra­
ditional Chinese conservatism, lack of investment capital, 
and the uncertainty over British intentions to remain at W e i ­
haiwei .
Social change was similarly less than dramatic, al­
though one can cite improvements in standards of public health 
and educational opportunities as tangible benefits derived 
from the foreign presence. Perhaps the most important con­
tribution which the British made at Weihaiwei during their 
first decade there, however, was to provide a stable and rel a ­
tively efficient administration of the area based largely 
on existing village institutions. Those social and economic 
changes which occurred were, therefore, gradual and not dis­
ruptive of the quiet, traditional life for which Weihaiwei 
was noted. As we shall see, however, the ability of the 
British to maintain the peace in the leasehold was to be 
repeatedly challenged during the remaining years of their 
tenure there as even this small backwater of rural China 
was soon caught up in a series of violent political events 
with far-reaching consequences.
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Chapter 4 
Weihaiwei and the 1911 Revolution
Shantung Provincial Assembly Election of 1Q09
British relations with local and provincial authorities 
evidently remained quite good throughout the last few years 
of the Ch'ing. Thus, in 1909 when the court called for the 
election of provincial assemblies as part of its modern re­
forms, officials were sent to Weihaiwei to register persons 
qualified to vote. There were 355 such people in the leased 
Territory,* or roughly .2kfo of the total population. This 
is a somewhat lower figure than the proportion of electoral 
voters to population in Shantung as a whole which was .38$.
It is also below the average figure for the entire country 
which was .^2$ and only slightly above the lowest provincial
p
figure which was Heilungkiang at .23$. Given what we know 
about the income and educational levels in the area, however, 
such a small number of electors is not surprising. Accord­
ing to the method of indirect elections which the Ch'ing gov­
ernment had established for the new assemblies, each magister­
ial district was divided into a number of precincts where the 
first round of voting took place, A fixed number of delegates* 
was chosen to form an electoral college which then elected 
Shantung's one hundred assembly members. One of these assem­
blymen, Yd Ch'dn-hsdan (Yd Yung), was from the leased Terri­
tory and was later to figure dramatically in local events 
surrounding the 1911 revolution.
When Commissioner Lockhart requested information about 
the 190Q election from his secretary to government, he was 
furnished with clippings from the North China Daily News de­
scribing some of the corrupt practices which took place during
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China*s first experience with modern democracy. He also 
noted that the attitude of the Weihaiwei community was gen- 
erally one of "good-natured m d i f f  e r ence." The modern 
scholar Chang P ’eng-yttan states that with the franchise 
available only to an extremely small portion of the male 
elite, most Chinese in 1909 were apathetic toward the elec­
tion. He notes that an even.more serious defect was the ex­
istence of fairly widespread bribery. In spite of these dif­
ficulties, however, the elections did serve to introduce
Western practices of self-government to China for the first 
4
t i m e ,
More significantly, those who were elected to the assem­
blies found themselves in a new and powerful position to in­
fluence local and even national affairs. Buck notes, for 
example, that in Shantung the "lower gentry," though "still 
underrepresented in proportion to their r;numerical strength," 
made clear gains in both status and power through the pro­
vincial assembly. The "upper gentry," too, gained a new 
access route to political power since by the traditional
laws of avoidance they had never before been allowed to serve
*5m  their home areas. He goes on to describe how Tsinan be­
came the main setting for provincial political and commer­
cial interests to assert themselves in the last decade of 
the Ch’ing dynasty. When the revolution took place in 1911 
it was the new provincial assemblies which played a leading 
role in bringing down the Ch*ing regime,^
Earlier chapters of this thesis have dealt with the 
conservatism of Weihaiwei*s largely rural population which 
was perhaps even reinforced by the British preference for 
traditional administrative methods and their protection of
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local village social structure. The foreign presence here 
certainly did not make Weihaiwei*s inhabitants feel any less 
Chinese nor did the leasehold boundaries cut them off from
events taking place in neighboring towns and villages. Al­
though daily life in the Territory continued to be fairly 
tranquil, however, and the majority of people, as elsewhere, 
did not participate in the election, there was a growing 
awareness of national and international affairs, especially 
among the younger generation. One district officer made the 
following observation in 1911 concerning boys at the Govern­
ment Free School in Port Edwards
. . . they have a sturdy patriotism and a
tendency to take a keen interest in the 
political conditions of China. This ten­
dency was visible long before the outbreak 
of the Revolution. The work of some of 
the young essayists affords an interesting 
proof that the educated people of Weihaiwei, 
while conspicuously law-abiding and submissive 
to our rule, remain true Chinese at heart, 
and make no pretense of being sentimentally 
attached to the British flag.?
There is no direct evidence of involvement by Weihaiwei*s
secondary students in the revolutionary activities which
characterized such modern schools as the Shan-tso kung-hstieh
in Tsinan, the Tung-mou kung-hstieh and the Yd ts’ai hstteh-
t *ang in Chefoo, the Chung-hstieh f a n g  in Teng-chou, and so
Q
many others scattered throughout Shantung. Yet one suspects 
that when political events outside Weihaiwei took a sudden 
and dramatic revolutionary turn in October 19Hi there were 
many occasions when British officials wondered how long the 
terms "law-abiding and submissive" would continue to accurately 
describe the local population.
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The Revolution of 1911
Eastern Shantung, and especially Chefoo, played an in­
teresting if somewhat complicated role in the revolution.
As one scholar has noted: "In the weeks immediately follow­
ing the Wu-ch'ang uprising, Tsinan and Chefoo became the two 
centers of political activity in Shantung. . . , Chefoo was 
the outpost of militant republicanism, where military men, 
police, the chamber of commerce, and newspapermen all favored
O
the Republican cause," Thus, the declaration at Tsinan of 
Shantung's independence from the central government occurred 
almost simultaneously with the establishment of a revolu­
tionary government at Chefoo on 12 November. The two oper­
ations were, however, carried out quite separately. Although 
nominally under the jurisdiction of Wen-teng hsien, officials 
in the walled town of Weihai, taking instructions from the
republicans at Chefoo, peacefully declared the town also in-
10dependent of the central government. Neither Wen-teng nor
Jung-ch’eng hsien, however, declared their independence until
somewhat later.
Meanwhile, the British commissioner at Weihaiwei, in
assessing the situation for the Colonial Office, noted that
in spite of the events at Chefoo there was no great cause
for alarm and all was quiet in the Territory. His one fear
was that there might be an influx of refugees from other parts
of China suffering from famine and various other hardships.
As a precautionary measure, therefore, he stationed guards
11at several points along the Territorial borders. Soon 
afterward he was instructed by the Colonial Office to commu­
nicate with the revolutionary officials in the surrounding 
area only so far as was strictly necessary so as to avoid
160
12
implying formal recognition of their authority. Lockhart's 
superiors were most anxious that British neutrality be pre­
served in this instance, but, as we shall see, the commis­
sioner was to have great difficulty in doing so.
The revolution at Tsinan turned out to be extremely 
shortilived, but"while it lasted it involved Lockhart in an 
intriguing series of communications from Shantung's Governor 
Sun Pao-ch'i. As one might expect, Sun, under pressure from 
the revolutionaries, was anxious to protect himself in a 
highly volatile situation. Immediately following his reluc­
tant announcement of Shantung's independence, he wrote to 
Lockhart to inform him of the event. Lockhart found the 
letter quite remarkable and described it as follows in a con­
fidential communication with the British ambassador:
The despatch which I have now received from 
the Governor is so skillfully worded in the 
original that it would be very difficult if 
not impossible for anyone who read it and who 
was not acquainted with the actual position 
of affairs to realise that it emanated from 
the head of a government that had declared 
its independence. In addition to the equivo­
cal nature of the language employed in his 
despatch, it is sealed with the official seal 
used by the Governor of Shantung in communi­
cations addressed to his Government before 
the declaration of his independence of the 
Province and is dated the third year of the 
reign of the present Emperor of China . 1 3
In a message which Lockhart also sent along to the ambassador
from the revolutionary leader at Chefoo to the governor, the
latter is referred to as "president" and the revolutionary
1 -^dating system is used. A translation of Sun's letter to
Lockhart reads as follows:
The present state of affairs presents many 
difficulties and the people's minds are 
restless and disturbed. In view of the 
circumstances, the gentry, merchants, and 
scholars of the province have submitted a
petition in which they have requested me 
to devise some means of dealing with the 
situation.15
He goes on to emphasize his duty of adopting a temporary ex­
pedient to protect the common good and reassures Lockhart 
that foreigners will be protected. He also flatters the com­
missioner by saying that he has always been "most sincere" 
in his political relations and he is sure that he would un­
derstand his position.1^
By 2 k November Sun, it would seem, had been drawn more 
securely into the revolutionary web and in another letter 
to Lockhart referred to himself as the "Commander-in-Chief 
of the Commandery of the Republic of China in Shantung," not­
ing that he had been publicly elected to the position by the 
people of the province in order to prevent chaos from develop­
ing. He also pointed out, however, that it was impossible 
at this point for orders from the Ch'ing authorities to have 
any effect at a distance. This time he signed the letter as
Commander-in-Chief, but combined dating systems, using the
17lunar day and month but the revolutionary year. '
Soon afterward on 30 November, Sun Pao-ch'i, following
Ytian Shih-k'ai's instructions, revoked Shantung's independence
and again wrote to Lockhart recounting the sequence of events
leading to this state of affairs:
My chief duty as Governor is to protect the 
province under my charge and to preserve 
peace among the people. In taking the steps 
already narrated I did so regardless of my 
personal reputation, and yielded to the pres­
sure of circumstances solely on account of tem­
porary exigencies and in order to maintain 
public tranquillity. Now, however, affairs 
are gradually resuming their normal condi­
tion . , .1°
This time he once again used the governor's official seal.
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Sun's remarkable ability to steer a safe path through an ex­
ceedingly dangerous period apparently saved him from execu­
tion as a traitor. He was also fortunate in being on good
1 °terms with Yttan Shih-k'ai and this no doubt aided his cause, ' 
The interesting point in this correspondence* however, was, 
as Lockhart observed, the cleverly understated way in which 
Sun downplayed the revolutionary nature of his position. One
senses that he was in a very subtle way assuming that Lock­
hart, as a fellow administrator, would understand his deli-
$
cate situation. He almost seems to take him into his confi­
dence as a sort of ally. He may also have been eager to
forestall possible foreign intervention by reassuring Lock-
20hart of his good intentions.
Although Shantung at this stage was officially back 
in the loyalist camp, however, the revolutionaries at Chefoo 
continued to maintain their independence for many months.
In fact, the more radical elements operating at the treaty 
port attempted in December to force the city's military com­
mander to march to Tsinan, arrest the government officials 
there, and install himself as president of Shantung. This 
effort was successfully resisted by the more moderate com­
mander who, with insufficient troops and funds, was eager 
to maintain, the armistice recently arranged with Tsinan
authorities. Subsequently, most of the radicals were either
21deported to or fled to Manchuria.
By mid-January 1912, however, the commander was forced 
to give way to a new military government sent from Shanghai 
with several ships and 2,500 troops. These men had been 
ordered by republican leaders to establish a revolutionary 
provincial headquarters at Chefoo since Tsinan was once again
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under Manchu control. Although some of the republican forces 
succeeded in taking the prefectural capital of Teng-chou and 
advancing into Huang hsien, government troops prevented them 
from going any further toward Peking. As the British consul 
at Chefoo noted, the revolutionaries were able to recruit 
local "coolies" to serve as soldiers but with no training 
and old weapons they suffered heavy casualties against gov­
ernment regulars and deserted in large numbers. There was 
also a fundamental division in the local revolutionary forces 
between those serving under General Lan T ’ien-wei, the rebel­
lious tu-tu of Manchuria, and the main group of southern 
troops who refused to support the northerners. Matters be­
came even worse for the revolutionary regime at Chefoo when 
the Chamber of Commerce, backed by local police and soldiers, 
forced the unpopular new tu-tu to resign. His attempts to 
squeeze large financial contributions from the merchants by 
holding their stocks of opium for ransom and other measures 
completely alienated the business community. The southern 
revolutionaries subsequently complied with requests for a 
change in leadership and a new man was sent to take over at 
Chefoo, but he fared no better in uniting the various mili­
tary forces. The separatist movement by late March posed
22no serious threat to Ytlan Shih-k'ai in Peking.
Although eventually defeated in their broader national 
objective, the new revolutionary troops which arrived at Che­
foo in mid-January caused serious political repercussions 
throughout the surrounding area. As one observer described 
the situation*
Villages and towns which had hitherto remained 
quiescent, enjoying a 'nominal independence' 
under their former Magistrates, were pushed by
extremists into taking more effective m e a ­
sures to show their sympathy with the r e v ­
olutionist movement. District magistrates 
were dismissed and local champions of free­
dom elected in their stead.
It was at this time that both Wen-teng and Jung-ch*eng hsien
demonstrated their support for the republican cause.
The independent walled town of Weihai had up until 
this point caused the British no trouble, but that was now 
to change. Upon learning that the town's magistrate had on 
23 January been arrested in his own yamen by a band of rev­
olutionaries who had marched through the Territory from Wen- 
teng, the British district officer went to investigate the 
situation for himself. He discovered- that the magistrate 
was indeed being held, supposedly under orders from the new 
independent Wen-teng hsien government. The revolutionaries 
were threatening him and demanding money although he insisted 
he had none. The British district officer promptly ordered 
the rebels out of the yamen, placed it under protective guard, 
and escorted the magistrate to Port Edward, Since two of 
the rebel leaders were residents of the Territory, one a 
Cantonese and the other a schoolmaster of a village school, 
who stated that they were instructed to take over the yamen 
by the Wen-teng government, the district officer demanded 
that they appear before him in court and provide guarantees 
that they would cause no more trouble at Weihaiwei. If they 
failed to do so they would face banishment from the Terri­
tory, He emphasized that as Great Britain was maintaining 
official neutrality with respect to the revolution, Terri­
torial residents could not be allowed to participate in it. 
^he Cantonese revolutionary then decided to leave the area 
but the schoolteacher produced the necessary guarantee and
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2^remained in Weihaiwei.
Meanwhile, it became clear that a member of one of the 
most influential families in the walled town, who was also 
head of the Chamber of Commerce there and a personal enemy 
of the Chinese magistrate, had taken a leading role in the 
affair.^ Most of the other businessmen in the town, how­
ever, were opposed to this man and desired that the former 
magistrate be reinstated. In a petition addressed to the 
secretary to government at Weihaiwei, representatives of 
ninety-two firms requested that the revolutionary government 
at Chefoo be informed of their wishes. The official trans­
lation of the petition mentions so-called "bad characters" 
who had plotted with members of the revolutionary party and 
seized the opportunity to gratify their "private spite" 
against the magistrate, It also expresses fear that disaster 
will befall the "commercial classes" of the town if he is 
removed as "all power will fall into the hands of mean crea­
tures whose sole aim will be the filling of their own purses." 
The petition refers to the harmonious relations which had 
previously existed between merchants in the Territory and
in the town as well as those between the British magistrate
2 7and the Chinese magistrate.
The commissioner did in fact inform the British consul
at Chefoo of the petition and he in turn notified the Chinese
head of government there that if the rebels took over in the
? 8walled town the British would have nothing to do with them.
The consul, however, was not very confident that the Chefoo 
authorities would act decisively to reinstate the magistrate. 
In a cable to Lockhart he made the following comment: "I
fear . , . that influence of new government over surrounding
districts is very slight and steps calculated to restrain
action of independent revolutionaries are only reluctantly
taken as those in power fear to expose themselves to attack
2 Qon account of supposed lukewarmness m  the ca u s e . ” ■ In 
spite of these fears, the magistrate was reinstated but was 
personally reluctant to accept the post since for many months 
he had received no salary. Again the British at Weihaiwei 
intervened to ensure his return. For many years they had 
paid the magistrate in the walled town a supplementary salary 
of $40 per month to ensure the maintenance of order there 
and, although they had withheld payment since November pend­
ing recognition of the republic, it was decided to resume 
the arrangement so that stability could be restored. The 
magistrate subsequently returned to his job,^°
One of the most striking features of this attempted 
takeover in the walled town was the way in which long-standin 
oersonal quarrels became the basis for political action.
The revolution and its ideology at this point seem quite 
irrelevant to the power struggle which took place between 
one group of influential citizens in the town and another. 
What the unstable environment of this revolutionary period 
did provide, of course, was the opportunity for one group
to attempt a power grab from the other. It is not clear,
however, whether the revolutionaries from Wen-teng hsien were 
manipulating the situation for their advantage or whether 
they in fact were being used by the head of the Chamber of
Commerce for his own purposes. No doubt it was a case of
mutual opportunism. The decisive factor in the affair, and 
one perhaps not taken into prior consideration by the rebels, 
was the interventionist attitude taken by British officials
16?
in the leased Territory.
One could certainly question whether the British were 
within their rights to involve themselves in this political 
squabble. Initially there was some confusion over the mat­
ter at the Colonial Office in London with at least one per­
son noting that in urging the Chefoo revolutionaries to comply 
with the..merchant petition to reinstate the former magistrate
of the town, Commissioner Lockhart was interfering in mat-
31ters which were not strictly his business. In the end the 
Colonial Office more or less agreed that at least the dis­
trict officer’s intervention in the town had been necessary
and proper under the terms of the original Weihaiwei conven-
32tion in order to preserve order within the Territory, One 
might still question, however, whether or not the’British 
were maintaining strict neutrality with respect to the revo­
lution. In effect, by evicting the rebels affiliated with 
the Wen-teng faction from the yamen, by recommending the pre­
vious magistrate’s reinstatement, and by resuming payment of 
his “salary,” they were taking the side of one faction as 
opposed to another. Although the walled town did not cause 
further trouble of this sort, the commissioner was soon faced 
with a potentially much more dangerous situation on his bor­
ders .
It will be remembered that revolutionary forces operat­
ing on the Shantung promontory were far from united in lead­
ership, or objectives. The new tu^tu, Hu Ying, sent by Sun 
Yat-sen to take over the independent government at Chefoo in 
February 1912 at first seemed unable to assert his authority 
over the various military units. In some areas brutality and 
extortion became commonplace as troops sought to maintain
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themselves. ^  The "revolution" which had taken place earlier 
in both Wen-teng and Jung-ch*eng hsien and resulted in dec­
larations of independence from the central government, had 
been relatively peaceful affairs similar to that at Chefoo 
itself. Small groups of revolutionary soldiers and members 
of the T *ung-meng-hui had been dispatched by the new mili­
tary government at Chefoo to various hsien capitals in the 
area, including Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng, where they were 
expected to gather arms and enlist local people in the effort 
to overthrow Ch’ing officials. The strategy of actual take­
over seems to have been the same at both places. Relatively 
small groups, perhaps less than a hundred, armed with only 
a few modern weapons, but mainly axes and farm implements, 
entered the towns at dawn and met no resistance from the few 
regular troops on guard duty. The majority of yamen func­
tionaries had already fled and it was an easy matter for the 
revolutionaries to occupy the administrative buildings and 
establish new military governments, Chinese accounts of this 
period, however, emphasize that they were handicapped by hav­
ing so few personnel and made the mistake of trusting and 
retaining some former yamen employees who, in league with 
local influential citizens and "evil gentry," eventually 
turned against them. They also admit to making inadequate 
defense preparations, no doubt assuming that their revolu­
tionary program would readily win over the "hearts and minds" 
34of the people,
mhe Counter-Revolution in Wen-teng and Jung-ch*;eng hsien
The new revolutionary regimes proved to be extremely 
short-lived. By early February waves of counter-revolutionary
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violence swept the young administrators from office and r e ­
sulted in many deaths. The available sources on these events 
are unclear as to exactly why and how such a situation could . 
have occurred, but if one pieces the various accounts to­
gether, it is possible to arrive at a reasonably accurate 
picture of what took place. Official British sources and 
newspaper stories point to a pattern of "high-handed" inter­
ference by the revolutionaries in traditional customs which 
incensed the rural population. For example, the temple of 
the city god at Jung-ch'eng was reportedly cleared of idols 
by the republicans and pressure was brought to bear on local 
people not to burn incense at the new year festivities. Per­
haps even more serious were the new regimes' threats to sell 
off common land used by villages for grazing purposes. Fu r ­
thermore, it was stipulated that no headgear, clothing, or 
buttons of rank associated with the Ch'ing regime could be 
worn. There were also reports of brutality and extortion on 
the part of certain military forces in the area, while revo­
lutionary sympathizers were said to have gone from village 
to village demanding money and, in some cases, threatening 
to hold people for ransom until they got i t . ^  Bearing in 
mind the complete lack of centralized governmental authority 
on the promontory at this time, it is not difficult to see 
how such chaos occurred. Likewise, with the disruption of 
normal revenue-collecting procedures, financing the various 
new regimes quickly became a problem. And, as the revolu­
tionaries themselves readily admit, they were desperately 
short of experienced personnel to staff the government offices 
as well as soldiers and weapons to defend them.
Those who have written about their treatment at
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the hands of the counter-revolutionary forces tend to d e ­
scribe 'them as a combination of disgruntled ex-imperial offi­
cials, "evil gentry," local bullies, and ordinary villagers 
who were incited to riot,-^ Certainly, one can understand 
how the former occupants of local power positions could have 
recognized the weaknesses of the new regimes as well as their 
unpopularity with a conservative rural population and organized 
a movement to recover the hsien capitals. One can also ima­
gine groups of villagers themselves spontaneously resisting 
the "high-handed" interference in their traditional way of 
life and organizing the defense of their own areas. From the 
available information it is difficult to determine exactly 
who led the "counter-revolution." What is clear is that dif­
ferent groups played varying roles depending upon location, 
circumstances, and timing of a given incident.
It appears that the initial impetus to recapture the 
hsien capitals may well have been organized by former offi­
cials and certain influential citizens who were unhappy at 
their loss of power and, in some cases, wealth to the young 
revolutionaries. These people seem to have joined forces 
with bandit leaders and others to mobilize ordinary villagers 
who were resentful of the treatment they had received from 
the new republican regimes. The villagers* dissatisfaction 
undoubtedly stemmed in part from demands for money and inter­
ference with local customs. This combination of people then 
acted with appalling brutality in the retaking of both Wen- 
teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien in mid-February 1912. They greatly 
outnumbered the handful of revolutionaries occupying the 
towns and thus easily overpowered them even with the old 
weapons at their disposal. A few republican officials and
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soldiers managed to escape into the leased Territory but many 
faced torture and execution at the hands of the angry mob.-^ 
The new republican tu-tu at Chefoo, Hu Ying, at first 
repudiated the actions of his fellow revolutionaries in Wen- 
teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien and refused to take action against 
the counter-revolutionaries. Hu was facing considerable dif­
ficulties at this time with a defiant group of so-called "pro­
gressive" party members who were in control at the prefectural 
city of Teng-chou, and the threat of open hostilities between
himself and the new acting governor of Shantung, Chang Huang­
'S Q
ch'ien. Commissioner Lockhart was also finding the situa­
tion increasingly alarming with large numbers of refugees 
streaming into the Territory from the two neighboring hsien 
and a growing possiblity of violence and banditry spreading 
over the borders.
The Weihaiwei Peace Conference and its Aftermath
In addition to requesting one hundred British troops
to guard Weihaiwei*s boundaries, Lockhart decided about this
time to offer Port Edward as a neutral meeting ground where
representatives from Chefoo, Wen-teng, and Jung-ch'eng could
4ocome to discuss means of restoring peace to the area. By 
the time the conference was held, however, the situation had 
greatly worsened as the Chefoo republicans had finally dis­
patched troops to Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng to suppress the 
uprising and punish the guilty parties. Their burning of 
villages further incensed the people and led to the retalia­
tory executions of several republican prisoners at Wen-teng, 
including Weihaiwei*s provincial assembly representative,
kl
YU Ch' tln-hsttan. The national political picture had also 
changed considerably with the abdication of the Hsttan-t'ung
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emperor on 12 February. Many people in the area around Wei-
42
haiwei, however, refused to believe the news.
After much confusion and delay the peace conference 
took place at Port Edward on 22 February and an agreement 
was quickly reached. The representatives of the Chefoo r e v ­
olutionary government promised to halt the advance of troops 
into the two hsien if the Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng peace de l ­
egates could persuade the counter-revolutionaries to return 
to their homes. After the agreement was reached, however, 
it was learned that the republican prisoners had been executed 
only the day before and more troops were being sent to the 
area from Chefoo. Many of the counter-revolutionaries by 
this time viewed the peace conference as a cover for further 
troop movements and several of the peace delegates were forced 
to hide for a time to avoid being captured by them. Some 
people also felt the British were to blame for calling the 
conference and spreading false stories of peace negotiations. 
Renewed efforts were made by certain counter-revolutionary
leaders to recruit villagers to fight with them and a fresh
4Tinflux of refugees poured into Weihaiwei, J
One especially incorrigible leader, and a native of 
the Territory, actually threatened to attack the leasehold 
itself if various queueless refugees who had fled there from 
Jung-ch'eng were not handed over to him. The British offi­
cial on the scene sent a communication to him emphasizing 
that, as his fu-mu kuan (or "father and mother official"), 
he would do his utmost to arrest him on a murder charge if
he did neturn- to the Territory. .The threat: evidently helped
44
dissuade him from launching an attack on Weihaiwei. This 
particular incident serves to illustrate two important points.
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First, it is clear that by this time various bandit leaders 
and their gangs were playing a leading role in the continu­
ing wave of violence sweeping the countryside around Weihai­
wei. Second, the British found themselves in a somewhat 
ironic predicament. Whereas one might have expected them 
to come under attack, at least verbally, from nationalist, 
anti-imperialist republican forces, they in fact had little 
difficulty with these people during the revolution. Rather 
it was the counter-revolutionaries who accused them of colla­
borating with the republicans who gave the greatest cause 
for alarm. One can safely assume that the republicans based 
in Chefoo, as in other treaty ports, were extremely fearful 
of military intervention by foreigners and thus took pains 
to avoid offending them. Some ofthe^less sophisticated "coun­
ter-revolutionaries," however, were not afraid to at least 
threaten the British at Weihaiwei. There is no evidence, 
though, of any actual physical violence being directed even 
by them at foreigners living inside or outside the leased 
Territory.
In the aftermath of the unsuccessful peace conference 
at Port Edward, many more republican troops were sent into 
Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien in early March 1912 and order 
was eventually restored. Both hsien capitals were retaken 
by the revolutionaries and those viewed as responsible for 
the counter-revolution were dealt with severely. Villages 
were burned and counter-revolutionary leaders shot in brutal 
retaliation for the earlier attacks on republican troops. J 
In a somewhat more conciliatory vein, however, a new procla­
mation was issued stipulating that temples earlier destroyed 
by the revolutionaries could be restored and traditional
17^
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theatrical performances resumed. Nevertheless, a renewed
campaign of queue-cutting in June and general unrest sent
more refugees fleeing into Weihaiwei and sporadic fighting
continued in the area until July, Commissioner Lockhart
found it necessary to retain a company of British soldiers
hn
in the leasehold until March 1913.
What conclusions can be drawn about Weihaiwei*s role 
throughout this turbulent period? Certainly, the British 
officials on the scene found themselves playing a not alto­
gether neutral part in the whole affair, When the sub-mag­
istrate at the walled town came under attack, for example, 
the British district officer and the commissioner acted as 
much more than intermediaries between the revolutionary 
authorities at Chefoo, the sub-magistrate at Weihai, and 
the business community there. A definite stand was taken 
in favor of the threatened official and the majority of -the 
Weihai merchants. This position was backed by physical force 
and the power of British influence over the revolutionary 
regime at Chefoo. It should be remembered, however, that 
most of the local leadership from the walled town, in fact, 
asked for British help in maintaining order there when one 
of their own citizens, in conjunction with an outside poli­
tical faction, sought to take advantage of the revolution 
to further his personal ambitions. The fact that the walled 
town was surrounded by British territory, though, served to 
insulate it from the much more violent disturbances which 
later broke out in Wen-teng and Jung-ch-eng.
When the counter-revolution erupted it was the Brit­
ish again who sought to defuse the situation by advocating 
a peace conference on neutral ground at Port Edward. Leading
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Chinese merchants within the leasehold, at the urging of
the British, agreed to use their influence in Wen-teng hsien
to persuade the counter-revolutionaries to send representa-
LlR
tives to the conference. Commissioner Lockhart at various 
points offered his own suggestions to the Chefoo representa­
tives regarding the use of force to put down the disturbance
and acted as a conduit for proposals between them and the
i+o
counter-revolutionary delegates.
The Territory of Weihaiwei itself provided a convenient 
sanctuary for large numbers of refugees, including republi­
cans, anti-republicans, and innocent villagers simply escap­
ing the violence or trying to avoid being dragooned into the 
armed forces of either side. Peace delegates who found them­
selves threatened by counter-revolutionaries after the con­
ference, as well as certain wealthy families who were being 
pressed for financial contributions, also sought shelter in 
British territory , ^  Soon after the disturbances broke out 
the commissioner let it be known that he would not oppose 
the entrance of genuine refugees into the leasehold.^ This 
came, in fact, as a response to numerous written appeals
from various groups of villagers living close to the borders
CO
in Chinese territory. It is interesting in this connection
that British officials were regarded by at least some of the
grateful villagers as performing a most valuable service and
their work was acknowledged in terms of praise similar to
those which would have been accorded to upright native offi-
co
cials in traditional China,
As for the citizens of the leased Territory themselves, 
it seems that, with the exception of the incident at the 
walled town, no armed uprisings took place within the borders,
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either in sympathy with the republicans or the counter-revo­
lutionaries. Yet there were many who were actively involved 
in various sorts of political activities and Reginald John­
ston may have somewhat underestimated the appeal of repub­
lican ideology in the area when he wrote the following of 
the people of Weihaiwei: "For weeks their attitude was one
of silent incredulity. Enthusiasm for the revolution was 
wholly lacking in that little section of Confucius’s native 
province, and probably not fifty of its inhabitants had the 
slightest conception of what a republic was."^
4
According to Chinese sources, however, there was indeed 
a branch of the T *ung-meng-hui operating within the walled 
town which had been established by republicans sent from 
Chefoo. In fact, this branch was partly responsible for or­
ganizing the independence movements which captured the capi­
tals of Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien. It proved a conven­
ient hiding place for republican activists.-^ It would seem, 
however, that this branch kept its existence secret from 
the British as I have found no references to it in British 
sources. This is not surprising since they would undoubtedly 
not have approved of it had they known. Perhaps unknown to 
them as well was the fact that one of their own translators, 
Hsia Chun-ch’ing, actually aided several revolutionaries who 
had fled the violence in Jung-ch’eng hsien and took refuge 
in the walled town of Wei-hai. Presumably he provided them 
with food and helped them continue their political activi­
ties. No doubt he knew of their clandestine meetings at the 
home of a local prostitute where they wrote a report on the 
recent events at Jung-ch'eng and prepared two members of 
their group, dressed as merchants, to take a steamer to Chefoo
177
in order to request troops from the new tu-tu. When the 
counter-revolutionaries were finally suppressed and repub­
lican governments reestablished in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng, 
these political refugees were summoned out of hiding from
Weihaiwei to again take up various duties on behalf of the 
5 6new regimes.
There were also Weihaiwei residents who served as re­
publican activists in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng, at least 
five of whom were killed by counter-revolutionaries there 
as a result. If one analyzes the biographical information 
available for twenty-seven "martyrs” of the Wen-teng upris­
ing, it is apparent that the work of the revolution was not 
carried on by outsiders. Twenty-one of these people appear 
to have been from Wen-teng hsien, mostly from rural villages, 
and five were from the leased Territory, while only one was 
from Kwangtung. They were all male and, of the sixteen whose 
ages we know, ranged from twenty to forty-six sui, with ten 
being thirty or younger. Almost all of them had had some 
education, four had studied in Japan, and at least four were 
T 'ung-meng-hui members. Three held traditional degrees but 
ten had had a "modern" education. Fourteen were from edu­
cated families, four of these being prominent ones, and appar­
ently only four came from poor backgrounds. Four were spe­
cifically involved in commerce of some sort and at least 
seven were teachers. Eleven were related to one another.
Compared to Rhoads' sample of Revolutionary Alliance 
members from Kwangtung, it would seem this group was some­
what older, less well-traveled, and less wealthy. Like his 
sample, though, they mostly bridge the Confucian and post- 
Confucian eras in China, with many having begun their school­
ing in the traditional manner and then having continued with
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some version of the "new learning." The formal revolutionary 
party does not seem to have been a factor for most of them, 
and one suspects that family or school ties were of greater 
importance in persuading them to work for the r e v olution .^  
Sympathy for the revolution apparently also extended 
to ordinary Weihaiwei residents who perhaps had not assumed 
leadership roles as those mentioned above, but had at least 
cut their queues and participated to some extent in the r e ­
publican activities at Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng. They were 
then terrified that the counter-revolutionaries would kill 
them if they succeeded in entering the T e r r i t o r y . T h e r e  
were also some rather infamous former Territorial residents 
who became notable for their cruelty in leading counter­
revolutionary violence on the other side of the border. Lock­
hart was even requested, in the event peace negotiations
failed, to prevent these men from carrying out further atroci-
cq
ties in the area.
Clearly, then, the rather artificial leasehold b o u n d ­
aries which were indicated only by a few stone markers and 
nuite inadequately patrolled by a few British soldiers could 
not possibly isolate Weihaiwei from the political turmoil 
taking place on the Shantung promontory in 1911 and 1912. 
Although the British proclaimed their Territory neutral, pro­
hibited political activity either for or against the revolu­
tion, and the movement of troops through the area, they were 
unable to completely block either the flow of ideas or people 
across their borders. It is true, however, that the people 
of Weihaiwei, as well as many refugees from the two neighbor-
h s i e n , were spared the worst violence and disruption of
^ o
this period because of British jurisdiction. This security
179
was to become even more important in the chaotic warlord 
years to follow.
Perhaps the most significant question which arises r e ­
garding the 1911 revolution in the eastern-most portion of 
Shantung is why, living in such close proximity to the strongly 
pro-republican treaty port of Chefoo, the people of this 
area reacted so violently against it in 1912. In spite of 
the usual image of the republican revolution as a mild, rela­
tively bloodless affair, there were estimates of at least 
seven hundred people being killed during and after the Wen-
Jung counter-revolution, with many more made homeless or
£>1
faced with other hardships. Even if, as the Chinese sources 
indicate, certain "evil gentry," former officials, and "local 
bullies" did succeed in organizing the villagers to oppose 
the fledgling republican regimes, it is not entirely clear 
how they did so. One account, however, states that 98^  of 
those involved were using the revolution as a cover for set­
tling private quarrels and they were not really very loyal 
to the emperor. Furthermore, this source maintains that the 
targets of the violence were not merely those who had actively 
led the revolution, but anyone who had gone to a modern 
school and read "new books," All were branded as yang or 
foreign.
It is necessary to remember here how conservative and 
remote the rural promontory was at this time. Transportation 
and communication links with Chefoo were extremely poor. The 
literacy rate was low and the economy was dependent, not 
upon treaty port trade, but agriculture as it had been for 
generations. If Weihaiwei village life is any sort of model, 
and one suspects it was not unusual, then traditional social
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and political structures must have been largely intact in 
Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien. Certainly, there were very 
few foreigners, including missionaries, living in the area.
In short, contact with the outside world had been rather 
limited prior to 1911. Thus, the sudden emergence in 1912 
of queueless young republicans who installed themselves in 
the official yamen and immediately set to work implementing 
revolutionary economic and social programs could not fail 
to alienate large portions of the population, especially 
when this led to interference in local customs and the col­
lecting of new taxes.
In assessing the chances for revolutionary success in 
a given area, Rhoads has stressed the importance of what he 
calls "the climate of opinion." '  In certain parts of Kwang­
tung where large numbers of people responded to the call for 
revolution, for example, confidence in the Ch'ing government 
had fallen to very low levels. Rhoads remarks:
Clearly, by the end of the summer of 1911 
most groups in Kwangtung, gentry, merchants, 
students, and peasants, had become disen­
chanted with their government. The recurrent 
panics in Canton, the growing number of peas­
ant anti-tax riots, the frequent criticism of 
the officials in the press and in memorials 
to the throne, the sometimes blatant sympathy 
for accused revolutionaries all indicated that 
public confidence,in the government had prac­
tically vanished.6^
The people of Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng simply did not seem 
to have such grievances against the government, The late 
Ch'ing reform movement which had succeeded in raising expec­
tations elsewhere in the province apparently did not have 
much of an impact in this area. Perhaps local people were 
not called upon to subsidize reform measures, such as new 
schools, and thus did not engage in anti-tax riots. Nor had
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the area become dependent upon commercialized agriculture 
and experienced sharp ups and downs in its economic fortunes 
as had say the region around Canton just prior to the revo­
lution.^ Organizations which played a prominent role in 
the republican movement in South China such as secret socie­
ties and local militia forces used in the frequent feuds be­
tween strong lineages there do not appear to have been very 
active in the area in and around Weihaiwei.
Roxann Prazniak has attributed the serious tax protest 
which erupted in eastern Shantung's Lai-yang hsien in 1910 
to an alliance of small and middle farmers, some small mer­
chants, artisans, and small landlords who were opposed to 
the abuses of a group of merchant tax-farmers implementing 
late Ch'ing reforms. She describes how a new county politi­
cal elite had emerged in this area based on the extensive 
commercial interests of these tax-farming firms but still 
dependent upon degree status and bureaucratic influence. The 
new elite, according to Prazniak, was increasingly less moti­
vated to respect the traditional community authority struc- 
ture and this led to a violent rebellion. Though Prazniak 
does not see a direct relationship between this incident and 
the revolution of 1911, it does serve to illustrate the kind 
of rural unrest present in some parts of Shantung in the clos­
ing years of the Ch'ing dynasty. Perhaps one could also 
argue that the apparent absence of such unrest at this time 
in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng and certainly in Weihaiwei may 
again indicate the continued existence of a largely tradi­
tional authority structure. The British, at least, went to 
great lengths to preserve this structure within the leased 
Territory. It also seems safe to say that this area, unlike
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Lai-yang, did not show any extensive growth of commercial 
interests which could have provided a new political elite.
In any event, the intensity of counter-revolutionary senti­
ment in Wen-Jung would tend to suggest that radical repub­
lican activists sent to the area were not attuned to the 
area's conservative biases.
Yet one must be careful not to create the impression 
that Weihaiwei and its neighboring hsien remained impervious 
to political change. The impact of a new national and poli­
tical awareness came to be recognized by the leasehold's 
British administrators in the fall of 1912. The district 
officer resident in the interior of the leasehold voiced his 
concern over the possible consequences if troops which had 
been temporarily stationed along the border were removed.
He observed: ". . . I have reason to believe that there is
a steady, pro-republic propaganda being carried on within the
territory, and that new ideas of patriotism . . . are gradu-
67ally making way among the people,” f He went on to point 
out that people were making a real effort to inform themselves 
as to current affairs in the outside world:
Newspapers are eagerly read in villages 
where until last year a newspaper was hardly 
ever seen. A few days ago a district head­
man astonished me by his familiarity with the 
'Loan Question* in Peking. . . . The problem 
of Tibet, is mentioned by simple farmers who 
til recently hardly knew that such a place 
existed; and I have good reason to believe 
that the denunciations of Great Britain by 
the irresponsible vernacular press in connec­
tion with various outstanding political ques­
tions are becoming matters of daily discussion, 
and cannot fail to foster the growth of a feel­
ing of restlessness,68
The awakening of nationalism at Weihaiwei made itself 
felt in an even more dramatic way about this same time when 
a nuestion arose as to whether local residents would be
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allowed to vote in forthcoming elections for the Provincial 
Assembly at Tsinan and the National Assembly at Peking. Both 
the British minister in Peking and colonial officials in Lon­
don initially took the position that Chinese authorities 
should not be allowed into the Territory even to make a list 
of qualified voters since Great Britain did not yet recognize 
the new republic. In the end, perhaps partly due to the stren­
uous complaints of the British commissioner at Weihaiwei, 
the Foreign Office ruled that it had no objection to Chinese 
electoral deputies making private inquiries within the Terri­
tory to obtain the information they required so that local
people could exercise the franchise they retained as Chinese 
6 0
citizens. The election, however, was not allowed to take
place within Weihaiwei, Local residents had to go to Chinese
territory to cast their ballots. This decision must have
been a welcome one to the British district officer in the
interior of Weihaiwei who had earlier received a petition
from various village headmen complaining that no steps had
70been taken to allow them to vote. Commenting on the level 
of discontent which had arisen over this issue, the British 
official noted: ". , , the people of our Territory are in­
clined to repudidate any suggestion that the temporary resi­
dence of three or four British officials in their midst
affects in any way their rights and privileges as Chinese 
71subjects. " f
So it would seem a great deal had changed at Weihaiwei 
in the years following the arrival of the British to the 
area in 18Q8, Local fears, as reflected in the boundary dis­
turbances of 1900, that the British had come to confiscate 
their land and levy onerous taxes had been alleviated and
184
the leasehold had even functioned rather smoothly under the 
foreigners with some tangible economic and social benefits 
to the Chinese living there. But gradually as change worked 
its way into the social fabric at Weihaiwei the British were 
forced to deal with a threat to their authority which could 
in the long run prove far more devastating than that posed 
by mobs of angry villagers shouting abuse and wielding clubs 
as they had in 1900. New ideas about the very nature of 
society and the way it should be ordered were slowly taking 
hold .in this tiny piece of British territory, a fact of which 
the colonial officials working there were quite well aware.^
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Chapter 5 
Weihaiwei in the Wake of Revolution
Although the worst of the revolutionary and counter­
revolutionary violence in the area surrounding Weihaiwei 
ended during the summer of 1912, it was some time before 
life returned to normal in the Territory. The unsettled 
conditions and influx of both refugees and various disrepu­
table characters led to an increase in serious crime with 
murders reported for the first time since the British had 
administered the area.* Piracy was also a problem on the 
Shantung promontory and posed a threat to coastal villages 
and local fishermen alike. Thus, the British decided in 
January 1912 to send a naval cruiser to patrol the long 
coastline which legally fell within their sphere of influence. 
Reginald Johnston went along on this mission and reported 
that when he and the crew called at various towns and vil­
lages seeking information about the pirates they received
2a warm welcome from beleaguered local inhabitants. So suc­
cessful were later navy raids in capturing some of the 
scoundrels that two Weihaiwei fishermen were deliberately 
murdered as a retaliatory gesture by others. Pirate raids 
had been a problem in this area, it will be remembered, 
since the Northern Wei dynasty (A.D. 386-53*0 and were not 
to be wholly eliminated even by the well-armed British Navy.
Economic Conditions and the Question of Government Revenue
In spite of this unrest, however, there was actually 
a decrease in the number of civil cases brought to court in 
the leasehold in 1912 as economic uncertainty and the general 
distraction of political events apparently prevented people
19^
from seeking arbitration as frequently as they had previous-
il
ly. Trade, though not dramatically active, did not suffer 
the disruption experienced at Chefoo or in many other parts 
of China at this time. Nevertheless, British officials ex­
pressed dismay that foreign capital could not be attracted 
to the area and noted that the trade which existed was fi­
nanced largely by Chinese investors. The question of long­
term British intentions at Weihaiwei still remained unre­
solved and discouraged greater commercial development. As 
one official remarkedt "One after the other schemes for 
building godowns so that the. Port might become a depot for 
goods going north to Tientsin and North China, schemes for 
oil mills and silk filatures, schemes for fruit firms have 
all fallen through . . In spite of this handicap, how­
ever, the local population was showing signs of increasing 
prosperity and land prices around Port Edward were rising.
In fact, economic conditions in Weihaiwei improved 
to such an extent that in 1913 and 1914 the British were 
able to implement new revenue-raising schemes without en­
countering serious opposition. After consultations with 
district headmen in 1913> it was decided to impose a tax 
on carts and wheelbarrows in order to help finance the re­
pair and maintenance of Territorial roads. The headmen sug­
gested that increases in petition fees (from $2.00 to $3*00) 
and in registration fees for land sales would also be accep­
table, but they did not recommend raising the rate of land 
taxation,^
In 1914 the question of how to increase revenue was 
explored still further with District Officer Moss proposing’ 
that all land be registered for a fee, that it be reassessed
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for tax purposes, and that henceforth registration of land 
be made compulsory. He argued that the old Chinese registers 
were completely inaccurate and that land taxes collected be­
tween 1905 and 1914 had been virtually the same each year 
at roughly $24,500. Many landowners held so-called "white 
deeds" which dated from before the British occupation, were 
unsealed, and had no legal sanction. These people, he pointed 
out, were simply evading the registration fees. Moss went 
on to note that in the distant past when the population of 
the Weihaiwei area had been much smaller and emigration less 
common, land had frequently been held under government grants 
in large, vaguely defined tracts. As the population grew 
and these tracts were subdivided it was rare to find a par­
cel of land exceeding twenty mou and most holdings at the 
time of the British occupation were ten mou or less. Yet 
even after land had been subdivided many times, Moss asserted, 
old inaccurate deeds were retained. His plan was to make 
the registers correspond with actual holdings and compel 
everyone to purchase a deed issued by the British authori­
ties. Thus, the land tax would be paid by individuals rather
7
than in a lump sum by villages as was the current practice.
The district officer for the southern portion of Wei­
haiwei offered several arguments against this scheme. First, 
he noted that the British were not entitled to make pre- 
I898 land deeds appear somehow less valid than those issued
after the occupation. This, he observed, would call into
question the sovereign rights of the Chinese state. Fur­
thermore, it would place too heavy and onerous a burden on 
Weihaiwei*s headmen to make them responsible for the revalu­
ation of land. To do the job properly would entail a full- 
scale cadastral survey which the leasehold simply could not
afford. He added that a similar project carried out in Hong
Q
Kong by trained surveyors from India had cost $100,000.
In addition, it had previously been ascertained from a meet­
ing with district headmen that a reassessment of land with 
a view toward tax increases would be extremely unpopular 
with the villagers and that they would not cooperate with 
the plan. These men stated that local farmers could not 
afford such increases and suggested that additional revenue 
be raised through a tax on animals, on houses larger than 
five chien, on sales made by merchants, or by increasing 
the levy on ground nuts.^ It is interesting that about this 
same time considerable agitation was taking place in areas 
just beyond Weihaiwei*s borders opposing new Chinese govern­
ment efforts to levy house taxes and compel land registra- 
10tion. Given such an atmosphere it is not surprising that
some of Weihaiwei*s district headmen hurriedly petitioned
the commissioner not to initiate a $1.00 per year poll tax
11which they mistakenly thought he was planning to do,
In the end the commissioner decided that neither a 
cadastral survey nor higher land taxes would be practical 
at Weihaiwei. Instead he chose to employ a few temporary
clerks to correct the land registers in the case of land
12
transfers only. In 1 9 1 5* however, District Officer Moss, 
again interested in increasing r e v e n u e , pointed out that 
some Weihaiwei farmers were cultivating government land 
without paying taxes and he recommended that they either be 
fined or e v i c t e d . ^  District Officer Johnston once more 
opposed Moss* idea, noting that it had traditionally been 
the practice in China to rent out government land for very 
small sums and even to purchase it back from the cultivators
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if later required by the state. There had never been any
intention of charging the equivalent of the land's value in
14-rent, nor were these farmers entered on the tax registers.
Lockhart in this instance also sided with Johnston's view,
deciding to charge only a nominal rent since the land was
poor and not to collect rent arrears. He ruled that 500
1per mou was probably a fair amount. **
Thus, it appears that the British basically desired 
to maintain a "low profile" at Weihaiwei and to adhere to 
traditional Chinese practices even when it meant foregoing 
sizeable increases in tax revenue. In this policy they dif­
fered greatly from the new breed of administrators appointed 
by Yttan Shih-k'ai in Shantung in 1913* A major new fiscal 
program was inaugurated at this time under Governor Chin 
Yun-p'eng by which commercial taxes were levied and tax col­
lection firms authorized to collect them on behalf of the 
government. A property title tax was also instituted as 
well as compulsory reregistration of titles.^ Of course, 
the fact that the British did not need to maintain a large 
army and chose not to implement expensive modern reforms, 
meant that they managed to keep their operating expenditures 
relatively low. Except for a brief period in 1916-17, they 
were also able to rely upon an annual grant-in-aid from the 
Treasury to help meet their expenses. The table below sum­
marizes government revenue and expenditure figures at Wei­
haiwei for the period 1911 to 1920*
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Table 3
17Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1911-1920 '
Year Revenue Expenditure Grant-in-Aid
1 9 1 1 - 1 2 $ 74 , 6 7 3
1912-13 79.582
1913-1^ 93.780
191^-15 109.898
1915-16 115,967
1916-17 126,908
1917-18 142,877
1918-19 150,723
1919-20 176,450
$153,690
146,146
166,960
148,185
155.967
139.300
175.652
184,600
207.141
S.6,000
6,000
8,300
5,000
3.500
none
630
4,000
7.900
In addition to keeping their operating expenses within 
reasonable limits, the British also desired to maintain the 
most amicable relationship they could with both Weihaiwei 
tax-payers and village headmen. Thus, they consistently 
sought advice from local leaders as to which tax proposals 
would meet with the widest acceptance. District Officer 
Johnston in particular seems always to have been aware of 
local customs in administrative matters and strenuously urged 
that these be maintained. Commissioner Lockhart was like­
wise eager to reinforce the position of village headmen 
whenever possible and in 1914 reaffirmed the need to have 
their signatures on deeds of land sales as was the traditional 
Chinese practice. The British also chose to communicate 
with the people in a manner which was most familiar to them. 
Lockhart’s speeches to the headmen, for example, could al­
most have been delivered by a Chinese magistrate, so filled 
are they with classical Confucian overtones. The basic im­
pulse was to exhort and persuade rather than to rule through
1 ft
Western-style legislation and bureaucratic mechanisms.
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Although there was no dramatic commercial boom at Wei­
haiwei from 1912 to 1919, there was a fairly steady growth 
of trading activity. In fact, by 1915 the local merchant 
community agreed that the construction of a new pier at Port 
Edward was definitely needed to facilitate the expanding 
volume of commerce. 7 After an engineer’s survey it was de­
termined that the pier would cost about $35»°00» a sum the 
government felt it could not possibly provide in the form
of a direct grant. The merchants, however, decided that the
20money could be raised through an increase in shipping dues. 
When British Treasury officials expressed concern about in­
terest payments on a loan for this project and the number 
of years over which it would be repaid, the merchants peti­
tioned the commissioner to implement a special shipping levy 
immediately so that the loan could be repaid about the time
the pier was completed. This arrangement was agreed to and
21
the pier was ready for use in late 1918*
The following table illustrates the improving trade 
picture at Weihaiwei as reflected in shipping dues collected 
during the period 1911-19181
Table 4 
Shipping Dues, 1911-191822
1 9 1 1 - 1 2 $ 4,512
1912-13 6 , 2 6 1
1913-14 14,520
1914-15 24,997
1915-16 31,707
1916-17 30,527
1917-18 32,932
One must bear in mind, of course, the fact that the 
war in Europe from 1914 to 1918 inevitably affected the Far
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East and there was some falling off of trade due to a short 
age of steamersi a surge in the prices of foreign commodi­
ties, and the elimination of certain overseas markets for
hit particularly hard by the absence of the British fleet 
during the war and many small shopkeepers and laborers found 
themselves in dire straits. As all island property was gov­
ernment owned, a petition was presented to the commissioner 
requesting that rents temporarily be waived and this was 
granted. The British were reluctant, however, to a l l o w  poor 
island residents to become completely dependent on govern­
ment relief and hoped rather that they would find work on
the mainland as domestic servants or seek help from their
ok.
relatives there.
The war also had some positive effects on the Weihai­
wei economy. The Japanese takeover of Tsingtao in 1914, for 
example, led many dealers to transfer their shipments of 
ground nuts to Weihaiwei for export. A bumper crop in 1917 
meant an even greater volume of trade in this commodity as 
shown below;
Chinese g o o d s.^ The inhabitants of Liu-kung Island were
Table 5
Ground Nut Exports, 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 9 ^
Year
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918 
1919
Ground Nut Seeds 
142,961 piculs
123,223
176,036
187,793
247,372
173,934
244,097
no figures available
2 6 9 , 1 6 0
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The war years also saw an increase in the export of 
salt and fish from Weihaiwei and there were hopes that to­
bacco would become an important new product. The British- 
American Tobacco Company in 1913 established an experimental 
farm at Weihaiwei and was impressed with the suitability of 
the climate and soil for cultivation of this plant. The 
plan was to provide local farmers with seeds and instruc­
tions on how to grow them and to overcome their resistance 
to the idea of cultivating a new crop by demonstrating how 
profitable it could be. In 1915 it was noted thati "The 
Company intends to withdraw its American manager and hand 
over the barns in which the tobacco is dried to Chinese who
p
will continue to cultivate the American seed." In spite 
of these efforts, however, tobacco production never did b e ­
come a major industry in Weihaiwei.
One industry which did flourish there for a time was 
the manufacture of hair nets with a firm based in Chefoo 
commencing operations in the leasehold in 1913- Chinese
hair was first sent to Germany to be specially prepared and
27then sent back to Weihaiwei where it was made into nets.
Some five hundred young girls and women were soon employed
at this job with an average output of ten nets per worker
per day. The technique could be learned in less than a day
28
at a wage of 1-3%^ per net depending on its size. The 
possibility of new duties being levied at Chefoo in order 
to construct a much-needed breakwater there tempted a number 
of other firms to consider moving to Weihaiwei. In 191? 
a soap factory was established and in 1918 a new silk fila­
ture • ^
Weihaiwei and the Chinese Labour Corps
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Perhaps the most important economic opportunity for 
Weihaiwei during the war years, however, was the decision 
in 1916 to make it the embarkation point for the Chinese 
Labour C o r p s . I n  fact, it was this development which 
helped most to offset other negative effects of the war.
By April 1918, ^+,000 "coolies" had been enrolled at Wei­
haiwei for labor service in Europe. Their wages ranged 
from $10-$20 per month for unskilled labor to $13-$30 per 
month for skilled labor., initial contracts were for three 
years and the laborers .agreed to work ten hours per day on 
railroads, roads, factories, mines, and dockyards. Cloth­
ing, food, housing, fuel, and return passages were provided 
to each man as well as a $20 bonus upon embarkation. In
addition, each worker's family received $10 per month as an
31allowance while he was away. One district officer remarked
upon the effect the Corps was having in the Territory*
". . . several beggar families in /w// district /are/ doing
quite well owing to the fact that sons and relatives /have/
gone to Europe. Not only /are/ they buying small pieces of
land but they even / /ave/ made subscriptions to the temple
as a thanks offering for their improved conditions in life."^
The presence of the labor depot in Weihaiwei also meant that
workers spent some of their money there before embarkation
and this benefited local shopkeepers. It is significant,
however, that although one-third of the laborers sent to
Europe were residents of Shantung, those who were natives of
Weihaiwei were few. One can only assume, then, that economic
conditions in the Territory must have been relatively good
33compared to other parts of the province. J
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The British police inspector in 1917 remarked upon 
other ways in which the Labour Corps contributed to better 
living standards in the leasehold* "The villages are affected 
in many ways, supplying farming produce, pigs, making of cloth­
ing and shoes, fodder to the mule camp, all leads to pros­
perity for the colony. Demand for carts and mules for trans­
port. Even the local women are busy making money, by making 
clothes for the d e p o t . T h u s ,  the decision in 1918 with 
the end of the war to move the center of Corps operations
to Tsingtao because of its superior transportation facili-
3^ties had an adverse effect on Weihaiwei's economy. J
Other Economic Developments
Yet by 1918, Weihaiwei showed signs of considerable 
economic prosperity. The "Victory Pier" was completed and 
so many new buildings were being erected in Port Edward that 
they extended from the eastern end of the town to the city 
walls of Weihai a mile away. Land' prices around Port Edward 
rose drmatically with some particularly desirable plots 
fetching the grand sum of $1 , 0 0 0 per mou in 1917 when in 
1900 they had only been worth $ 6 0 . ^  By this time also 
there was a new Chamber of Commerce in Port Edward. In 
1916 one of the district officers was asked for advice by 
some of the local Chinese merchants on how to form such an 
organization noting that their traditional kung-hui, though 
it contained between seventy and eighty firms, was at a dis­
advantage in dealing with other cities which had modern 
chambers. They also had had difficulty in forming an execu­
tive body to represent and manage the kung-hui and thought 
it best to organize an elected committee. By July 1916 
they succeeded in establishing the Chamber of Commerce and
' 20^
electing a twenty-member executive council to run it. Four 
of these men had also served as electors during the 1909 
provincial elections. Among the problems the new chamber 
hoped to deal with first was the alarming proliferation of 
notes issued as currency by shops in the Territory with in­
adequate financial backing. At the same time, they hoped 
to cooperate with rather than displace other traditional 
merchant organizations such as the shang-hui based in the 
market town of Yang-t'ing in Weihaiwei's southern district.^
Commenting on the emergence of the new Chamber of Com­
merce, a British official noted that especially in compari­
son with Tsingtao* " . . .  the natives of Weihaiwei have 
gradually and steadily come to lean more and more on the 
Government officers for advice. They now refer to Government 
far more problems than they did formerly. Since my own tenure 
of office they abolished the old half-hearted Merchant Guild 
and established a proper Chamber of Commerce which is doing 
excellent work."-^ Andrew Nathan notes that such chambers 
assumed rather wide responsibilities.in China, including the 
protection of local industries, the formulation of fiscal 
policy, and the regulation of prices, accounts, and enter­
prises, to name just a few.*^ By establishing such an organ­
ization the merchants of Weihaiwei made it clear that they 
wanted Port Edward to continue its transformation from a 
quiet fishing village to a modern trading community fully 
equipped to compete with its neighbors at Chefoo, Tsingtao, 
and other ports on the China coast.
The British Treasury too was hopeful that Weihaiwei 
would continue along the path of economic development in 
order that its own local revenues would eventually free it 
from dependence on imperial subsidies. Immediately following
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World War I an especially urgent appeal was made to all colo­
nial administrators to help in the nation's war recovery pro­
gram by stimulating economic growth in their respective areas.
In line with this request, Commissioner Lockhart called a 
meeting of Weihaiwei*s British businessmen in August 1919  
to discuss ways in which the leasehold might participate in
ZiQ
this effort. By October two reports had been prepared for 
the commissioner, one by the British merchant community and 
the other by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
It was noted in the British report that the total 
value of trade at Weihaiwei in 1918 was approximately $8,128,000 
with a healthy balance between exports and imports. Ground 
nuts already comprised +^0 percent of the export trade but 
it was felt this figure could be improved upon if scientific 
methods of fertilization, better irrigation, and new seed 
were introduced. In addition, ground nut oil could be man­
ufactured if machinery were made available. The report also 
noted that although in 1919 there were eight silk filatures 
with eighty looms producing about seven thousand pieces of 
silk annually at Weihaiwei, the bulk of local cocoons was 
still sent to Chefoo for processing. It was suggested that 
both British and Chinese investors be encouraged to build 
enough additional filatures to accommodate this trade. The 
fishing industry, it was thought, could be greatly expanded 
with the introduction of steam trawlers and the construction 
of factories for canning and the conversion of fish to meal 
for fertilizer and animal feed. Salt was considered another 
promising commodity, although as yet there were only four 
collection pans in place along Weihaiwei's extensive coast­
line. It was recommended that this trade be enlarged with
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a view to supplying the huge foreign markets. Weihaiwei's 
abundant granite and lime resources could likewise be ex­
ploited and other mineral deposits investigated. Continuing 
efforts were also required in afforestation. Furthermore, 
if the needs of the growing Chinese population were care­
fully studied, it was thought possible to stimulate greater 
use of British-made goods perhaps through a permanent in­
dustrial exhibition. And, it was optimistically noted*
"There is perhaps no place in China where the native is so 
kindly disposed towards Europeans as in Weihaiwei. The mer­
chant class is intelligent, conservative and thrifty. The 
peasant is peaceful and industrious, working his own fields 
and living in a well-built stone house . . ."
Other British suggestions included a renewed attempt
to educate local farmers in commercial fruit production and
the possible development of brickmaking, cement, and glass
industries. It was also recommended that unless reciprocal
agreements could be reached with the Japanese respecting
British steamers carrying cargo between Japanese ports,
Japanese ships should not be allowed to operate between Wei-
l±o
haiwei and Hong Kong.
Ih its report the Chinese merchant community emphasized 
the need for railroad transport at Weihaiwei, the establish­
ment of a large banking facility, construction of various
iiT
factories, and an industrial school. J Finally, in making 
his own recommendations, Commissioner Lockhart agreed that 
a railway was vital and stressed the importance of retaining 
the British lease at Weihaiwei until 1998» under the same 
terms by which Japan occupied Port Arthur. He also thought 
that the Territory's duty-free status should be maintained
with no new Chinese customs agencies permitted.
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Education
The trend toward "modernization" was demonstrated at 
Weihaiwei in other ways during the post-revolutionary decade 
as interest continued to grow in education, especially in
k C
Port Edward. Educational opportunities in the Territory 
compared quite favorably with conditions existing in neigh­
boring hsien at this time where -the republican revolution
46
had led to disorganization and a lack of funding for schools.
This was espe c i a l l y ■true after 1913 as Yttan Shih-kVai's
policy of withholding power from provincial legislatures
made local "gentry" less interested in contributing to the
maintenance of state institutions. Buck notes that the
earlier enthusiastic support of Shantung's local elite was,
kp
in fact, never fully recovered. r Educational policy and 
funding at Weihaiwei, however, remained relatively consis­
tent, Table 6 below illustrates the gradual rise in enroll­
ments at government and private schools in Port Edward from 
1913 to 1919*
Table 6
Enrollments at Weihaiwei Schools for Chinese Students
48
(Excluding village ssu-shu)
1913 1915 1917 1919
Government Free School 70 78 70 92
Anglo-Chinese School 49 49 40 50
Mission Workroom for Girls 41 100 * *
St. Joseph's Mission School for 
Boys 9 20 22 18
Mission School for Girls 32 46 59 50
Anti-Foot-Binding School 24 15 16 *
(* No figures available.)
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In 1916 the new Wen-teng magistrate, who was especially 
interested in educational affairs, requested that the Brit­
ish authorities allow him to investigate the finances and 
property of Weihaiwei's schools. He was promptly informed 
that this was not possible as he had no authority inside the 
leasehold. Apparently, this man was something of an educa­
tional fanatic, for as one district officer reported* "There 
are complaints in his district that he hardly ever finds 
time to hear lawsuits, and that the people cannot get deci­
sions from him, as he devotes his energies almost wholly to
kg
educational matters." 7 This very minor incident, which 
ended peacefully, was the prelude to a series of much more 
serious conflicts which the British were to experience in 
the late 1920s with Kuomintang officials over the issues of 
education and political jurisdiction in the - Territory
In 1919 the Chinese authorities governing the walled 
town of Weihai closed all the private schools there, forcing 
many additional students to seek admission to the Government 
Free School in Port Edward. Thus, during the 1918-19 aca­
demic year there was an all-time high enrollment of 92 with 
109 applicants for the following year. The government 
thought it necessary at this stage to separate the school 
into two branches, although the students continued to be 
taught jointly. One branch, called the Huang Jen Free 
School, remained tuition-free for poor boys, while the 
second branch, known as Huang Jen College, was for wealthier 
students who were charged a modest annual fee. The ever­
growing interest in education as reflected in the enroll­
ment figures was, to the dismay of the conservative head­
master at the government school, accompanied by a similar
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increase in enthusiasm for the study of English.
Unfortunately, however, there were by this time far 
more graduates from Weihaiwei*s schools than there were suit­
able jobs within the Territory, especially following the 
closure of the Chinese Labour Corps offices. The Anglican 
headmaster of the Anglo-Chinese School expressed his concern 
in 1919 that there was little demand in the leasehold for 
English and that many of the boys attending his school, at 
the age of seventeen or eighteen, were too old to begin to 
study the language anyway. He hoped that by introducing 
typing and bookkeeping courses he could at least provide 
them with additional marketable skills. Some of the weal­
thier graduates from his school went on to Nankai College 
in Tientsin or more advanced schools in Tsinan. Others were 
employed in local Chinese shops as apprentices or returned 
to their villages to become farmers. Two of the more for­
tunate ones found jobs at the Chinese Bank of Communication 
in Chef0 0 . ^  As in so many of China's rural areas, however,, 
there simply was no way to employ large numbers of educated 
people. Nevertheless, one must assume that even those stu­
dents who simply returned to their native villages upon 
graduation would still have had an important impact there 
merely by being literate and having been exposed to new 
ideas from the "outside world." No doubt many of them 
later became local leaders and perhaps even pressed for re­
form in traditional primary schools.
Public Health
Change came to Weihaiwei's villages in other ways too 
as a result of the British presence. In 1916 a new hospital
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was completed in the rural town of Wen-ch*tlan-t*ang where 
the southern district officer had his headquarters. Yet 
even this new institution was established in a very tradi­
tional manner as it was the kung-hui for eight local vil­
lages which both donated the site for the hospital and agreed 
not to charge rent on it. In return for this generosity, 
it was expected that the government express its appreciation 
in an appropriate manner. Thus, the commissioner and his 
staff spent considerable time deciding upon the proper Chi­
nese inscription for a commemorative plaque, or pei-wen, 
which was erected and conspicuously displayed in honor of
CL
the kung-hui.^
Continuous efforts were also made to have as many
people as possible protected against smallpox at Weihaiwei
and by 191S it was estimated that 50 percent of the popula­
te
tion had been vaccinated. ^ In the same year it was de­
cided for reasons of sanitation and with a view toward a 
larger tourist industry at Weihaiwei, to tear down the dilap­
idated buildings which made up the Chinese East Village on 
Liu-kung Island and to ask most of those living there to 
move to the mainland, especially those with no visible means 
of support. All cultivation using human fertilizer was also 
prohibited. In addition, the British drew up elaborate 
plans for new East and West Villages with modern shops, mar­
kets, latrines, drainage systems, and water supply. ^  In
1919 it was estimated that East and West Villages would
Cn
cost $ 2 6 , 0 0 0  and $23,000 respectively to build,
In the meantime, as one might have expected, the new 
restrictions on cultivation and the efforts to move people 
to the mainland caused hardships for some, A correspondent
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for the North China Herald observed that the Chinese did not 
understand this policy and "were rather put out that they 
/K s i& 7 to leave these old unsanitary houses, and seek new 
quarters on the mainland*" He continued* "It has been a 
bit hard for some of them as empty houses are not easy to 
get on the mainland, for the place is growing rapidly in all 
directions,"-^ Acting temporarily in Lockhart's absence as 
commissioner, Reginald Johnston wrote a lengthy memorandum 
to the Colonial Office proposing that the old buildings 
should indeed be demolished and new ones erected for those 
allowed to remain as employees and shopkeepers servicing 
the island's naval facilities. The arable land, he thought, 
should be utilized under a carefully regulated scheme for 
dairy-farming, market gardening, and fruit cultivation on .a 
fairly large scale. Lots could be leased on stringent con­
ditions to Europeans or Chinese. This scheme, he felt, 
would provide the people with food and enhance Weihaiwei's 
value as a health resort,
It is not entirely clear just how many of Johnston's 
proposals were incorporated into the two villages eventually 
constructed on the island, but after some delay due to a 
shortage of British funds for the project, the old buildings 
were demolished and many new garden plots were laid out in 
the open spaces thus provided. In 1921 East Village was 
completed and West Village had acquired two blocks of new 
shops with a third block planned for 1922.^ Furthermore, 
in response to complaints by island inhabitants that private 
school facilities were both inadequate and too expensive for 
poor children to attend, the government agreed to help sub­
sidize a new school organized by the Chinese and operated on
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a subscription basis. In 1920 there were thirty-five stu- 
dents in attendance. At roughly the same time that these 
improvements were occurring on the island, similar steps 
were being taken at Port Edward to eliminate dilapidated 
buildings and widen the streets. Thus, it would seem 
that at least some parts of the leased Territory by the 
early 1920s had acquired a more modern outward appearance 
as well as new social institutions and attitudes.
Political Developments
In view of the economic and social changes taking 
place in Weihaiwei, plus the Territory's greatly expanded 
contact with the outside world after 1912, it is hardly sur­
prising to also find important changes in the political 
life of the area at this time. Mention has already been 
made of the general unrest which affected the area following 
the 1911 revolution. One district officer in February 1913» 
for example, observed with alarm that within his jurisdic­
tion seven robberies had occurred in a period of ten days. 
Furthermore, he had had to deal severely with a local radi­
cal who was making a nuisance of himself:
A revolutionary gent has been showing his 
contempt for the religious observances of 
his fellow villagers by smashing shrines and 
images. The whole village has a case against 
him and I have had him arrested. . . .  I- shall 
probably make an example of him as it will be 
a good opportunity to let the people of the 
Territory know that we do not support people 
who break up t*u ti shrines.°3
The prescribed penalties for such a crime were heavy: a
jail sentence of two years and/or a fine of $500*
The district officer's behavior in this case is quite
consistent with overall British policy at Weihaiwei, namely
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that local religious practices be respected and traditional 
social institutions preserved. One might go even further, 
however, to say that this officer displayed remarkable in­
sight into the workings of Chinese local society and his own 
relationship to it. In his instroduction to Studies in C h i ­
nese S o c i e t y , Arthur Wolf has noted: "In traditional China
government and religion were so closely related that the 
imperial bureaucracy, temple organization, peasant insurrec­
tion, and popular conceptions of the supernatural all b e ­
longed to the same sphere." Thus, Wolf argues, "the super­
natural world of the Chinese peasantry was a faithful repli­
cation of their view of the Chinese social landscape, . . , 
Taking the view of the peasant we find that the gods were 
thought to have essentially the same characteristics as posted 
officials.” The t'u ti k u n g , or "earth god," for example, 
like a local official was responsible for the welfare of a 
specifically defined area. His functions, as those of the 
district magistrate, were twofold: to act as policeman
guarding against supernatural bandits, the local kuei or 
ghosts, and, as a kind; of "spy," to make reports to his super­
iors regarding the activities of humans in his c h a r g e . ^  By 
protecting the t*u ti shrine in his locality, then, as the 
equivalent of the hsien magistrate, the British district 
officer was in a sense also preserving his own position with­
in the village authority structure since, to the Chinese 
peasant, the supernatural and natural order were the mirror 
images of one another. If a "revolutionary gent" were allowed 
to shatter such an important part of the villagers* spiritual 
world he would also have seriously undermined the authority 
of those governing the villagers' temporal world.
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Wolf concludes his analysis of this aspect of Chinese
local society by sayings
Assessed in terms of its long-range impact 
on the people, ^ h e  Chinese imperial govern­
ment/ appears to have been one of the most 
potent governments ever known, for it created 
a religion in its own image. Its firm grip 
on the popular imagination may be one reason 
the imperial government survived so long d e ­
spite its many failings. Perhaps this is a l ­
so the reason China's revolutionaries have 
so often organized their movements in terms 
of the concepts and symbols of such foreign 
faiths as Buddhism and Christianity. The 
native gods were so much a part of the estab­
lishment that they could not be turned against 
i t «
It will be remembered that when republican revolutionaries
attacked "the establishment" in neighboring Jung-ch*eng-hsien
in 1912, they turned their wrath on the temple of the city
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god as well as the yamen of the district magistrate. 1 It 
will also be r e m embered, h o w e v e r , that in so doing they helped 
stimulate violent counter-revolutionary hatred among the local 
population. The British, on the other hand, by openly demon­
strating their respect for religious practices in Weihaiwei, 
also very skillfully reinforced their own position within 
the established Chinese social order.
Unlike the revolution of 1911» the 1913 uprising against
Yttan Shih-k'ai, often referred to as the "Second Revolution,"
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had little impact in Weihaiwei or in Shantung generally.
Yet it was about this time that the British took steps to 
once again ensure that traditional village practices and in­
stitutions were maintained. As has been mentioned, the legal 
petition fees were raised in 1913 in order to both discourage
excessive litigation and encourage greater reliance on vil-
6q
lage elders for resolving disputes. 7 A continuing effort 
was also made to ascertain local Chinese opinion on various
215
matters before any government policy was enacted. The moti­
vation behind this was of course to assist the British admin­
istration in making informed decision, but it was also to 
provide local leaders with a sense of involvement in and 
hopefully commitment to the existing government at Weihai­
wei .
The British for many years had been acutely aware of
a problem which Martin Yang has discussed, namely that in
traditional China the closer the relationship between a local
leader and the government, the less prestigious and desirable
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that leader's position became. In 1914 Commissioner Lock­
hart was especially' concerned about the increasing difficulty 
of getting "respectable" men to serve as village and district 
headmen due to the defamation these positions were receiving 
by a minority of local citizens. When questioned about ex­
isting procedures of selection, the headmen themselves stated 
that election by rotation was an unsatisfactory method as it 
led to quarrels and diminished their authority. They also 
disliked the responsibility of having to sign all land deeds
and thought the government should simply issue them without
71
their signature.
After further consultation it was decided that head­
men throughout the Territory should be selected in a uniform 
manner and that there should be certain minimum standards 
both for those holding the office and those entitled to vote 
for it. Thus, village and district headmen were to be elected 
by local villagers, subject to the recommendations of the 
British district officer, and confirmed in office by the 
commissioner. Candidates were to be men of good character 
who owned at least ten mou of land, with preference given
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to those having an education. To he an elector one had to
he free of any criminal record and to have paid land tax on
at least one mou of land. A majority vote of 60 percent was
required for election, hut if the district officer was not
satisfied with the man chosen or if one-third of the electors
72requested it, a new election could be held.
Clearly the British were attempting with these new
electoral procedures to strengthen traditional leadership
roles and to promote the modern self-government movement
which was quite popular at that time in China, even in a
rural area like Weihaiwei. By stipulating that candidates
for the office of village or district headman had to own ten
mou of land and that preference would be given to those with
an education, the British were simply regularizing certain
minimum standards which had long been recognized by local
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customary practices. J It is doubtful that these regulations 
altered the balance of power already existing within Weihai­
wei* s villages. They were intended to guarantee, though, 
that every village and district would have one person actu­
ally filling the somewhat unpopular position of middleman 
mediating between village interests and those of the British 
administration. Making the election of headmen subject to 
the approval of the local district officer and confirmation 
by the commissioner also ensured that the British retained 
overall political control.
It is significant that these foreign rulers, like so 
many Chinese officials who served before and after them at 
Weihaiwei and indeed throughout China, encountered a degree 
of local resistance which they were never able to fully over­
come. This resistance does not appear to have been based
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upon any sort of widespread anti-foreign feeling among the 
villagers or their leaders. Rather it reflects a basic prob­
lem in the relationship between Chinese local society and 
those who governed it on behalf of the central authorities.
It seems accurate to describe the British in this case as 
nearly analogous to Chinese officials since they modeled 
their behavior so closely on that of hsien magistrates and 
were responded to by the Chinese as if they were hsien magi­
strates. Try as they might to tie the village and district 
headmen more closely to their administration, they continued 
to find a spirit of independence and reluctance to accept 
further widening of their responsibilities. Although Frederic 
Wakeman is referring more specifically to the problematical 
relationship between local "gentry" and hsien magistrates, 
his analysis could apply equally well to that existing be­
tween Weihaiwei's village and district headmen and British 
officialdom when he states that* "Local social organizations 
. . . embodied contrary principlesi integration into the im­
perial system and autonomy from it. The dynamic oscillation 
between these poles created the unity of Chinese society, not
by eliminating the contradictions but by balancing them in
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such a way as to favor overall order."'
The British were certainly not alone at this time in 
attempting to integrate local leaders into a more unified 
administrative structure, Philip Kuhn, for example, has 
described the ways in which Yttan Shih-k'ai's government r e ­
sponded to the challenge presented by newly-formed self- 
government assemblies in 1913 and 1914. Alarmed that some 
of these bodies were competing with the traditional county 
bureaucracy for control of financial resources, the central
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government in February 1914 simply declared all such assem­
blies illegal. It went even further in December of that 
year by issuing a new code called "Experimental Regulations 
for Local Self-Government" which, as Kuhn notes, "envisaged 
a restricted form of popular participation, closely hedged 
about with franchise limitations and official prerogatives,
based on a unit called the 'self-governing ward' (tzu-chih 
7 6c h *tt)."(J These large wards, four to six per county, in 
theory were to manage such things as education, public health, 
and roads and were intended to provide the central govern­
ment with an additional level of coordination between the 
counties and villages. In practice, however, it was the 
late Ch'ing system based on much smaller units, known as 
ch'ti, and largely controlled by local "gentry-managers" which 
continued to function in most parts of China until 1929 or 
later. Commenting on the failure of these bureaucratic 
mechanisms to curb the power of local elites in early r e ­
publican China, Kuhn concludes*
It seemed for a time as if the control- 
autonomy relationship in local govern­
ment was going to be left at the point 
it had reached by the empire's end: a
substantial ramification of the infra­
structure of sub-county government by 
means of formal control of wards and ward- 
like units by the lower elite, but without 
a workable system whereby that elite might 
be disciplined in the public interest, ' 
much less brought into a system of mobili­
zation appropriate to a modern nation.
It is, then, perhaps all the more remarkable that the 
British at Weihaiwei attained some measure of success in 
both encouraging local participation in government while at 
the same time retaining ultimate administrative control. 
Equally remarkable is the fact that they did so largely by
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relying on traditional village institutions. A report filed
in 1914 after the electoral reforms had been implemented
noted that every village had selected an official headman
and that in many cases he was assisted by a village council.
The new system also ensured that each of Weihaiwei's twenty-
77
six districts was represented by a district h e a d m a n.1
In a continuing effort to recognize "good citizenship"
in the Territory, Commissioner Lockhart made a number of
honorary awards in 1914, including one to a man described
as "native gentry," who received an inscribed tablet or p i e n ,
for the encouragement he had given to villagers in supplying
labor for road construction since 1906, This tablet was to
be displayed in his ancestral hall. In addition, medals were
awarded to four headmen who had either helped in settling
disputes, promoted education, or simply conducted themselves
7 8
in a praiseworthy manner. Based on his statistical studies 
of the Ch'ing shih-lu for the period 1796 to 1911, C. K. Yang 
has made the following observation regarding the distribu­
tion of "honor awards" by the Chinese government in recog­
nition of the traditional virtues of loyalty, piety, and 
chastity:
. , . when the system was threatened by 
crises, one of its responses was to r e ­
inforce the faith in fundamental values 
in order to restore the effectiveness of 
traditional guidelines of social action.
. . . The data show clearly that as the 
frequency of mass actions increased, the 
political system responded by frantically 
increasing the number of honor awards to 
reassure the population of the soundness 
of traditional values.79
Although the British at Weihaiwei in 1914 were not threatened 
by the kind of violent opposition with which Yang is primar­
ily concerned, they clearly saw the need to counteract the
220
passive resistance which was undermining the headman system 
upon which their administration depended. Thus, they too 
chose to increase the number of "honor awards" to "reassure 
the population of the soundness of traditional values" and 
to reinforce their own position within the local authority 
structure•
In a speech delivered at the 1914 awards ceremony, 
Commissioner Lockhart reminded the assembled headmen of their 
duties, impressing upon them the need to have all land deeds, 
transferals, or mortgages registered. He also urged them 
to support the government's program of afforestation whereby 
free seed and seedlings were supplied to villagers for plant­
ing along roads and on wasteland. He further informed them
of new cart taxes and shipping levies and asked for sugges-
8 0
tions as to additional measures for increasing revenue. 
Lockhart was then clearly making a very strong effort to 
simultaneously buttress the authority of Weihaiwei's head­
men and to mobilize them to serve both "the public interest" 
and British administrative purposes.
The First World War, as we have seen, had a consider­
able economic impact upon the Territory but caused little 
political concern. One district officer wrote in 1915*
There was some uneasiness during the time 
when active operations against Tsingtau 
were being conducted and during the early 
months of the year under review, but this 
anxiety never became acute as the people 
were well aware of the fact that the Japa­
nese were allies of Great Britain and that 
there was therefore no possibility of a move­
ment of Japanese troops in the direction of 
Wei h a i w e i .
Growing awareness of international political alignments among 
the people of the Territory is perhaps the most significant
221
fact illustrated by the above comment, though the news that 
China had severed relations with Germany and joined the
82allies in 1917 apparently aroused no interest in Weihaiwei.
Unsettled conditions continued to exist in Shantung 
throughout the decade following the 1911 revolution and made 
the British authorities in Weihaiwei wary of reducing their 
police force. Pirates were active in southern Manchuria 
and along the promontory coastline with gangs at times oper­
ating near the Territory. One British officer noted in 
1915 that so far only British prestige and the fear of their 
guns had kept the bandits away, but he was concerned that 
this deterrent might be losing some of its effectiveness.
He was also worried that Japanese aggression in Manchuria 
might discourage Chinese from settling there and persuade 
them to return to Shantung without any means of supporting 
themselves. He added that the Japanese, through their occu­
pation of Tsingtao, issuance of the infamous "Twenty-One 
Demands," and troop buildups along the Tsingtao-Tsinan rai l ­
way, had incurred deep resentment in Shantung and he feared 
that this could produce hostility toward foreigners in 
general. Furthermore, he believed that Yttan Shih-k'ai*s 
restoration of the monarchy could lead to trouble from C h i ­
nese republicans or Japanese using Shantung as a base for 
their a c t i v i t i e s . ^
Given Yttan Shih-k'ai's blatant suppression of parlia­
mentary democracy after assuming office in 1912, it is not 
surprising that Territorial residents showed little interest 
in the provincial elections of 1915* Electoral regulations 
made it extremely difficult for anyone to qualify to vote 
as it was again necessary to own $5»0Q0 worth of property
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and to produce elaborate documentation verifying such owner­
ship. Only four people did so and even they were not in­
formed by the Chinese authorities about where and when to
* 84vote.
Political participation at Weihaiwei took place in a 
somewhat more alarming manner in 1917. It should be noted 
that Sun Yat-sen in that year had formed a separatist mili­
tary government based in Canton. In December an anonymous 
Chinese letter addressed to District Officer Johnston revealed 
that "a number of the adherents of Sun Yat-sen*s section of 
the 'Southern* political party were holding secret meetings 
in Port Edward and were plotting to bring about an armed 
attack on Wen-teng City . . . with a view to holding it as 
an advance-post of the 'Southern' republicans in their strug­
gle with the Peking Government."^  Johnston was especially 
concerned that the meetings had been held "within a stone's 
throw of the police headquarters" and yet he. had received 
no report from his men about them. He decided to take swift 
action:
A midnight raid on the premises of the 
plotters was successfully carried out, and 
among the persons arrested were a personal 
friend of the notorious Sun Yat-sen, several 
'Southerners' from Shanghai and Canton, and 
a few natives of this Territory, who had a l ­
ready been concerned in previous revolutionary 
movements, 1
Johnston, however, at this point found himself in an awkward 
situation for to deal with the conspirators too severely 
would make enemies who might later take advantage of the 
Territory's relatively defenseless position. To be too len­
ient, on the other hand, would encourage continued use of 
Weihaiwei as a convenient staging ground for political in­
trigue. As a compromise he chose to banish the outsiders
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from the Territory and insist on guarantees of good behavior
Q r j
from the weihaiwei residents. ‘
It is interesting that this small band of revolution­
aries formed quite an exclusive group in Shantung in 1917.
As David Buck observes*
After the 1916 uprising /an abortive attack 
on Tsinan organized by the southern Revolu­
tionary party and aided by the Japanese/,
Sun's support in Shantung disappeared a l ­
most completely. The few Shantungese who 
remained closely associated with Sun and
his cause during the next decade nearly a l ­
ways operated outside their home province.
The only activity of Sun's Revolutionary 
party and the later Nationalist party in 
Shantung was clandestine propaganda or orga­
nizing work.88
The Weihaiwei conspirators must have considered the leasehold 
an ideal location for their activities and nearly equivalent 
to a site outside the province as it was safely beyond C h i ­
nese jurisdiction and had the added advantage of containing 
some republican sympathizers, perhaps even within the police 
force itself. As is well known, however, Sun Yat-sen*s plans
once again collapsed as he was forced out of Kwangtung by
Lu Jung-t'ing in May 1918 and fled to Shanghai to begin yet 
another reorganization of his revolutionary party. Accord­
ing to British sources, Weihaiwei for the next several years 
remained free of further political intrigue.
Conditions elsewhere in Shantung at this time were far 
less peaceful. Following the death of Ytlan Shih-k'ai, each 
shift in the balance of power at Peking ultimately led to a 
change in the military and civilian leadership of Shantung. 
From 1916 until 1928 no fewer than eleven men held the offices 
of military and civil governor and "actual power was con­
stantly shifting between the two posts, as well as from one 
man to another in the seemingly unending chain of new appoin­
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t e e s . " ^  There was obviously little opportunity for each 
of these men to consolidate his authority over the province 
and a continual shortage of funds meant inadequate protection 
for those living outside the larger cities. The British con­
sul at Tsinan observed in 1918 that well-armed, roving bands 
of over one thousand men roamed the southern and western 
border districts burning villages and robbing the wealthy.
Trade in many areas was at a standstill and farmers left 
their fields untilled.
In the immediate post-Yhan shih-k'ai period the Shan­
tung promontory was not badly affected by the general law­
lessness existing in the province as bandit gangp were reluc­
tant to move too far from their bases of supply in western 
and southwestern Shantung. They reportedly also avoided the
Tsingtao region, demonstrating a "wholesome dread of the 
9 1
Japanese."7 By 1918, however, conditions near Weihaiwei's 
borders began to deteriorate with both bandits and beggars 
from the disturbed parts of the province creating difficul­
ties. In Jung-ch'eng hsien an armed gang of forty men landed 
on the coast and proceeded past the hsien capital where no 
attempt was made to arrest them. They then raided a village 
about five miles from the Territorial borders and carried 
off several Chinese for ransom, among them a resident of W e i ­
haiwei. A successful escape was made by sea. Further r o b ­
beries took place in July of that year with some even occur­
ring inside the Territory. At this point the commissioner 
decided to expand his police force with twelve special C h i ­
nese constables and one Chinese non-commissioned officer.
As an added precaution, British troops were sent from Tientsin
9 2
to reinforce W e i haiweifs borders.7 All of this new protection
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encouraged several wealthy families living outside the Terri-
93tory to seek temporary sanctuary in Weihaiwei.
Perhaps even more alarming than the bandit raids of 
this period, however, were the serious civil disturbances 
which took place in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien in opposi­
tion to the implementation of new salt taxes. In May 1918 
District Commissioner Johnston, who was temporarily serving 
as Weihaiwei*s commissioner in Lockhart's absence, expressed 
his concern about neighboring districts to the Colonial 
Office as followsi
Indeed the severe fighting which took place 
there in the year of the revolution (1911) 
seems to have had a thoroughly unsettling 
effect on a large proportion of the inhabi­
tants, Riots accompanied by bloodshed have 
taken place on more than one occasion during 
the past year, within a distance of four miles 
from the British boundary, and the authority 
of the Chinese District Magistrates has been 
defied with impunity by uneducated rustics 
and fishermen.9^
Johnston was not worried that this particular unrest would
spread to Weihaiwei unless the anti-Japanese feeling at the
time so prevalent in Shantung were extended to her allies.
He noted that thusfar he had observed no signs of "Boxerism"
in the Territory, but he had no doubt there were a "number
of people, not wholly without influence, who ,/were7 decidedly
anti-foreign or anti-British in sentiment} and it /was7 hut
too probable that these persons would welcome the outbreak
of any disturbance which involved </the7 Government in em-
o <
barrassment or in loss of prestige."7^
Another provincial election was held in Shantung in 
1918 following the appointment of a new military governor, 
Chang Shu-yuan. There was some hesitation by the British 
authorities at first over whether to allow local residents 
to vote, but they were petitioned by six district headmen
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who argued that if this right had been recognized in 1909 
under the Ch'ing government, it certainly could not now be 
refused under the republic. No doubt anxious to avoid pro­
viding any excuse for a disturbance in W e i h a i w e i , especially 
given the unsettled conditions nearby, the British acquiesced 
to this request. They also dispatched a few of their police 
to act as observers at the polling places located inside 
the walled town and at Meng-chia-chuang, a large market town 
in the south of the Territory. More people were officially 
qualified to vote in this election than in the previous one 
of 1915» and there was considerable rivalry between competing 
factions. In fact, the incidence of duplicate voting and 
irregularities led to complaints and a second balloting 
shortly afterward. Although local interest in self-govern­
ment would appear to have increased by this time, it was 
not accompanied by profound respect for the niceties of de m ­
ocratic procedures.^
Yet in the midst of so much turmoil elsewhere in Shan­
tung, Weihaiwei must have seemed a model of peace and tran­
quility. Reginald Johnston remarked in 1918*
The vast majority of the inhabitants of Port 
Edward are as yet but very slightly affected 
by the reforming activities of 'Young China.'
Even the queue, which is now rarely seen in 
the treaty ports and other commercial and in­
dustrial centres, is still cherished by multi­
tudes of the people in this Territory and the 
conservatism which insists upon the retention 
of this so-called badge of servitude to the 
extinct dynasty is powerful in moulding the 
thoughts and habits of the people in more im- 
p o r t a ^  respects than the arrangement of the
As will be seen in the next chapter, however, the British
were once again to find to their surprise that the leasehold
and its "conservative" inhabitants were indeed affected by 
events elsewhere.
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Chapter 6
Nationalism and the Growing Pressure for Rendition
The May Fourth Movement at Weihaiwei
Though it would be a gross exaggeration to describe 
local activities surrounding the May Fourth incident as a 
major watershed in Weihaiwei*s political history, it is cer­
tainly fair to say that they symbolized an important new 
awakening of nationalism among some of the Territory's res i ­
dents. As elsewhere in China, these activities were among 
the earliest attempts to organize a broadly-based protest 
against both Japanese imperialists and those regarded as 
traitors in the Chinese central government who had cooper­
ated with them. Following the announcement at the Versailles 
Peace Conference on 30 April 1919? that Japan would be granted 
full control of German concessions in Shantung, huge demon­
strations broke out in many Chinese cities. The largest of 
these took place in Peking on 4 May and led to the arrest of 
several young protestors which in turn triggered a widespread 
student strike and a boycott of Japanese goods.
Among the Shantung cities participating in this great
mass movement were Tsinan, Chefoo, T*ai-an, Liao-ch'eng, and 
2Wei-hsien. In Chefoo the economic boycott was organized by 
a group called the Home Industries League and it continued 
to operate with remarkable effectiveness until the former 
German leasehold at Kiaochow was returned to China by the 
Japanese in December 1922.^ The durability and intensity of 
this movement at Chefoo is perhaps not so surprising when it 
is noted that the city had a modern history of political activ­
ism including strong support for the 1911 revolution as well
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as serious economic grievances against Japan especially with 
regard to its declining silk industry. As an additional fac­
tor contributing to the strength of the local May Fourth mov e ­
ment, it should be stated that Chefoo had a fairly large stu­
dent population from which emerged much of the anti-Japanese 
leadership.
From the available sources it would appear that May 
Fourth activities at Weihaiwei were less volatile and on a 
smaller scale than those carried out at Chefoo. Nonetheless, 
here too there was an organized protest against the Japanese 
and an economic boycott which lasted until December 1921.^
From a printed broadsheet issued by the "Weihaiwei An-li-kan 
t'ang chiu-kuo hui" (Weihaiwei Anglican School Save the Nation 
Society) in^response to the student arrests in Peking and 
directed to the fu-lao (elders) of the entire country, it is 
clear that at least some of the students of the Anglican school 
at Port Edward were deeply concerned about the declining f o r ­
tunes of their once proud nation. In this virulent anti- 
Japanese document the students also lashed out at national 
figures such as Ts'ao Ju-lin, Chang Tsung-hsiang, and Lu Tsung- 
ytt whom they regarded as having sold out to the enemy. Further 
demonstrating their considerable awareness of national affairs 
they emphasized•that the question of Japanese rights in Shan­
tung was bound up with the much broader issue of China's poli­
tical destiny and they called for a boycott of Japanese goods 
as well as greater use of Chinese products.^
It is not clear whether the Weihaiwei Anglican School 
Save the Nation Society was the umbrella organization responsi­
ble for the publication of another broadsheet by a group de­
scribing itself as part of the shih-.jen t'uan (ten-man teams)
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movement. This was another technique first used by students
in Peking and later copied by May Fourth activists elsewhere
whereby small groups from secondary schools and universities
7
were deployed to organize strikes and boycotts. In an effort 
to publicize itself and to recruit more volunteers the Weihai­
wei group behind this document discussed ways in which teams 
could be organized, the amount of dues which might be collected, 
and future alliance with similar bodies in Shanghai, Tientsin, 
Peking, Tsinan, and elsewhere. To promote the popular notion 
of fu-kuo ch*iang-kuo (a rich and powerful country) the stu­
dents stressed the need for education, morale-boosting, and 
various constructive projects which could be carried out on 
a nationwide basis. Clearly, then, there were a number of in­
dividuals in Weihaiwei in 1919 who saw themselves as part of 
a great national movement attempting nothing less than the
Q
salvation of their country.
The specifically anti-Japanese activities of these in­
dividuals eventually elicited an angry response from the 
Japanese consul at Chefoo who complained to Commissioner Lock­
hart in August 1919 that meetings for the dissemination of 
hostile propaganda were being held in Weihaiwei and that Japa­
nese citizens were not being allowed to board steamers, rick-
q , .
shaws, or sampans m  the Territory. British documentation 
from this period confirms that there were incidents of harass­
ment of Japanese nationals at Weihaiwei, at least partly in­
stigated by local students, and that the commissioner was com­
pelled to issue a warning to all schools that such behavior
10
would not be tolerated. An article from the Manchurian 
Daily News of 8 August 1919» the details of which are confirmed 
by British sources, indicates that rumors were spread both in
Chefoo and Weihaiwei accusing the Japanese of poisoning vil­
lage wells. Lockhart acted immediately to reassure the in­
habitants of the Territory tha,t such stories were false and
11further warned that rumor-mongers would be severely punished.
It was undoubtedly the economic boycott at Weihaiwei 
which proved the most effective means of demonstrating anti- 
Japanese feeling there. During the 2i years in which the boy­
cott was enforced there was a marked decrease in the volume 
of Japanese goods imported to Weihaiwei as well as in Chinese 
products destined for the Japanese market. One British offi­
cial remarked somewhat ruefully in 1922: "The boycott of
Japanese trade referred to in the last two Annual Reports 
continued with unabated vigour up till December last, with 
loss to the trade of the Territory, and none to that of Japan." 
Although the British generally did not attempt to interfere 
with the boycott, they did intervene in at least two cases 
when trading interests of their own nationals were involved.
On one occasion in 1921 they successfully called upon the Chi­
nese Chamber of Commerce to mediate with local "coolies" so
that a Japanese steamer could be loaded with goods destined 
13for London. J
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the Japanese 
boycott at Weihaiwei is that it lasted as long as it did and 
aroused such strong feelings in a part of China which would 
hardly appear to have had the necessary preconditions for such 
an outburst of nationalism. The large student communities 
primarily responsible for leading May Fourth activities else­
where simply did not exist in Weihaiwei. Nor had very many 
of the Territory's students been educated abroad and thus ex­
posed to the "radicalizing".experiences John Israel has dis­
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cussed in his study of Chinese student nationalism. Fur­
thermore, with no railroad links to the rest of Shantung and 
lacking even one territorial newspaper or journal in 1919* 
Weihaiwei did not seem to be in very close contact with the 
highly-charged political atmosphere elsehwere at this time.
As has been previously noted, Reginald Johnston wrote in early 
1919 that "the vast majority of the inhabitants of Port Edward
/were7 as yet but very slightly affected by the reforming ac-
1 5tivities of 'Young China.*" J Nevertheless, a fair proportion 
of these inhabitants later in that same year demonstrated a 
rather remarkable degree of political awareness and the abil­
ity to organize a new and effective type of protest.
The Rendition Question
One cannot help but suspect that at least some of the 
British residents at Weihaiwei in the course of the Japanese 
boycott must have felt apprehensive that this new wave of anti­
imperialism might eventually be directed against them and per­
haps even force their withdrawal from the leasehold. In fact, 
as has been mentioned many times in this thesis, the uncer­
tainty of British tenure at Weihaiwei had almost from the be­
ginning posed one of the greatest obstacles to the area's eco­
nomic development. And the issue of rendition, as we have
seen, had been raised as early as 1905 with the forced evacu-
16ation of the Russians from Port Arthur by the Japanese.
It was also the Japanese who brought about a reconsider­
ation of the general question of all foreign rights in China 
by entering World War I on the side of the Allies, forcing 
the Germans out of their leasehold at Kiaochow, and then se­
curing a number of agreements with China, Russia, Great Britain,
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and the United States to buttress the special privileges they 
demanded in Shantung at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
In the months leading up to this conference the British made 
a thorough reappraisal of their entire China policy. One of 
the Far Eastern experts called upon for an opinion regarding 
Weihaiwei was Reginald Johnston who in 1918 was temporarily 
serving as commissioner in Lockhart's absence. In his view 
the Territory had no strategic or commercial value and had 
not even added to British prestige. Many Chinese, he noted, 
were contemptuous of how little had been spent to improve Wei­
haiwei in comparison to other foreign leaseholds, Johnston 
therefore felt strongly that Weihaiwei should be returned to 
China with the possible exception of Liu-4cung Island which the 
Admiralty might find useful to retain,^
Sir John Jordan, then serving as minister plenipoten­
tiary in Peking, agreed that Weihaiwei should be given up but 
only as part of a major restructuring of British policy in 
China which would include the surrendering of all leased terri­
tories, the internationalizing of treaty port concessions, and 
other far-reaching reforms. Sir James Macleay of the Foreign 
Office Far Eastern Department argued, however, that as long 
as other countries such as Japan were demanding privileges in 
China it was necessary for Britain to protect her own interests 
there. He even repeated the familiar idea that China might
actually want the British to remain at Weihaiwei as a counter-
18weight to the Japanese presence in Shantung. The Admiralty 
also desired to maintain its right to use Weihaiwei as a con­
venient training ground and sanitorium.
Although not very carefully considered by many of the 
British officials involved in this policy review, Chinese
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opinion on the issue of foreign "rights" was becoming quite 
clear. By the time of the Paris Peace Conference China's 
chief delegate, Wellington Koo, argued forcefully for the com­
plete abolition of extraterritoriality, the return of all 
leaseholds, the expulsion of Japan from Shantung, as well as 
for other measures designed to restore Chinese national sov­
ereignty. In the end, as is well known, the Chinese did not 
attain their objectives at Paris and refused to sign the peace 
treaty, The British, for their part, decided in favor of a 
policy which would both preserve their own interests and
attempt to restrain Japan from making further advances in 
iq
China, This policy did not include the rendition of Weihai­
wei. The Chinese national outcry over the Paris settlement 
and especially American dissatisfaction with the concessions 
granted to Japan among other things eventually led to yet 
another international meeting, known as the Washington Con­
ference (12 November 1921-2 February 1922), which, in addition 
to discussing world disarmament and other major issues, sought 
once again to deal with the "China Question."
It is significant that in the period between the Paris 
and Washington Conferences, from June 1919 to November 1921, 
as many world leaders and ordinary people alike began to have 
second thoughts about the justice of the peace agreements with 
regard to China, the question of Weihaiwei's rendition was 
raised once again. The American consul-general at Shanghai, 
for example, noted with some amazement that the staunchly pro- 
British editors of the North China Daily News urged in April 
1921 that this matter be quickly resolved and even admitted
that many people favored the return of Weihaiwei to China as
20a goodwill gesture. And in fact during the second half of
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the Washington Conference itself both France and Britain 
offered to give up their leased territories of Kwangchow Bay 
and Weihaiwei respectively if other powers would do likewise. 
Though objecting vigorously to any discussion of leased ter­
ritories obtained before 1920, the Japanese were finally per­
suaded under the considerable pressure of world opinion and 
Anglo-American diplomatic efforts to relinquish their terri­
torial claims to Kiaochow in December 1922 while retaining
21
certain important economic interests in Shantung. The W e i ­
haiwei issue, however, proved surprisingly difficult to r e ­
solve .
Although Britain had proposed publicly at the Washing­
ton Conference on 1 February to return the leasehold to the 
Chinese with the proviso that arrangements be made for the 
fleet to continue to use the area as a summer recreation facil­
ity and sanatorium, the Chinese delegation was informed pri­
vately that other details remained to be worked out regarding
the status of the port and the safeguarding of foreign prop- 
22
erty rights. Both the foreign and Chinese communities at 
Weihaiwei responded swiftly to the rendition proposal. Brit­
ish residents sent a petition to. London on 18 February re-
23questing that their interests be protected. J
Two representatives of the Chinese merchant community
also presented their views on the matter at a meeting of the
newly-revived Weihaiwei Advisory Council on 22 February, Ku
Minpr-hsttn, a native of the Territory, vice-chairman of the
Chamber of Commerce, and a man described as the most prominent
24Chinese merchant in Weihaiwei, proposed that in the event 
of rendition the various public services at Port Edward (road 
maintenance, sanitation, lighting, policing, etc.) should be
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supervised by a municipal council made up of Chinese and for­
eigners. Financial support for these services, he thought, 
could be provided through special taxation as allowed by the 
new Chinese administration. In addition, he optimistically 
maintained that even if Weihaiwei were made a treaty port 
where customs duties could be levied, trade would only decline 
by 30% at most as Port Edward would continue to be a conven­
ient transit point for ground nut exports. The other Chinese 
representative on the council was Li Yi-chih, an English- 
speaking Cantonese businessmen who was also chairman of the 
Chamber of Commerce, acting British postmaster, and manager 
of a foreign-owned provisions shop. He agreed with Ku that 
those Chinese whose businesses served Chinese needs would be 
little affected by rendition but he also warned that those 
serving the foreign community would be hit hard as would prop­
erty values in Port Edward.
The gloomiest view put forward at the council meeting 
was, of course, that of a British merchant who felt that the 
import-export trade at Weihaiwei would decline by more than 
30% following rendition and the imposition of customs duties. 
He was convinced that since the Territory produced little in 
the way of export goods itself and since most items were only 
brought there for transhipment in order to avoid customs duty, 
this trade would simply shift to the more convenient ports 
of Chefoo and Tsingtao, Furthermore, he felt municipal ser­
vices would rapidly deteriorate and that there would be an ex­
odus of foreign residents and tourists. As a precaution, all 
of those attending the meeting, with the exception of Ku Ming- 
hstin, signed a resolution urging that proper compensation be 
made to both British and Chinese residents in the event of
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. . 25
losses following rendition.
Concerned Chinese merchants at Weihaiwei cabled Peking 
in March 1922 for permission to organize a police force in 
order to deal with any bandits who might be tempted to take 
advantage of a British withdrawal from the area. The British 
journalist reporting on this development also noted that farm­
ers in the more remote parts of the Territory believed that 
the British were being forcibly evicted from the leasehold and
he warned of the dire effects this might have on national pres-
. . 2 6
tige.
The appointment of Liang Ju-hao as Chinese Rendition 
Commissioner stimulated the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in May 
1922 to hold a series of meetings with district and village 
headmen and other local leaders in order to formulate proposals 
for the future administration of Weihaiwei. Although two hun­
dred people attended one of these meetings, no foreigners were 
invited and it is clear from the ideas put forth at the time 
that rendition was viewed by Weihaiwei’s more influential citi­
zens at least as an opportunity to gain formal control over 
local government. It was proposed, for example, that a local 
Chinese council be responsible for administering the area, that 
the present police force, including foreign inspectors, be r e ­
tained, though with some additional volunteers, that the system 
of taxation remain the same, that funds be provided to build 
more roads and stimulate trade, that Port Edward remain a free
port for ten to fifteen years, and that there be no large garri-
2 7
son of Chinese troops. It would appear then that the notion 
of self-government was quite popular at Weihaiwei in 1Q22 and, 
judging by the manner in which these very specific proposals 
were articulated, it would also appear that a fair number of
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people there were eager to assume responsibility for their own 
affairs.
When British and Chinese officials actually commenced 
negotiations concerning the retrocession of Weihaiwei, however, 
it soon became obvious that the two parties disagreed on many 
issues. The major problem was to determine the nature and ex­
tent of British naval privileges at Liukungtao. The Admiralty 
was eager to retain unrestricted access to many of its facili­
ties on the island and to be allowed the right to use the har­
bor for training operations. The Chinese, on the other hand, 
felt that upon rendition the naval base should revert to exclu­
sive Chinese control and that Britain could only expect to use 
the harbor and the island as a "guest” at the discretion of 
the Chinese authorities. Initially, the British were also con­
cerned that some provision be made by the Chinese government 
for linking Weihaiwei either by rail or by road to its hinter­
land. In addition, they sought many guarantees for the protec­
tion of foreign property rights, international trade, and the
2 A
maintenance of public services in Port Edward.
During much of 1922 articles appearing in the Ai Kuo 
Pao at Chefoo expressed strong nationalistic arguments regard­
ing the Weihaiwei negotiations. It was observed, for example, 
that according to the original I898 agreement Weihaiwei had 
been leased on the same terms as Port Arthur which was for 
twenty-five years. Thus, it was argued, since the expiration 
date would arrive in 1Q23 there was no need for the Chinese to 
grant Britain any concessions in exchange for the return of the 
leasehold, nor to lose the "face" that had just been gained at 
the Washington Conference. The authors of these articles also 
arsrued that the harbor should be for the exclusive use of the
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Chinese and that no compensation should be paid for the acqui-
2Q
sition of former British government property, "
As the negotiations dragged on attention was even drawn
to the "Weihaiwei question" in Peking when about one hundred
members of the Shantung Guild demonstrated in September 1922
outside the president's office demanding the leasehold's un-
30
conditional restoration. By this time Liang Ju-hao was com­
ing under personal attack for his position in favor of allow-
. . 31
m g  British warships to anchor at Weihaiwei. And in January
1Q23 the new British executive official at Weihaiwei, A. P.
Blunt, described the negotiations as having broken down. He 
also observed that rendition would be welcome among the Chinese 
residents of the Territory and that although local criticism 
t h u s f a r  had been muted, he felt agitation could become a prob­
lem if the British insisted on terms that were too severe.
Some local people had even remarked that British actions did 
not correspond with their promises at the Washington Conference 
and that the negotiations were undermining confidence in Bri­
tain's "good faith.
As might be expected, such criticism was expressed much 
more openly outside the Territory in neighboring Wen-teng and 
Jung-ch'eng hsien as well as in Chefoo. The guilds of Wen-teng 
sent a written complaint to the government in Peking in January 
and in the following month a group calling itself the "Wen-teng
33
Self-Government Society" called for a boycott of British goods. J 
In March representatives were sent from both Wen-teng and Jung- 
ch* eng to make their demands personally in Peking while students
from those hsien who were studying in the capital held a meet-
. 34
m g  to discuss possible ways of influencing the government.
The similarity at this stage with May Fourth anti-Japanese
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activities was becoming painfully obvious, but still the tor­
tuous negotiations continued.
In November 1923 a group of Shantungese living in Peking 
issued a public manifesto calling for the unconditional rendi­
tion of Weihaiwei and threatening to initiate an anti-British 
boycott and to submit the entire matter to an international 
court for settlement. Certain statements in this manifesto 
made it clear that both parties in the Weihaiwei negotiations 
were concerned that the outcome would set a precedent for the 
return of other leased territories and concessions in China 
and neither side, therefore, was prepared to give too much a w a y . ^  
By May 1924 criticism of Liang Ju-hao had evidently become so 
intense that he resigned his position and the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs became directly responsible for the continued 
discussions on Weihaiwei. In the course of these renewed de­
liberations a draft rendition agreement was finally produced 
which was acceptable to both sides and yet in October, just b e ­
fore it was due to be signed, Feng Ytt-hsiang overthrew the gov­
ernment in Peking. The British then felt, given the general 
chaos and absence of a constitutionally mandated administration, 
that it was impossible to withdraw from Weihaiwei. By the time 
negotiations were resumed again in the late 1920s, relations 
between Britain and China were even more strained and the actual 
return of Weihaiwei did not take place until October 1930. The 
continuing uncertainty of political conditions both inside and 
outside the Territory during the intervening years was to make
administration of the area increasingly difficult as will be
37
seen later in this chapter.
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The Famine of 1920
There were other factors quite unrelated to the rendi­
tion problem which made the 1920s an unsettled period in We i ­
haiwei 's history. One of these was the great drought famine
of 1920-21 which affected 300,000 square miles and five of
38
China's northern provinces including Shantung. Lack of rain 
on the Shantung promontory had almost completely destroyed We i ­
haiwei* s crops in 1919. but true famine conditions only de­
veloped in the spring of 1920 when for a second year there was
3Q
very little r a m .  According to Commissioner Lockhart, the
full extent of the suffering in some of Weihaiwei's villages
did not become known to the government until late March since
many people were reluctant to "lose face" by admitting their 
40
destitution. The worst affected areas were south of Port
Edward in the region of Chang-feng, Wen-chttan-t'ang, and Pei-
k'ou, but districts along the Chefoo road were also in dire
straits. Making matters even worse was the fact that fishing
41
had also failed at this time. Some families, it was reported,
were reduced to eating corn husks, peanut shells, and sweet
potato runners and there were a good many more beggars about 
42
than usual. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce estimated that
at least two thousand families, or approximately ten thousand
43
people, were on the verge of starvation.
Although the Chamber of Commerce and at least one of
Weihaiwei*s district headmen were already making efforts to
secure outside loans to help the destitute, it soon became
apparent that a massive government-aided relief operation was
needed to sustain the Territory's needy until the next rain-
44
fall and a normal harvest. Thus, the Weihaiwei Famine Relief 
Committee was formed of both British and Chinese residents with
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the commissioner as chairman. The purpose of the committee 
was to assist the government in raising funds for the purchase 
of grain and to help in its distribution. The first step 
taken by the group was the purchase of nearly 200,000 catties 
of kaoliang from local stocks and the hiring of carts to trans­
port it to six distribution centers scattered throughout the 
Territory. With the aid of village headmen a complete list 
was compiled of all families requiring assistance and these 
same headmen were then required to guarantee with their signa­
tures that they had.actually received and distributed grain 
in strict accordance with the lists for their villages, A 
British district officer and police inspector went along to 
the distribution centers to ensure that the grain was properly 
handled. In addition, the committee made arrangements to pur­
chase over 2,800,000 catties of grain from Manchuria both as 
an immediate food supply and as seed for the next planting.
Some 8,600 people received free grain over a four-month period 
at Weihaiwei but it was also decided to respect the wishes of 
many small landowners who did not want direct relief and pre­
ferred loans which they agreed to repay within a year with 
their land serving as security. Village elders and the respec­
tive district headmen were co-guarantors of these grain loans 
which were provided to about 29,000 people for two months.
The total grain loaned was valued at nearly $55,000 and in 
every case was promptly r e p a i d . ^
The relief effort at Weihaiwei was financed partly by 
an emergency grant from the British Treasury but primarily 
from public subscriptions to the Weihaiwei Famine Relief Fund 
which were solicited from local merchants, from individuals 
in treaty ports all over China, and from abroad. The total
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cost of the relief effort was approximately $90,000. It would 
have been even more expensive except for the fact that the 
desperately-needed rain did arrive in June 1920 and quickly
46
restored agricultural production to more normal conditions.
The most interesting feature of the famine relief methods
employed at Weihaiwei is once again their close resemblance
to traditional practices. As natural disasters were a perennial
fact of life in China, there was a long-established and quite
detailed "code of practice" for local magistrates responsible
for their alleviation. As one might expect, tax reduction
was high on the list of essential measures for famine relief
and there were even prescribed formulas for computing the amount
of such reduction according to the damage suffered on each 
47
piece of land. Similarly, Commissioner Lockhart found him­
self having to explain to a revenue-hungry Colonial Office in 
1920 that he could not possibly impose new or increased taxa­
tion given the drought conditions at Weihaiwei and that he in 
fact was concerned local farmers would not even be able to pay
their current taxes, especially with the added burden of fam-
48
m e  loans to repay.
There were other parallels as well. One conscientious 
Ch'ing magistrate, Wang Feng-sheng (1776-1834), for example, 
on the basis of his own experience in crisis management r e com­
mended that the best way of determining who was most in need 
of relief was "to have a record of the people stricken by calam­
ity prepared by the village heads, examined by the gentry, and 
then sent to the commissioners /assigned by the magistrate's
— 7 49
superior officials/ for further investigation." ' Although 
"gentry" were not involved in this procedure at Weihaiwei, 
probably because there were so few of them, the listing of
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famine families was done by village heads with British author­
ities and district headmen acting as a check on the enumera­
tion. The rationale for this system at Weihaiwei must have 
been quite similar to Wang Feng-sheng's. He was concerned 
that this important task, if left to clerks or pao-chia heads, 
could lead to corruption and if left exclusively to the "gen­
try" would result in favoritism. Clearly, though, the magi­
strate himself could not possibly visit every household so 
the above compromise was selected. The distribution system 
used at Weihaiwei, though not trouble free, was on the whole 
quite successful according to the following account:
The system was excellent. Many complaints 
were subsequently received of alleged abuses 
by village headmen: in preparing lists (in
favouritism), in distributing at destination, 
in charging too high a rate of exchange when 
repayment was made, in charging too heavy ex­
penses, I think these abuses probably pre­
vailed in a majority of villages but only to 
a minor extent. It is difficult to see how 
they can be avoided, but a serious warning in 
advance* should the necessity arise again, 
would do no.harm.50
Magistrate Wang was well aware of the frequent inade-
nuacy of government relief and recommended that additional
funds be obtained from local well-to-do residents and especially
shopowners. He also suggested that the magistrate himself
set an example by making a personal contribution and that a
relief board made up of local notables be set up to manage
51
the relief fund. All of these measures were taken by the
British at Weihaiwei in 1920 and Commissioner Lockhart, in his
proclamation to the people during the famine, again resorted
to a very traditional style in exhorting them to obey local 
52
regulations.^ The commissioner was especially careful after 
the crisis was over to recognize the efforts of those involved
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in the relief campaign. Members of the Chamber of Commerce 
and hospital staff received a thank you in the form of appro­
priate four-character phrase calligraphy while headmen had 
their choice of a framed letter from the government or a small 
silver replica of a special memorial pei or tablet erected 
in Port Edward to commemorate the prompt way in which Weihai­
wei *s farmers repaid their famine loans. There was also a 
special famine memorial ceremony at Port Edward in April 1921 
during which the commissioner and local dignitaries delivered 
addresses of mutual praise. ^
The harmonious relationship which clearly existed at 
Weihaiwei between the Chinese population and British officials 
during and after the famine of 1920 is in sharp contrast to 
the difficulties experienced by those working for the China 
International Famine Relief Commission in other parts of north 
China, especially during the even more severe famine of 1928-31. 
Nathan writes, for example, that at that time: "The commis­
sion discovered that Chinese outside the westernized fringe 
of society through which it operated showed a limited appreci­
ation of its wider aims and viewed it as a source of funds to
it
be exploited in any way possible.J I would suggest that the 
success of the Weihaiwei relief effort, especially the fact 
that all of the grain loans were repaid with the next harvest, 
is a very good indication of the attitude people had toward 
their local government. It was clearly not regarded as a for­
eign body dispensing charity, but rather as the recognized 
sroverning authority to which certain obligations were owed.
In the final analysis it must be said that the enforcer of 
these obligations was certainly not physical power for the 
combined military and police apparatus at Weihaiwei was miniscule.
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It would seem rather that the ultimate sanction for default 
on a government loan was the contempt of one's neighbors, and 
"loss of face" in Chinese society was a powerful threat indeed. 
Yet one must conclude that this particular sanction would not 
have existed at Weihaiwei if the British administration, oper­
ating through the Chinese village and district headmen system, 
had not by this time been rather well accepted as the "legiti­
mate" governing body.
It must also be noted here that the famine at Weihaiwei 
did not have the disastrous effects experienced elsewhere in 
north China. There is no mention in British records, for ex­
ample, of the sale of farm animals or children as a means of 
raising cash for food. Nor were houses torn down so that the 
timber could be sold. The official British census of 1921 
states that deaths due to the famine were not a serious prob­
lem, although there may have been a greater number than usual 
of people leaving the Territory to seek temporary work else- 
where. J In addition, the fact that Weihaiwei made such a 
rapid recovery is both a sign that the famine was not as severe 
as that suffered in other parts of China and that the relief 
operation was effective. Similar measures were taken once 
again in 1925 when drought struck Weihaiwei's farm output 
and the price of grain was even higher than it had been in 
1920.56
Economic Development, 1921-192?
It is significant that throughout the 1920s British 
officials frequently described economic conditions there as 
being seriously affected by national or international factors. 
As the years went by the Territory's economic health was to
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a greater and greater degree determined by such things as 
world market prices for export commodities, national and in­
ternational political problems* the stability of Chinese and 
foreign currencies, and a host of other variables which were 
completely beyond local control. The expanding commercial 
community at Port Edward was especially vulnerable to such 
conditions but farmers and fishermen in the more remote areas 
were also affected.
The most important single export commodity at Weihaiwei 
continued to be ground nuts for which demand and price fre­
quently fluctuated. The value of ground nut kernels in 1921,
for example, was 25$ higher than it had been in 1920 and busi-
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ness was brisk. The general deterioration in political con­
ditions in China in 192^, on the other hand, made the money 
market very tight and many dealers that year were forced to 
sell their ground nuts quickly, even at a loss, rather than 
wait for the price to r i s e . ^  Further difficulties arose in 
1925 as anti-foreign agitation disrupted trade at Shanghai, 
while at Hong Kong the British were especially hard hit by a 
fifteen-month strike and boycott beginning in the summer of 
that year. The diversion of the British fleet to riot-torn 
Shanghai meant a great loss of business to Weihaiwei merchants
and irregular shipping to Hong Kong posed difficulties for
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local ground nut dealers, ' This ever-fluctuating trade pat­
tern continued in 1926 and 192? as the ground nut market once
again improved both in terms of total volume exported and price
, 60 r e c e i v e d .
The peanut.trade also encountered problems of a more 
localized variety as indicated in several Advisory Council 
meetings of 1922, Disputes repeatedly arose, for example,
25^
over what should be considered a standard unit of measurement 
for nut purchases and sales and over the dishonest practice 
of watering nuts which was employed by some farmers and deal­
ers to increase their weight. In the end the Ground Nut 
Guild and Chamber of Commerce agreed that only an authorized 
foreign scale should be used for weighing purposes. They 
also asked that the government issue proclamations banning 
the practice of watering nuts and that even greater cultiva* 
tion of peanuts be encouraged through a system of cash rewards 
and medals. With a membership of some ninety-eight firms 
in 1922 the Ground Nut Guild at Weihaiwei was evidently a 
fairly powerful organization and assumed responsibility not 
only for weight standards, but also for market days, and hours, 
as well as supervising the testing and conditioning of nuts 
before shipment, and at times acted - as a sales agent for its 
m e m b e r s .
The g u i l d ’s efforts to eliminate disreputable practices
led to a certain amount of opposition from the small number
of middlemen involved. They in turn retaliated by posting
anonymous placards which threatened action against the guild
whenever the Territory was returned to Chinese jurisdiction.
The clear implication was, of course, that the guild acted
under British protection. Thus, even though the placards
were not specifically anti-government, the British had them
removed and noted that only those few individuals guilty of
watering nuts were actually opposed to the guild anyway. The
majority of firms were concerned that Weihaiwei maintain its
reputation in foreign markets for supplying a high quality 
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product. It is interesting that those opposing the guild, 
an organization which, along with the Chamber of Commerce,
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certainly spoke for the hulk of Weihaiwei*s business "estab­
lishment," regarded them as closely identified with the Brit­
ish administration. It is also significant that local busi­
nessmen by this time had learned a great deal about how to 
organize themselves to compete effectively in a modern trad­
ing environment and recognized the need for British assistance 
in protecting their own interests, J
There were other areas of economic development at Wei­
haiwei in the 1920s as well. The ever-increasing demand for 
silk cocoons to supply Chefoo's filatures led one firm to 
plant 30,000 mulberry trees in the Territoryfwith the hope 
of improving upon the traditional scrub oak sericulture prac­
ticed there. There were even suggestions that a silk expert 
be hired to stimulate the industry at Weihaiwei. Unfortunately, 
the government did not act upon this recommendation even
though the number of workers employed in the weaving of silk
6 k
thread had doubled between 1911 and 1921.
Salt output was also increasing in the Territory with 
87,500 piculs produced in 1920 as compared with 11,000 piculs 
in 1907♦ The international demand for this product was sub­
ject to great fluctuation, however, and never guaranteed a 
large income to its producers at Weihaiwei or to the British 
who taxed it. In 1921 the Chinese government decided to en­
force its monopoly on the salt trade by prohibiting shipment
of the product between Weihaiwei and other parts of the count 
6 5
try. D This in effect greatly limited the Territory's poten­
tial for expanding salt exports to the large Korean market 
since its own output was relatively small. One way in which 
Weihaiwei's salt was profitably utilized, however, was in its 
own thriving fishing industry. This trade was greatly aided
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in 1925-26 by the introduction of motorized boats. The larger
catches made possible with these boats were then salted for
66export to both Shanghai and Hong Kong.
A few handicraft industries continued to contribute to
Weihaiwei's relative prosperity in the 1920s. Foreign demand
for hair nets# for example, boomed in the period 1920-23 and
local workers benefitted, especially since the finished nets
were exempted from duty. According to official British sources
there were 623 female workers employed in this industry in
1 9 21.^ The obvious drawback to this largely American market,
of course, was that it was entirely determined by the whims
of Western fashion and by the second half of the decade hair
6 Anet manufacturing appears to have greatly declined.
Other industries employing similar skills, however, con­
tinued to do well including lace-making, embroidery work, and 
the weaving of silk hosiery. The Roman Catholic Workroom was 
especially active in training young women in the art of lace- 
making. It was observed, for example, in 1921 that:
This class of skilled workers is a valuable 
asset to the community and their economic 
value is being felt in their employment by 
traders from lace centers further north who 
have opened small branches of their estab­
lishments in Weihai City, Native employers 
also engage the trained workers, sometimes 
in small factories and often in the workers'
own homes.69
By 1927 it was reported that there about a dozen workrooms
70for embroidery and hosiery weaving m  the Territory. The
1921 census listed I83 female laceworkers and 2^ -2 "weavers"
71employed in the leasehold. As the cost of living continued
to rise at Weihaiwei in the 1920s, these new opportunities
72to supplement family incomes were undoubtedly welcomed.
Weihaiwei also had the advantage of enjoying peace and
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relative political stability throughout this decade in con­
trast to turbulent conditions elsewhere. In fact, the in­
crease of banditry just over the territorial boundaries be­
gan to strain the small local police force and it was expanded 
in the mid-1920s, Economic growth itself brought more people 
in and out of the Territory and demanded greater police vigi- 
lance.’ v The town of Port Edward m  particular must have pre­
sented a picture of bustling activity and new growth. Here 
the native wheelbarrow had been largely replaced by carts and
bicycles and by 1927 there were even a few automobiles to be
ok,
seen m  the Territory, At the same time there was a flurry
of building activity in the town and this created work for
local masons and carpenters.^  There was even a new cinema
in Port Edward by 1921 and requests for permission to build
76many more followed in the period 1925-30. It must have been 
with some pride, therefore, in 1921 that Stewart Lockhart who 
had come to Weihaiwei as commissioner in 1Q02 with the object 
of encouraging economic growth finally retired from his post 
and returned to England.
Lockhart's Retirement
Lockhart's retirement was in fact an important occasion 
in the history of British administration at Weihaiwei for it 
gave the local population an opportunity to express their appre­
ciation to him personally for his nineteen years of "enlight­
ened" service. On 21 April there was an elaborate ceremony 
at which many local Chinese dignitaries read speeches of 
praise, erected a stone table in his honor, and presented fare­
well gifts, including a traditional silk robe and umbrella, a 
vase of pure water signifying the purity of his administration,
258
and a silken scroll. The speech delivered by a representa­
tive of the district headmen is typical of the sentiments 
expressed on this occasion. A British translation follows 
below:
His Honour the Commissioner, Lo Kung,
Came from the British Empire.
With diligence he administered us,
Not shunning laborious toil.
He was kind and polite to scholars,
And treated the peasants bounteously.
His methods of rule were good,
And he planned to enlighten and improve.
He encouraged and bettered education,
And taught farming and mulberry planting,
He was attentive to commerce,
Directing and advising where necessary.
He protected the good
And punished the wild and wicked.
He was kind and stern, as required,
Just as seasons have rain, dew, ice, and frost. 
During the famine of last year,
When anxiety engulfed the whole land,
He raised subscriptions for the people's relief 
And gave grains of kindness and gruel of love.
The thirsty ones were satisfied 
And the hungry were fed.
Thousands of the lives of the people
Were favoured by the light of his grace.
Suddenly, hearing of his glorious departure 
Our hearts are breaking with sorrow,
As if we were losing a merciful mother. . . '
Ku Ming-hsttn also spoke at the ceremony on behalf of 
the Chamber of Commerce and emphasized Lockhart's contribu­
tions to the Territory's economic prosperity.^  No doubt a 
traditional Chinese magistrate would have been delighted to 
hear such generous praise for the successful fulfillment of
his two main responsibilities: protecting the people's wel-
7 0
fare and administering .justice/'' Lockhart in turn responded 
that he had been dependent upon the cooperation of the local 
inhabitants whom he hoped would always remain simple and up­
right. And he went further to say: "I regard myself as for­
tunate in having always had to deal with the affairs of such
an eminently reasonable and lovable race as the Chinese whom
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I have always found as loyal as the Highlanders of my own
country and ever ready to lend me their assistance in sun-
80
shine and storm." The man who succeeded Lockhart as chief 
administrator concluded that "the deep and universal regret 
felt by the Chinese population" at his predecessor's retire­
ment was "as high a tribute to British administrative methods 
and as helpful to British prestige in China as would have
8lbeen more material progress and up-to-date methods . . ."
Lockhart's retirement also signalled the end of an era 
at Weihaiwei, for no one after him, except Reginald Johnston 
who served as commissioner for three years from 1927-30, would 
command either the knowledge of Chinese or local customs which 
this man had. Nor, I think, would there ever again be such 
close rapport between the British and their subjects here for 
no one would serve as long as Lockhart had. In all fairness, 
however, it must be said that the character *of life in the 
leasehold was also changing and with it so too the expectations 
of the people from their government.
Proposals for Self-Government, 1921-27
Attention has already been drawn to the increasingly im­
portant role played by the Chamber of Commerce at Weihaiwei.
It should be noted that as early as 1919 this body had pro­
posed that, in view of the menacing bandit problem along terri­
torial borders, it might be a good idea to have a volunteer 
defense force similar to those existing at Chef00 and Antung,
In order to protect -Port Edward it was suggested that local 
firms could supply volunteers according to their size and 
that these men could perform daily drills under government 
supervision with arms paid for by the Chamber, Meanwhile,
the rest of the Territory could be defended by village volun­
teers alloted on the same basis as the ancient pao-chia system 
with one man per ten households. Each district would have a 
drill ground and the police could serve as instructors with 
guns borrowed from the government and ammunition supplied 
through village funds. Each village was to also have four 
watchmen. It was further recommended*
The Headmen of the various villages who all 
know well whether their neighbours are good 
or bad, should make a register and having 
inserted in it the names of all those who 
have no occupation or property or whose move­
ments are unsatisfactory, should daily keep 
them under investigation. If any suspicious 
outsider happens to arrive, his antecedents 
should be thoroughly investigated.$2
The government finally agreed to have these forces as auxiliary 
units to the police provided that they, and not the Chamber 
of Commerce, maintained control over them.^
On behalf of local fishermen and headmen in 192^, the 
Chamber of Commerce also asked the government for greater pro­
tection from Manchurian bandits who were preying upon the fish­
esing fleet. In the end, however, the Chamber was forced to
act upon the government's suggestion to hire themselves a
8 ^
motorized trawler for their own protection. D
In 1922, as negotiations were taking place to return
Weihaiwei to Chinese jurisdiction, Ku Ming-hstln and Li Yi-chih,
the vice-chairman and chairman respectively of the Chamber
of Commerce, proposed at an Advisory Council meeting that
the local headman system be revised. They made the following
complaint about the existing system*
When the 'right people' are selected for this 
position, they usually are respectable but 
ao things in a perfunctory manner and do not 
know how to promote what is good and get rid 
of what is evil. When the 'wrong people' are 
selected, they make arbitrary decisions in the 
rural areas and bully those who are stupid and
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weak. Therefore, in our humble opinion 
this system should be abolished and in 
its place a system of self-governing dis­
tricts should be established.^
Under the existing system there were 25 district head­
men and 357 village headmen, but Ku and Li wanted to greatly 
expand this so that there would be one district for every 
600-1000 families and one village headman and one sub-headman 
for every village of 100 families. Villages with 150 fami­
lies would have one headman and two sub-headmen and so on in 
that proportion. The new total of elected headmen wduld then 
be about 570 with 36 districts. Each district would have a 
committee made up of all the village headmen who would choose 
a chairman and vice-chairman. The committee would meet weekly 
to discuss such matters as education, social reform, sanita­
tion, afforestation, improvement of agricultural methods, new 
crops, and so forth. It was also recommended that there be
a meeting place in Port Edward to which experts on the above
8*7subjects could be invited to speak.
Commenting on these proposals the British noted that 
the machinery for self-government already existed in China 
although the movement had been somewhat in abeyance since
Yttan Shih-k’ai's takeover. In any event, it was observed*
88
"The results attained have not been very encouraging." The 
new administrator, Blunt, stated that he did not think such 
a plan was suited to Weihaiwei, but it might be possible, he 
thought, to initiate it at Port Edward and then extend it if 
the British retained the leasehold. Of course, it must be 
remembered that negotiations by this time were underway re­
garding Weihaiwei*s future and the British were obviously not
keen to institute such important changes until the rendition
8 0
question had been resolved. The significant point here is
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that some of Weihaiwei*s leaders sensed that an opportunity 
perhaps existed for them to assume more responsibility for 
their own affairs and chose this time to make their views 
known. The Advisory Council meetings were a good forum for 
them to discuss all sorts of issues, including the need for 
storm signals, ground nut problems, changes in the land tax 
registers, the installation of telephones, and local markets.^0 
For his part, the new executive appears to have been 
eager to maintain cordial relations with Weihaiwei's district 
headmen and in 1923 decided to entertain them all at a ban­
quet twice annually in order to give them a bit more "face”
91m  -the community. Throughout the remaining years in which
Britain held Weihaiwei, however, the basic administrative
structure was unchanged and apparently functioned with a fair
degree of success. One of the British police inspectors in
1921 even went so far as to say that he believed the sharp
contrast between Weihaiwei*s relative security and the violent
conditions in neighboring hsien was due primarily to the in-
92fluence and authority of the headmen.
Education, 1920-27
The decade following the May Fourth movement was a per­
iod of considerable intellectual activity in China, a period 
in which "modern" education was seen to hold the answers to 
many of the nation's most fundamental problems. In Weihaiwei, 
too, school enrollments continued to rise and there were some 
attempts to make the benefits of education more widely avail­
able. The following table gives a general indication of the 
rising enrollments in Port Edward's schools:
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Table 7
Enrollments at Weihaiwei Schools for Chinese Students,
1920-192893
1920 1922 1924 1925 1927 1928
Government
School 116 122 153 180 200 200
Anti-Foot
Binding
no
figures 35 38 42
no
figures 50
St, Joseph's 27 no
figures
151 241 264 170
Plymouth
Brethern 50
no
figures 77 126
no
figures 190
Anglican
School
no
figures 90 120 140 80 63
Ch* i-tung 40 100
In 1920 the government carried out a survey of all pri­
mary schools in the Territory and discovered there were 284 
with 307 teachers and an average attendance of roughly 4,700, 
only 100 of whom were girls. The annual cost of these private 
schools was $15»000. It was observed that although a modern 
curriculum was being taught in some of the village schools, 
there were also a great number which were conducted along 
more traditional lines. The biggest problem was finding 
"modern" personnel to staff the schools and such teachers in
oh
general came from outside the Territory, Referring to the 
old-style village schools, one observer noted* "There is, 
however, a commendable keenness to gradually abolish this 
type of school and substitute modern schools. The difficulty 
is the dearth of suitable teachers on the one hand and a re­
luctance on the part of some of the villages to discard the
old style of teacher who finds it difficult to adjust hira-
9 <
self to the requirements of modern educational methods."7^
Taking their inspiration from James Yen's 1000 character 
movement for illiterate adults, some of Weihaiwei's leading
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citizens in 1923 proposed the establishment of night schools
for the poor and by 1924 the idea had been so well received
that there were twenty-six of them. The association behind
this program was called the "P'ing-min chiao-yii hui'* (Popular
Education Society) and by 1926 it was requested that the pro-
q 6
ceeds of the theatrical tax be devoted to its support.
Further interest in educational affairs was demonstrated 
in 1927 when Weihaiwei's district headmen petitioned the gov­
ernment for a special levy on the land tax in order to sup­
port a new middle school for boys. The British also agreed 
for a time to pay the rent on the school building. During 
1926, its first year of operation, Ch'i Tung Middle School
had an enrollment of 40 boys and in 1927 the figure had risen 
97to 100. This new institution was mainly supported by public 
subscription and was staffed by university graduates.
While the British generally looked with favor upon edu­
cational efforts at Weihaiwei, they were not unaware of the 
predominant role which China's schools were playing in the 
growth of nationalism. Thus, when anti-British strikes broke 
out in Shanghai in 1925* for example, some of Weihaiwei*s stu­
dents attempted to organize a demonstration in favor of the 
movement. Half of the boys at the Anglican School stopped 
attendinec classes after this so-called "May 30th Incident" on 
the grounds that the school was under British management.
Some of the older students from this school also asked for and 
received the government's permission to hold a memorial ser­
vice in commemoration of those killed in the riot at Shanghai 
and to raise funds to aid their families. A meeting was sub­
sequently held in the walled town with representatives from 
twelve schools in which subscriptions were called for and an
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effort made to organize lectures and the distribution of cir­
culars at Weihaiwei explaining the strike movement. At this 
point Blunt asked the Chamber of Commerce to use its influence 
to prevent the students from leading any sort of political agi­
tation. At the same time the British also arrested four men 
they said were distributing propaganda in connection with the 
strike, declaring: "The sole menace to the peace and order
of the Territory would appear to be in the activities of Chi­
nese professional agitators who may work their way across the
frontier with intent to incite the people against the Govern- 
98ment." * A warning was also given to a government clerk not
9 9"to meddle m  politics."7 The students at the Government 
School apparently did not participate in these events. Their 
headmaster commented that a few of the older boys showed a cer­
tain "enthusiasm" for the recent student movement but still 
attended classes regularly. He found them generally rather 
conservative and "not too much infatuated in the Western civ­
ilization." They did, however, make an effort to start a 
student union and asked that they be provided with footballs 
and newspapers. Significantly, the British approved the foot­
balls but not the newspapers.*00
Newspapers
It is interesting that the first attempt to publish a 
Chinese newspaper at Weihaiwei occurred in August 1923 but 
perhaps floundered when the new administrator, Blunt, discour­
aged it.*0'*' Another effort was made in 1927 with the launch­
ing: of the Wei-hai wu-pao in December and by this time Regi­
nald Johnston had become commissioner. Though he informed 
the would-be publishers that they would have to provide the
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government with the names of responsible people who could be 
sued in the case of libel, he also made it plain that the gov­
ernment would not reject the paper out of hand.
With the appearance of the first issue of the Wu-pao 
Johnston observed that, though it could not be described as 
a "first-class production," it was not at all offensive and in 
fact was highly complimentary to British administration at 
Weihaiwei. At the same time, however, he reserved judgment 
as to whether this was merely a temporary diversion since the
paper's publisher, Sun Han-ch'uan, made no secret of the fact
102that he had been m  Russia. Other members of the newspaper's 
staff also came under suspicion by the fact that they did not 
seek the support of the local business community but rather 
appeared to have outside funding. Two in particular were de­
scribed as "men of neither means nor repute who would turn
their hands to any job for the sake of anything they could
103make. Both are opium smokers." J In any event, the paper
does not appear to have given the British any trouble during
its short life. Those issues which have survived from 1927
and 1928 carried articles much more critical of corruption
within the walled town and in China generally than of the lease-
104hold administration. The fact that Port Edward was in a
position to support a daily newspaper by 1927 is perhaps the 
most interesting thing that one can say about it. Another 
paper which emerged in 1929-30, however, proved to be a bit 
more of an irritant as will be seen in the next chapter.
Social Problems
Though Weihaiwei was clearly assuming many of the attri­
butes of a "modern" society in the late 1920s, it still retained
26?
other features which were strangely impervious to change.
The cruel custom of foot-binding, for example, continued to 
be practiced despite official and unofficial campaigns against 
it. Blunt again addressed the district headmen on the evils 
of foot-binding in October 1921 and, although the men expressed 
agreement with him, they noted that the older women in their 
own families refused to be persuaded. Although Blunt had 
copies of his proclamation against this custom circulated 
throughout the Territory and even sent to the Wen-teng and 
Jung-ch*eng magistrates, he was reluctant to make foot-binding 
a crime especially in view of possible rendition. He warned 
the people, however, that future Chinese officials were not 
likely to take such a lenient view of the subject.*0^
The incidence of suicides at Weihaiwei also remained 
high, especially among young w o m e n . T h i s  phenomenon, how­
ever, was not unique to the Territory and seemed rather to be
the result of extreme pressures which traditional Chinese fami-
107lies exerted on young married women. Other social problems
with which the police frequently had to deal were gambling 
and opium smoking. With respect to the latter, the government 
was fairly successful in discouraging opium smuggling at Wei­
haiwei by increasing the penalties against it and by lowering 
the price of the drug sold legally to licensed addicts. They 
were, of course, unable to eliminate the large supplies avail­
able just across the border and rumored to be of Japanese ori-
1 O R
gin. Yet life in British-controlled Weihaiwei remained a
model of law and order compared to the increasingly anarchic 
conditions existing elsewhere in warlord China,
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Political Conditions
By May 1925 Shantung had acquired the dubious distinc­
tion of having one of the most notorious warlord regimes in 
the entire country. As a subordinate of Manchuria's powerful 
Chang Tso-lin, Chang Tsung-ch'ang owed his survival as Shan­
tung's military governmor entirely to intimidation and brute 
force. Until his ouster in April 1928, he managed to almost 
completely destroy the Shantung economy through a combination 
of ruinous taxes, the printing of unsupported paper money, 
confiscation of bank reserves, and plundering of the country­
side by undisciplined troops. Matters were made even worse 
in 1927-28 by a series of natural disasters which forced thou­
sands of people to seek relief by emigrating to Manchuria.*0^ 
Even prior to this particularly appalling period, how­
ever, Weihaiwei found itself at times caught up in the endless 
series of battles between contending warlord factions. In 
June 1924, for example, after an abortive attempt to seize 
a Chinese gunboat at Chefoo, a band of about twenty adherents 
of the Canton government fled into the Territory en route to 
Shanghai.**0 A few months later in October it was noted that 
representatives of the so-called "Red Cross Society" had en­
tered Weihaiwei, apparently acting as spies for Wu P'ei-fu 
in an attempt to observe the movements of any Pengtien fol­
lowers who might be using the leasehold to gain access to Shan­
tung. After it was discovered that these men were soliciting 
the support of local well-to-do citizens, the British decided
to close down their office and they moved instead to the walled 
111town. With the arrival of Chang Tsung-ch*ang's armies,
the police at Weihaiwei were especially vigilant to ensure
112that increased banditry did not spill over their borders.
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By 1927 the continuing battles to gain control of China 
were being conducted in ideological as well as military terms 
and Reginald Johnston, now commissioner at Weihaiwei, found 
himself being asked by Chinese authorities at both Chefoo and 
Tsinan to extradite suspected "bolsheviks." Johnston at this 
time initiated a policy of strict political neutrality to 
which he adhered consistently until rendition in 1930. He 
stated, for example, that it was not against English law for 
a person to be a Communist and unless it could be proven that 
subversive activities had occurred, no action would be taken. 
There was- to be a whole series of similar demands made upon 
him from 1Q28-30, all of which he successfully resisted.
Johnston was especially apprehensive that if Chiang K'ai- 
shek*s forces were to extend their influence into Shantung* 
"Chefoo /would7 be a centre of intrigue and anti-British dem-
1 1 II
onstrations against us m  Weihai." By November 1927 he 
wrote* "We still survive but we are threatened continually 
by bandits, who indeed have already crossed our boundary sev­
eral times, though fortunately without doing much damage."
A new permanent garrison of 150 British soldiers was added at
11 ^
this point to help stem the tide of bandit incursions. J
Johnston found himself complaining in this same year 
that Weihaiwei was not the old "Wu Wei place" it used to be 
and that he spent a good deal of his time hunting down "Chi­
nese and Korean bolshevik spies." He also found himself "al­
most at war with the Shantung government" for refusing to ex­
tradite "innocent refugees" who were accused of being bolshe- 
viks but were actually pursued for their money. He felt
relieved at this point, however, that Weihaiwei*s more perma­
nent residents thus far displayed neither bolshevist nor anti-
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117British sentiments. No one m  fact seemed eager for ren­
dition given the upheaval which then existed throughout China. 
Yet pressure would soon be brought to bear once again upon 
the British to withdraw from Weihaiwei, not by those inside 
the Territorial borders, but by a new and extremely nation­
alistic government under Chiang K'ai-shek.
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Chapter 7 
The End of an Era
-The Northern Expedition Comes to Shantung
The strong tides of nationalism were indeed flow­
ing across China in the late 1920s, but these years, if 
anything, brought even greater administrative chaos and 
economic deprivation to the long-suffering people of Shan­
tung than had the earlier portion of this turbulent decade. 
In the autumn:of.1927 * with serious disputes dividing the 
Kuomintang internally and relations with Japan causing 
difficulties externally, Chiang K'ai-shek's great North­
ern Expedition to eradicate warlordism and unite China 
suddenly came to a halt in southern Shantung. Given this 
reprieve, Chang T s *ung-ch'ang temporarily remained in 
power in Tsinan until the Nationalists forced his with­
drawal to Manchuria in the spring of 1928,
Even then, however, the Nanking regime was prevented 
from immediately consolidating its position in Shantung. 
Serious fighting, later known as the "Tsinan incident," 
broke out in May between Kuomintang and Japanese troops 
and, although a cease-fire was quickly negotiated, the 
Japanese continued to occupy the provincial capital and 
the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad until the spring of 1929.
By then disputes had arisen between Chiang K'ai-shek and 
his erstwhile ally Feng Ytt-hsiang over who should actually 
control the province. Timely defections by two of Feng's 
commanders, Han Fu-ch'b and Shih Yu-san, however, settled 
the matter in Chiang's favor and in September 1930 Han 
was repaid for his support with the chairmanship of the
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Shantung government, a position he retained until the
1
Japanese invasion of 1937.
Although the struggle to control the provincial ad­
ministration at Tsinan ended in 1930, certain parts of 
Shantung remained in the hands of minor warlords for some 
time afterward. The Chefoo region, for example, had been 
primarily controlled since 1928 by General Liu Chen-nien, 
a former subordinate of Chang T s 1ung-ch'ang, who had in 
that year declared his somewhat dubious loyalty to the 
Nanking forces. With its proximity to Manchuria and rela­
tive remoteness from Tsinan, the Shantung promontory was 
an ideal staging ground for battles between various groups 
of northern militarists and those claiming to be affili­
ated with the Kuomintang. Chang T s 'ung-ch*ang himself 
even attempted an unsuccessful return invasion of Shan­
tung from this area in February 1929. Thus, the American 
consul reported in May 1929 that there had been no less
than six changes of flags and nine different factions in
2
power in Chefoo in the past year alone. Such instability 
inevitably had repercussions in the leasehold of Weihaiwei.
In fact, as the political fortunes of all these 
competing groups rose and fell in rapid succession, the 
British territory proved once again to be a conveniently 
neutral sanctuary for many displaced soldiers and generals 
as well as civilian refugees. Those with their own finan­
cial resources made a considerable contribution to eco­
nomic growth in Weihaiwei during these final years of the 
British occupation. In August 1928 one observer remarked: 
"Northern and Southern partisans, ex-officials and others, 
are now jostling each other for houses in which to live.
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The owners of home property are reaping an abundant silver
h
harvest, and the building trade is booming.*'
Not all of the effects of this influx were positive 
ones, however. As well as having to deal with a constant 
barrage of extradition demands from neighboring Chinese 
officials and the legal problems they presented, the com­
missioner at Weihaiwei was also faced with large numbers 
of armed soldiers entering the Territory as they deserted 
from warlord armies. By early 192° there were so many 
of these men coming in that a proclamation was issued 
throughout the leasehold specifying the conditions under 
which they could remain,^
Banditry
Of greater concern to the British administrators 
than individual refugee soldiers were those who decided 
to form new bandit gangs or reinforce the many already 
in existence in areas bordering the Territory. As con­
tinued war and extortionate government brought ever greater 
poverty to Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien, the relative 
prosperity within Weihaiwei*s borders presented an attrac­
tive and tempting contrast.
The annual presence of British ships at Weihaiwei 
during the summer of 1927 was an effective deterrent to 
local armed gangs, but the withdrawal of the fleet in the 
autumn encouraged a few bandits to make exploratory visits 
along the borders and into the market towns. During the 
winter of 1927-28 there were a number of armed robberies 
in the Territory, some of which were led by bandits operat­
ing from the western border regions. There in a rugged
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range of mountains over 3*000 feet high there were several
7
ancient temples which they used for shelter. The com­
missioner became especially concerned after receiving 
anonymous letters which threatened armed raids into Wei­
haiwei by these men who were said to number in the thou­
sands and to be equipped with guns supplied from Dairen. 
Fortunately, the raid was never carried out and most of 
the violent crime of this period took place outside the
O
Territory.
In February 1928 the British commissioner was able 
to report that the Territory to that point remained basi­
cally secure and added*
The only plausible explanation of the com­
parative immunity of the leased Territory 
from the unwelcome attentions of bandits 
seems to be that they come from an extremely 
ignorant and superstitious section of the 
population, that they are badly equipped 
and led, that they have heard of, if they 
have not seen, British men-of-war and sea­
planes, and that they entertain a very 
healthy dread of the fighting capacities of 
the British soldier and of the British- 
trained Chinese police,9
He also voiced his fear, however, that the recent "surren­
der1' of the Hankow concession and "unpunished outrages" 
at Nanking would inspire greater boldness among bandit 
gangs, especially when backed up by armed, runaway sol- 
diers.10
The breakdown of law and order in the Chefoo area
gave even more cause for alarm in 1929 as was noted by
the British consul there:
It is difficult to write of conditions in 
the interior without giving way to super­
latives. The whole of the consular dis­
trict with the exception of such main routes 
as Chefoo to Ninghai and Chefoo to Lungkow 
is overrun with robber bands and Red Spears
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and even those exceptions must be qualified 
for armed robbers and kidnappers operate, 
in small bands, as opposed to small armies 
elsewhere, in the very outskirts of Chefoo. 1
Weihaiwei, however, even at this stage remained im­
mune from large-scale attacks and by 1930 the commissioner 
had learned from certain anonymous letters addressed to 
himself that there was a more important reason for the 
leasehold's relative security than British "prestige" or 
its meager defense force. He explained:
. . . the bandit-leaders regard the Leased 
Territory not only as a very convenient 
place of refuge in time of need but as a 
safe and advantageous meeting-place for 
local branches of the semi-religious and 
semi-political secret societies with which 
the majority of bandits are associated. By
rigidly abstaining from entering the Terri­
tory as bandits, they feel they can pass 
through it in safety, or become temporary 
residents, without any serious risk of being 
recognised either by villagers who might 
have been among their victims or by the 
British police.*3.
Many local residents undoubtedly knew of this practice
but were reluctant to inform the commissioner and upset
the status quo as long as they were left in peace. And 
the commissioner, with his small security force, was cer­
tainly not in a position to launch a bandit extermination 
campaign anyway. The safest course, and the one in fact 
adopted, was to turn a blind eye to the bandit presence 
in the Territory so long as its residents were not them­
selves the object of attack. It was a precarious method 
of peace-keeping to say the least, but one which worked 
over the short period remaining until the British withdrawal.
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The Struggle for Political Control of the Walled Town
In addition to endemic banditry, there were other 
indications of the near anarchy which existed in Shantung 
in the late 1920s. As on previous occasions when disputes 
arose over who should exercise national, or provincial ad­
ministrative authority, problems soon developed in the 
walled town of Weihai. As early as June 1927 the Chinese 
sub-magistrate there requested that the British assist 
him with security measures by supplying weapons as well 
as a telephone link with Port Edward. Although the com­
missioner replied that he had no spare rifles to offer,
he promised to help in the event of actual violence in 
12the town. J It is interesting that Reginald Johnston should 
have been the one to receive such a request, since it was 
he who had rescued an earlier Weihai official during the
lit
1911 revolution. In March 1928 the Chinese magistrate
shrewdly reminded1 Johnston of this precedent and again
asked that he help to prevent "Communists" from creating
disturbances. The commissioner, however, informed the
Colonial Office that this particular official was in reality
less afraid of "Communists" than of either a revolution
against the Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang administration in which
he served, or a local rebellion against himself as he was
1 *5quite unpopular within the walled town.
In August 1928 a new man was appointed to the Wei­
hai sub-magistracy when the administration at Chefoo came 
under nominal Nationalist control. The commissioner was 
impressed with this official's intention to launch anti­
opium and anti-gambling campaigns but doubted they could 
actually be implemented given the town's dependence on
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these major sources of revenue. In the following months 
a good deal of the commissioner's time was taken up r e ­
sponding to pleas for assistance from rival claimants to 
the Weihai post. In September he was asked by two dif­
ferent individuals for support in removing the incumbent
magistrate from office and declined. Explaining this peculiar 
situation to his superiors, the commissioner wrote:
That there should be so severe a competi­
tion for the chief post in the town of 
Weihaiwei may surprise those who know 
that its trade is almost extinct, all but
a few of its leading merchants having long
since migrated to the leased Territory.
It is probably less populous than it was 
thirty years ago, and at the present day 
it can hardly be described as anything 
better than a walled village. The truth 
is, however, that the town possesses three 
sources of revenue —  or rather of 'squeeze*
-- which are quite sufficient to attract 
the cupidity, of those who from lack of in­
fluence or opportunity cannot hope to attain 
higher spheres of enrichment. These three 
sources of profit are opium, gambling and 
prostitution.1 '
The commissioner again received a call for help from 
the magistrate in November 1928 when one of the factions 
seeking to control Weihai sent an armed gang to terrorize 
the town. At that point he decided to position police
18
outside the city walls to arrest anyone carrying arms.
The battle, it appears, was essentially between the incum­
bent official who was a representative of Liu Chen-nien, 
then in control of the Chefoo area, and various individuals 
sent by the new provincial government located at T'ai-an. 
(Tsinan in 1028 was still occupied by the Japanese.) In 
the meantime, with its own position in Shantung far from 
assured, the Nanking administration was reluctant to back 
anyone with troops against General Liu. The T'ai-an can-
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didates, without military support, were repeatedly thrown
out of Weihai by Liu's forces and finally gave up trying
to control the town although Kuomintang agents were re-
1Qportedly in the area as late as February 1929.
The fact that the Nanking authorities at this point 
were highly suspicious of Liu's loyalty made it important 
for them to also maintain agents in the area to keep an 
eye on him. As the British commissioner noted, the leased 
Territory itself was highly valued as a safe haven for 
spying and propaganda operations by all of the political 
factions involved. At the same time, the town was valued 
because it was surrounded by foreign territory and, in 
the event the British chose to clamp down on such political 
intrigue, could itself become a place of refuge for the 
various agents. It was also a convenient place from which 
to survey British activities.
As one might expect, none of the Chinese factions 
competing for Weihai in early 1Q29 was eager to arouse 
British hostility and consequently refrained from propa­
ganda operations with which they could be directly linked. 
The commissioner was worried, however, that local Kuomin­
tang agents were secretly forming a party of their own 
to take part in an anti-British campaign whenever the 
government at T'ai-an or Nanking felt strong enough to 
initiate it. He added that while most of the leasehold 
residents were well-disposed toward their foreign admin­
istrators, there could be something to fear from*
. . . dissatisfied litigants, ex-convicts, 
village bullies who have been prevented 
from tyrannising over their neighbours, 
headmen who have 'lost face' by being de­
tected in acts of petty extortion, and
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persons who have been dismissed for 
misconduct from the public service.
To these must be added the numerous 
people, here as elsewhere, who would 
sell their services to any party that 
promised them money, influence or offi­
cial position, 0
Rumors abounded at this time that Chiang K'ai-shek and 
Feng Ytt-hsiang intended to stir up anti-British agitation 
as soon as relations with Japan improved and, with the 
question of Weihaiwei's retrocession hanging in the bal­
ance, the commissioner hoped that such agitation would 
not compel a humiliating withdrawal by his government
and future dangerous repercussions for British citizens
♦ . . 21 remaining m  the area.
In the meantime, it seemed a good idea for the Brit­
ish to maintain as cordial a relationship as possible 
with Liu Chen-nien, the T'ai-an authorities, and the Nan­
king regime. As long as the leased Territory was important 
to all of these people for their various political purposes 
and as long as they remained at odds with one another the
British felt the possiblity of an armed attack by any of
22them was remote,. As so often in the past, the leasehold 
during this chaotic period once again proved useful to a 
wide variety of Chinese: bandits, deserting soldiers,
political refugees, frightened villagers from neighboring 
hsien, spies, propagandists, and its own 180,000 residents. 
It was clearly becoming ever more of a burden, however, 
to the British who derived little benefit from it but were 
responsible for its administration and security. The pos­
sibility of retrocession thus began to appear, at least 
to some, as the best solution to the problem.
Growing Pressure for Rendition
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Not surprisingly, one of those most in favor of 
rendition in 1929 was Weihaiwei*s Commissioner Johnston 
who was especially worried about Kuomintang activities.
The local warlord, Liu Chen-nien, had never exhibited any 
great affection for the party, but his relationship with 
the Nanking authorities became distinctly more intimate 
after a meeting with some of them in the summer of 1929. 
Several of Liu*s numerous tax bureaus subsequently came 
under central and provincial government control and per­
mission was given for the establishment of an official
branch of the Kuomintang as well as a new civilian form
21of government at Chefoo.  ^ The commissioner was concerned 
that KMT activists operating openly and with Liu*s support 
would now feel encouraged to initiate new moves to hasten 
the British withdrawal from Weihaiwei.
Danger signs had been emerging since September 1928 
when Johnston noted the appearance of anti-imperialist 
slogans in the Chinese-controlled walled town. Further­
more, he wrote: "I have reason to believe that a stealthy
attempt is being made to instill subversive and anti-foreign 
ideas into the heads of some of our schoolboys, and that 
the Kuo-min-tang intend to establish -- if indeed they have
not already established -- a branch of their propaganda
2 L i
department m  this Territory."
It will be remembered that the British had reached 
agreement on the rendition of Weihaiwei with the Ts*ao 
K'un regime but were then forced to postpone implementa­
tion when Feng Ytt-hsiang engineered a coup in Peking in 
November 1924, The matter was left unresolved during the
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next few years as Chiang K'ai-shek*s southern troops
battled with the warlord armies of the north for control
of the country. During 1928 the problem was once again
discussed at length by Colonial and Foreign Office staff,
but it was thought impossible to withdraw from Weihaiwei
as long as Chang Ts*ung-ch*ang remained in power in Shan- 
2tung. J By the end of the year, however, his regime had 
been toppled and the British found themselves in a diffi­
cult negotiating position as they faced the nationalistic 
and anti-imperialist government of Chiang K'ai-shek,
Flushed with the success of the Northern Expedition 
and supported by a rising tide of nationalism among the 
public, the Nationalists at this point felt confident in 
pressing their demands for tariff autonomy and the re­
covery of foreign concessions and leaseholds. The Brit­
ish soon discovered to their dismay that the original 
192^ Weihaiwei agreement so painstakingly negotiated was 
now considered unacceptable to the Chinese because it
allowed the Admiralty a perpetual loan of naval facili-
2 ^
ties at Liu-kung Island. In fact, by June 1929 a com­
plete deadlock developed in the discussions.as the Chinese 
Naval Ministry suddenly expressed the desire to make Wei­
haiwei its principal base and to expel all foreigners 
from Port Edward without compensation for financial loss. 
Furthermore, the British were offered only a three-year 
loan of facilities on the island with no provision for 
renewal. Both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty found
these, new proposals totally unacceptable and the talks
27were stalemated until January 1930. In the meantime, 
however, civil war again broke out between Chiang and his
29^
warlord enemies and when discussions were resumed the 
British negotiating team found the Chinese more willing 
to compromise. This long delay was somewhat less helpful, 
however, to the Colonial Office staff on the scene in Wei­
haiwei where Kuomintang activists made life increasingly 
difficult t
In February 1929 the commissioner reported that many 
copies of an article entitled "The Scandal of Weihaiwei 
and its Rendition,” which had appeared in a Peking journal 
in June 192?, were being circulated in the Territory "by
persons whose aim it /was7 to couple the rendition of
2 8Weihaiwei with the humiliation of Great Britain," The 
author of the article, according to the commissioner, 
took a strongly nationalistic position, was favorable to 
the Communists, and very anti-British in his criticisms 
of the first Weihaiwei draft agreement. His demands in­
cluded an unconditional withdrawal, financial compensation 
to China, and an official apology from the British for 
occupying the area beyond the terms of the original con­
vention. Otherwise, it .was argued, there should be a com­
plete break in economic relations between the two coun­
tries and a boycott of British products.
The Kuomintang at this time took further political 
advantage of the Weihaiwei issue by publishing a list of
national "Humiliation Days" which included the date on
_ 29
which the Territory had been leased from China m  1898, 
Also worrying was a telegram written by the Shensi provin­
cial KMT organization which appeared in many Shantung and 
north China newspapers. It urged the Chinese people to
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demand the return of the leasehold and accused the Brit-
30ish of bad faith in not already having done so. Such 
publicity demonstrates the importance given to the Wei­
haiwei issued by the Kuomintang at the national level.
And there were a number of other ways in which the party 
carried out what one observer described as a "policy of
31pin-pricks" designed to put the British on the defensive.
With the highly-charged issues of extra-territoriality 
and China's ability to implement a modern and humane 
system of law being extensively discussed at this time, 
it is not surprising that the KMT chose to focus its atten­
tion upon British legal procedures at Weihaiwei. It will 
be remembered that both civil and criminal law were ad­
ministered in the Territory by the commissioner and his 
district officers and cases were only rarely referred to
the British Supreme Courts at Shanghai or Hong Kong for
32 . . .review/ At least one of Weihaiwei's senior district
officers had in the past expressed uneasiness at having 
to fill the roles of judge and jury simultaneously. As 
has been noted, this system was very similar to local gov­
ernment administered by traditional Chinese hsien magi­
strates. To the young, westernized KMT party activists 
sensitive to foreign criticism of "backward" Chinese legal 
practices, however, Weihaiwei proved a most convenient 
target for counter-criticism. Commissioner Johnston in 
late 1929 observed, for example:
I should explain that I have reason to be­
lieve that our legal practice here is at 
present being studied, with an interest 
which is not at all likely to be benevolent, 
by members of the Kuomintang, of which a 
branch now exists in Weihaiwei City. They 
are presumably reporting the results of their
29 6
investigations to their headquarters and 
anything that they can construe to be a 
legal irregularity, or a miscarriage of 
justice, will no doubt be seized upon and 
emphasized in order to convince their 
fellow countrymen, if not foreigners, that 
Western legal principles and methods are 
no better than their own. The fact that 
the ordinary work of the courts in the 
Territory is carried on by men who are 
hot trained lawyers, has doubtless not 
escaped their observation,33
The propaganda campaign against the British con­
tinued throughout 1929 and another alarming article was 
reprinted from a Chinese journal in the Shanghai Morning 
Post in August. This particular author again insisted 
upon Weihaiwei*s unconditional return to China, but went 
even further in calling attention to the similarity be­
tween this issue and that of the British presence at Hong 
Kong, It was suggested that Great Britain should also 
be expected to withdraw from the latter in the near future. 
The vastly greater importance of Hong Kong to British 
commercial and military interests made this an especially 
disturbing point of view and an underlying concern through- 
out the Weihaiwei negotiations.
Although successive administrators from I898 to 1930 
unanimously agreed that the local Chinese population was, 
with minor exceptions, content under British rule, Commis­
sioner Johnston in 1929 was under no illusion regarding 
the depth of its loyalty, especially if faced with KMT 
intimidation. He remarked:
In the event of a skillfully-organised pro­
paganda campaign being started against us, 
with Chefoo as its main centre and Weihai 
City as a minor base, our own people . . . 
would be far too timid to raise a finger 
in our favour or to make the smallest attempt 
to organise a counter-movement on our behalf.
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They have their own lives and property 
to think of, and they know that the Kuo­
mintang, when it has Chinese 'traitors* 
to deal with, is utterly merciless and 
capable of any cold-blooded barbarity.35
The irony of this situation was, as the commissioner 
pointed out, that British prestige within the immediate 
Weihaiwei area had probably never been higher, at least 
with respect to security matters and economic prosperity. 
Both local residents and refugees from the war-torn neigh­
boring hsien were particularly grateful at this time for 
the relative peace provided inside the territorial bor- 
ders.3
The commissioner felt somewhat more vulnerable to 
criticism, however, regarding the low level of public 
spending at Weihaiwei and stated in early 1930 that if 
rendition were not so likely he would feel compelled "to 
press for authority to apply a very large proportion of 
our accumulated surpluses to various much-needed public
on
works and other projects of development. f More money, 
he thought, was needed for additional road-building, for 
a telephone network, for harbor improvements, and especially 
to expand educational opportunities. The Kuomintang was 
quick to seize upon this latter issue in its Weihaiwei 
propaganda campaign.
In October 1929 difficulties arose when the director 
of the education bureau for Wen-teng hsien requested 
authority to bring the Weihaiwei educational system into 
harmony with that of surrounding districts. He complained 
that many of the village schools in the Territory were 
still of the traditional private variety and did not ad­
here to new national regulations,^ Although rejecting
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the director's request for jurisdiction at Weihaiwei,
the commissioner readily admitted to the Colonial Office
that the condition of local schools, especially in the
rural areas, was indeed deserving of criticism due to
government neglect. In his view, a much larger education
budget was called for as well as a third district officer
fluent in written and spoken Chinese to serve as an in-
30
spector of schools. 7 The most he was actually able to 
achieve, however, was approval for larger government 
grants to Port Edward schools. Whereas in 1928 educa­
tional expenditures for the year stood at a mere $3»000, 
the budget for 1929-30 was increased to over $11,000,
Nearly half of this sum was for a grant to improve the 
Chinese established Ch*i-tung Middle School, Interest 
in this school was so great in 1929 that, after encourage­
ment from the commissioner, local merchants were able to 
increase their building fund to $20,000 and a new build-
i4*0
m g  was opened m  the autumn. The commissioner no doubt
reasoned that greater government support for the middle
school would help deflect KMT criticism, but he was also
aware that annual grants could serve to maintain a degree
of control over the way in which the school was operated.
As he remarked 1
In this way I have endeavored to convey 
to those concerned an intimation that 
the interests of the School are bound 
up with those of the British Government 
of the leased Territory. The realisation 
of this fact will I think tend to strengthen 
the hands of the School authorities in their 
efforts to maintain a high standard of good 
order and discipline, and enable them to 
prevent the students from engaging in any 
undesirable political activities or from 
being victimised by subversive propaganda
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The commissioner had good reason to fear "subver­
sive propaganda" emanating from the Territory's educational 
institutions. The efforts of the Wen-teng official men­
tioned above appear to have been part of a general KMT 
campaign to infiltrate the schools and use them as centers 
for anti-British activities. By December 1929 the situa­
tion was becoming serious, as the commissioner observed:
By use of the underhand methods practised 
everywhere in China by the Kuomintang, its 
agents or those of the allied educational 
bureaus have already caused trouble and 
dissension in the largest and most important 
of our schools —  the Weihai Middle School,
/I.e., the Ch'i-tung Middle School7 which 
owes so much to British encouragement and 
support -- and have succeeded in establishing 
at least an indirect control over one of the 
leading village schools in the heart of the 
Territory. They have also secretly distribu­
ted parcels of their propagandist school text­
books among many other village schools and 
in some cases have persuaded the teachers 
(partly by veiled threats) to make use in ^ 
their schools of the books so distributed.
In spite of the efforts of Ch'i-tung*s headmaster 
who tried to keep "politics and anti-foreignism" out of 
the school, the older boys apparently succeeded in caus­
ing so much trouble that by January 1930 it was necessary
A3to temporarily close the institution. y At the same time,
the headmaster was labeled a "counter-revolutionary" and
his name was added to a KMT black list along with the
twenty-seven other "running dogs of British imperialism"
who were Weihaiwei's most prominent and successful mer- 
AAchants. The commissioner was even forced to station 
police at the school to prevent students from taking 
equipment. In the end, 30 of Ch'i-tung's 180 pupils 
were expelled, a new man from Jung-ch'eng hsien was ap­
pointed headmaster, and the school itself was reopened
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in February. By this time rendition negotiations were
once again making progress and the British administration
at Weihaiwei felt that as long as the Territory appeared
destined for a speedy return to China, further difficul-
A  ^
ties at the school were unlikely. J
It is interesting* however, that in this critical 
period both the British government and its Kuomintang ad­
versaries were keenly aware that Weihaiwei's schools had 
a significant political role to play. The commissioner 
in particular was convinced that his government's previous 
policy of non-interference in traditional village schools 
was no longer adequate to meet either the KMT threat or 
to serve the educational needs of Weihaiwei*s children. 
Given the imminence of rendition, however, it was hoped 
that some additional expenditures and the maintenance of 
school discipline would help the British*at least make a 
graceful exit from what had become an embarrassing situa­
tion.
Agreement Reached on Rendition
Fortunately for the British, the Chinese were in a 
somewhat more conciliatory mood when negotiations over 
Weihaiwei were resumed in January 1930. At this point 
Chiang K'ai-shek was faced with the possibility of yet 
another war between his forces and the combined warlord 
armies of Feng Ytl-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. In order to 
obtain the strategically important base at Weihaiwei, 
therefore, Nanking was more willing to compromise on the 
issue of British naval privileges and foreign property 
rights. Chiang*s hold on the rest of eastern Shantung in
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early 1930 was by no means secure. One British observer 
reasoned that with Weihaiwei in their possession the N a ­
tionalists would have two possibilities for dealing with 
the recalcitrant General Liu Chen-nien who was reported
to be again considering an alliance with the anti-Chiang 
LA
northerners. The leasehold could either be offered to
him as a bribe for supporting Nanking, or, if sufficiently
Ilj
fortified, it could be used to intimidate him. (
After several more difficult bargaining sessions
between the Chinese foreign minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, and
the British ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, an agreement
was at last signed on 18 April whereby Weihaiwei would
be returned to China on 1 October, with the confidential
proviso that the Nanking regime at that time exercised
LQ
"effective control" over Shantung. According to the 
terms of rendition, Britain was to be granted the free 
use of island naval facilities for ten years with the 
option of renewal. Moreover, foreign property-owners 
were to be given new perpetual leases on their holdings.
If the Chinese later decided to close the port, it was 
agreed that foreigners would receive compensation. In 
the meantime, existing public services and municipal r e g ­
ulations were to remain, as much as possible, unchanged 
and the views of foreigners were to be taken into account 
in the future Chinese administration of Port Edward, The 
British, on the other hand, agreed to hand over all gov­
ernment land and buildings, as well as works and purchases 
made under various improvement schemes, the Chefoo-Weihaiwei
llQ
cable, and certain other assets, 7 The British ambassador 
was basically pleased with these arrangements, arguing
302
that naval privileges had been secured for a time at least 
as well as protection for property owners. Furthermore, 
he felt that previous discussion of closing the port had 
only been a bargaining position and that the Chinese "now 
having secured the right to do so in return for buying 
out property owners /would7 probably forget about i t . " ^  
With the work of the negotiating teams at an end, all 
that remained, it seemed, was to implement the agreement ' 
on 1 October. As always with Weihaiwei, however, things 
were never as simple as they seemed, and there was con­
siderable skepticism even as late as September that the 
Territory would actually be returned.
In the meantime, there was growing anxiety within 
the leasehold itself as rendition appeared more and more 
likely. One particular manifestation of this concern 
aroused a good deal* of attention as far away as Peking 
and even in London. One of Weihaiwei's most prominent 
residents, Liang Te-jang, who was a descendant of a former 
governor of Shansi and for many years an active promoter 
of local public works projects, took it upon himself in 
April to petition the British government to postpone re n ­
dition until more stable conditions existed in China.
This document in turn found its way into the North China 
Daily News where, not surprisingly, there was a good deal 
of satisfaction expressed that the Chinese themselves (un­
like the Indians) recognized the advantages of British 
rule. Even The Times in London played up the significance 
of this petition. Commissioner Johnston provided the 
following additional information about it to the Colonial 
O f f i c e :
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I may add that various appeals similar to 
that made by Mr. Liang reached me during 
the past year or two, but hitherto they 
have seldom been committed to paper and 
never signed. This is the first time 
that a signed petition on this subject 
has been presented, and it probably indi­
cates that the general dread of what is 
likely to happen to the Territory after 
retrocession has been intensified by the 
newspaper reports that rendition is imminent,
I am informed that the inhabitants of the 
adjacent Chinese districts are also in a 
state of growing alarm at the prospect of 
the rendition of the Leased Territory, which 
has always been to them a haven of refuge 
when their sufferings became intolerable.51
One local British businessman who was especially 
worried about possible financial losses upon rendition 
made use of the petition to support his own public pro­
test through the China Association. When criticized by 
the commissioner for not consulting him in advance about 
this action, E. E. Clark remarked that although he was 
of course concerned for his own future, he had also r e ­
sponded to local Chinese who had been "pressing" him to
<2
do something to postpone rendition.
The Chinese merchant community, fearing possible 
KMT reprisals, felt it had to act with discretion in mount­
ing any sort of protest movement of its own. Even so, 
its actions were apparently closely monitored by Port E d ­
ward's newly-established, nationalistic newspaper, the 
Wei-hai jih-pao. In May 1930 a dispute arose between 
the owners of the paper and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
when articles appeared accusing "some Weihai people" of 
having sent a telegram to the British authorities in Hong 
Kong requesting the retention of the Territory. Although 
it is not clear whether such a cable was ever sent, the 
merchants did want the British to remain at Weihaiwei and
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the paper was attempting in a way to blackmail them. The 
commissioner characterized the author of the objectionable 
articles* a "Mr. Sun," as a "left-wing revolutionary of 
the - Bolshevik type" who was attempting to instill class 
hatred and anti-imperialist feelings among his readers.
He added! "Fortunately very few people in Weihai are 
likely to pay any serious attention to what he writes; 
otherwise we might have to prevent its publication in the 
Territory," Whether or not the combined displeasure of 
the Chamber and the government had any effect on the news­
paper is unknown, but Mr, Sun's articles stopped appearing 
at the end of M a y . ^
The long delay between the initialing of the r e ndi­
tion agreement in April and implementation in October gave 
ample opportunity to those who wished to publish further 
anti-British material in the national press, -In late July, 
for example, both foreign and Chinese-language newspapers 
began carrying stories, issued through a Japanese agency, 
that at the instigation of the British Weihaiwei's rendi­
tion was about to be canceled or postponed. These papers 
reported that the British had sent a note to Nanking r e ­
fusing to return the leasehold for an indefinite period 
and citing China's political instability as a reason for 
their action. Although Foreign Minister Wang publicly 
denied these rumors, they had the effect of stimulating 
further hostility toward Britain,-^ Commenting on this 
fact, Weihaiwei's commissioner noted that there was already 
talk of organizing an anti-British movement in China in 
retaliation for this alleged breach of f a i t h .^ 5
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During the summer of 1930 the commissioner found 
himself in a difficult position as both the ambassador 
in Peking and officials in London were eager for his assess­
ment of the political situation in Shantung in order that 
a final decision could be made on rendition. With the 
very real possibility of civil war taking place once again 
in Shantung between the Nationalists and their warlord 
opponents it was impossible to say for certain which side 
the wily Liu Chen-nien would support. The commissioner 
complained in July that his own information about condi­
tions even in the Tsinan area was often based on unreliable 
stories from Chinese newspapers and it was much more diffi­
cult to find out anything regarding the interior of the 
province. Apparently, the Nanking authorities themselves 
were uncertain as to who would control eastern Shantung 
by October for they devised a contingency plan to take 
effect in the event that they were not. It was hoped, 
in order to avoid the humiliation of postponing rendition, 
that the Manchurian regime of Chang Hstteh-liang would 
assist with the administration of Weihaiwei on Nanking's 
behalf and that Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, who commanded the 
northern Chinese naval squadron and took his orders from 
Mukden, would be responsible for the area's defense.
In mid-August the problem was still unresolved and 
the commissioner admitted that there was no guarantee even 
if Shantung was under Nanking's firm control in October 
that conditions would be any more tranquil than if the 
northerners took over. It was his personal opinion that 
Britain in fact had less to fear from Liu Chen-nien, even 
aligned with the north, than it had from the anti-imperalist
30 6
Nanking r e g i m e . ^  As mentioned earlier, however, the sudden 
defection of General Han Fu-ch'ti to the Nationalist cause 
finally decided the matter in Nanking's favor. On the very 
day that Han was appointed chairman of Shantung a meeting 
took place between the British ambassador and Dr, G. T. Wang 
in which the latter announced that there was no longer any 
question of his government's control over the province. 7 
On 15 September Weihaiwei*s commissioner was informed by 
the Colonial Office that ratification of the convention for 
rendition would take place as planned on 1 October,
Conditions in Weihaiwei in 1930
To many observers it must have seemed as if the C h i ­
nese were reacquiring Weihaiwei at a time when its economic 
health had never been better. Signs of prosperity were 
everywhere in 1930* What had been the tiny, non-descript 
fishing village of Ma-t'ou in I898, was now the bustling 
town of Port Edward with 20,000 inhabitants and a thriving 
import-export trade. The once common mule-litter was 
now considered largely a relic of the past with carts and 
bicycles by far the more usual form of transportation over 
a fifty-mile network of modern roads. It was even possible 
by 1929 for local residents to take a bus all the way from
Port Edward to Chef00, Wen-teng, Jung-ch'eng, and other
6l
neighboring towns. Nor was prosperity limited to the 
leasehold's town-dwellers.
In sharp contrast to those in nearby Chinese terri­
tory, Weihaiwei's villagers lived in peaceful surroundings 
free to pursue their agricultural tasks without fear of
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extortionate taxation or conscription into a warlord 
army. The worst these people had to be concerned about 
it seems was the perennial north China problem of drought. 
Local crops were badly affected in 1927, 1928, and 1929 
by a lack of rainfall, but grain held in reserve was suf­
ficient to prevent famine conditions like those of 1920 
from developing, D In fact, by late 1929 there must have 
been a considerable recovery since it was observed in that 
year that with the great influx of destitute refugees 
from other parts of Shantung many local farmers were "in 
a position for the first time to engage hired labourers 
to assist them . . .  at wages which would /have been7 **e- 
jected with scorn by the poorest Weihaiwei natives . . . "
The chaos existing outside the leasehold boundaries 
had also led to a change in the distribution of local m a r ­
kets. Whereas in previous more peaceful times many W e i ­
haiwei residents had frequented markets held in Chinese 
territory, in the late 1920s three of these had been r e ­
located just over the border in the British zone safely 
beyond the reach of Chinese tax-collectors and bandits.
There were then, in addition to the walled town, nine 
marketing centers in the leasehold, four more than when 
the British a r r i v e d . ^
Although many of Weihaiwei's merchants suffered 
losses in 1929 due to price fluctuations in ground nuts, 
timber, and grain, the total volume of goods shipped through 
Port Edward in that year was at an all-time high. Whereas 
in 1902 only 1^6 steamers had entered port with 152,000 
tons of goods, the total for 1929 was 1,139 steamers carry­
ing 1,307,000 tons. Enormous quantities of cotton yarn
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and piece goods were now being shipped through Weihaiwei 
from Japan via Dairen and then distributed into the Shan­
tung interior and neighboring provinces. The ground nut 
trade was still important to the leasehold, but there were 
also large amounts of sugar, rice, and paper coming in from 
Hong Kong for transshipment to Chihli and e l s e w h e r e . ^
In addition to the flourishing import-export trade 
at Weihaiwei, there were several other prosperous sectors 
in the local economy in the late 1920s. The traditional 
fishing industry, for example, was given a considerable 
boost through the use of motorized trawlers as well as 
ice in shipments to Shanghai and Tientsin. The wide variety 
of fish caught near Weihaiwei had by this time, it seems, 
established a high reputation for itself in many parts 
of China. Salt production, too, had greatly expanded 
since the British first arrived in the area. In 1902 less 
than thirty acres of land were covered with salt pans, 
but in 1929 one thousand acres were devoted to this pro­
duct. The handicraft industry of lace-making, originally 
introduced by missionaries, was by this time largely in 
Chinese hands and employed quite a number of local women 
who had been trained at the Roman Catholic convent. With 
so much construction taking place in Port Edward, the 
building trade and related industries of brick and tile
manufacturing boomed in the late 1920s as did tourism and
6 7businesses which catered to foreign souvenir-hunters, 
Naturally, the government shared in Weihaiwei*s 
prosperity through increased tax revenue, the bulk of 
which came from shipping dues and not from land. Other 
categories which showed considerable increases included
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house taxes in Port Edward (in 1929-30 this figure was
equal to the entire amount collected from land taxation),
6 8
and court fees. Table 8 below illustrates the favorable 
financial position in which the British found themselves 
during the last decade of their administration:
Table 8
Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 3 0 ^
Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus
l°24-25 $189,554 $179,944 $ 9,610
1925-26 219,14-2 187,432 31,710
1926-27 24-0,763 214,331 26,432
1Q27-28 256,494 247,014 9,480
1928-29 324,636 313,228 11,408
1929-30 433.774 316,830 116,944
As has been mentioned, Commissioner Johnston, in 
his final years at Weihaiwei, actually found the growing 
surplus of accumulated revenue and the relatively low level 
of public expenditure to be an embarrassment. In late 
1929 he reported that only $52,750 Had been spent since 
1922 on "improvements" in the Territory, all of which had 
come from local taxation and not Colonial Office subsi­
dies. These included, among other things, a major new 
road across the northern peninsula, a new hospital and
police station, bridge repairs, wells, and telephone in- 
7 0
stallations. It should also be noted that shortly 
after Weihaiwei became self-supporting in 1922, the Brit­
ish began building up a "reserve fund" from their surplus 
of revenue over expenditures. As rendition appeared more 
and more likely, the Treasury was anxious that expenditures 
be kept to a minimum and that sufficient funds be avail­
able for staff pensions and other expenses when the British
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withdrew. In fact* in October 1930 this fund stood at 
over $300*600 and its removal from Weihaiwei was opposed 
by- the new Chinese commissioner-to-be as early as July 
1 9 3 0.71
A further indication of Weihaiwei*s relative pros­
perity during the last decade of British rule was the fact 
that the local merchant community on its own initiative 
was able to raise sufficient funds through a surcharge on 
shipping dues to finance several public works projects.
It will be remembered that Port Edward's "Victory Pier” 
which was completed in 1918 had been financed in this man­
ner. Weihaiwei*s businessmen were apparently so pleased 
with the result that they decided to reinstate the sur­
charge in 1920 in order to provide new cargo storage facil­
ities at the pier and this project was completed for a 
total cost of $60,000. Similarly* in 1921 they took $10,000 
from the fund to purchase a new boat for the government to 
use, among other things, as a coastal patrol vessel. Plans 
were also made in 1925 to construct a much-needed break­
water for the protection of vessels anchored at Port E d ­
ward, but for a variety of reasons this project had to be 
postponed. By 1930 the so-called "Harbor Improvement Fund" 
contained more than $ 80,000 and the merchants were eager 
that it be spent on further community projects before the 
British withdrew. Thus, it was decided that a new stone 
pier and road should be built at Narcissus Bay, a rapidly 
growing area south of Port Edward and east of the walled 
town where it was assumed further commercial expansion 
would inevitably take place. The merchants also agreed 
at this time to allocate a further $6,500 from the harbor
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fund for the electrification of Port Edward*s streets
and $10,000 was invested as a kind of educational endow- 
72
ment f u n d.f
The existence of these various civic improvement 
projects demonstrates several points about Weihaiwei*s 
merchants in the 1920s, First, it is apparent that they 
felt wealthy enough by this time to donate a portion of 
their profits to public works which would win them respect 
and appreciation in the wider community. In this regard, 
they were assuming to an even greater extent than pre­
viously a role which would have been filled in many parts
of traditional China by the local degree-holding elite 
71
or " g e n t r y . " A s  has been mentioned, however, there were 
relatively few degree-holders to perform this function 
in Weihaiwei even during the late Ch*ing period. Then, 
with the abolition of the examination system in 1905, 
the formation of provincial assemblies in 1908, and the 
emergence of chambers of commerce about the same time, 
merchants in the Territory, as elsewhere in China, found 
themselves playing a larger part in the management of 
local affairs. By the 1920s their influence continued 
to grow along with their wealth. With sufficient revenue 
to administer the Territory, British officials, unlike 
many of their Chinese counterparts at this time, saw little 
need to press the merchants, or anyone else, for more taxes. 
As a result, the relationship between the government and 
the business community was largely a cooperative one, with 
the latter often supplying supplementary funds and the 
former expertise and supervision for the implementation 
of public works.
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Furthermore, all of the undertakings mentioned 
above were designed to enhance commercial growth at W e i ­
haiwei and thus served to conveniently combine "public­
spiritedness" and personal gain for the merchants. It 
should also be noted that the type of projects chosen r e ­
flects the degree to which the leasehold, and Port Edward 
in particular, were now dependent upon international trade 
for a good portion of their income.
The eagerness of the merchants to carry out their 
projects before the British withdrew from Weihaiwei indi­
cates the uncertainty and even mistrust they felt toward 
the incoming Chinese administration. In fact, the $10,000 
donation for education actually came about when the newly- 
formed, KMT-affiliated "Weihai Educational Association" 
strenuously objected that none of the surcharge revenue 
was going to be spent on the Territory’s schools. Since 
the merchants greatly feared antagonizing this group with 
its important political contacts, they decided to offer 
their $10,000 donation as a "compromise" and to ensure 
that the rest of the money could be spent as they wished, J 
It must have seemed likely to the merchants by this time 
that the largely harmonious relationship they had enjoyed 
with the British would soon be replaced by a struggle 
with the new Chinese authorities for control of Weihai- 
wei's financial resources.
The merchants were not alone in their fears for 
Weihaiwei*s future at this time. In spite of so many 
signs of prosperity, the British commissioner observed 
in 1Q 30 that both the government's finances and ultimately 
the entire leasehold economy were in a precarious condition.
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He was well aware that Weihaiwei*s current well-being 
was largely due to its duty-free status and convenience 
as a transshipment point. He was also aware that trade 
at nearby Chefoo and other places had suffered as a r e ­
sult of the leasehold's tax advantage. Even representa­
tives from the Maritime Customs and Salt Administration 
had become concerned that too much revenue was being lost 
as a result of goods passing through the Territory and 
evading taxation. The commissioner was convinced that 
the only reason steps had not been taken earlier to deal 
with this problem was the likelihood of rendition and
the inevitable establishment of customs offices at Wei- 
76
haiwei. He was, therefore, quite worried that the 
Territory would suffer economic hardship when its duty­
free status was removed.
In July he had an opportunity to share his concerns 
with the chief delegate of the Chinese rendition committee, 
Commander Hstt Tsu-shan, formerly of the Chinese Navy and 
soon to become the new high commissioner at Weihaiwei.
While investigating local conditions in the Territory 
and making arrangements for the actual handover in October, 
Hstt held talks with the commissioner at Port Edward. He 
informed him at that time of the decision to make the en­
tire leasehold, including the walled town, into a special 
administrative area under the direct control of the central 
government. This meant that shipping dues, stamp duty, 
and salt taxes would all have to go to Nanking, When 
asked about the possiblity of raising taxes'in order to 
finance local government, the British commissioner replied 
that a moderate increase in the land tax would be possible
31^
since it was presently collected at a much lower rate 
than in neighboring h s i e n . He also strongly recommended, 
however, that the new commissioner refuse to> accept admin­
istrative responsibility for the area without guarantees 
of financial assistance from the central authorities as 
he was certain that increased taxation alone could not
make up for possible losses in shipping dues if trade de- 
77
c l i n e d . r
Another detail with which Commander Hstt was c o n ­
cerned was staff for his new administration. He was eager 
to offer re-employment to all of the Chinese clerks work­
ing for the British and invited them to meet with him at 
a Port Edward hotel to discuss the matter. Somewhat sur­
prisingly, the entire group refused, stating (wrongly) 
that they were British subjects, serving the British gov­
ernment, and that he would have to come to them in their 
government offices. Embarrassed and somewhat irritated 
at his staff's behavior, the commissioner carried out an 
investigation and discovered that the clerks were actually 
afraid Hstt would replace them with a staff loyal to him­
self within a few months and, with this face-saving opera­
tion, were demonstrating their independence at a time 
when he needed their services, Hstt handled the matter 
graciously, however, and did rehire all of the Chinese 
involved. At the same time he told the British commis­
sioner that he had discarded a large number of petitions 
from local people "abusing'’ British rule and implied that
they were undoubtedly trying to curry favor with a rep-
78
resentative of the incoming government.
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Rendition
Predictably, in the months leading up to rendition 
there was considerable nervousness among the local popu­
lation at Weihaiwei as merchants, farmers, and government 
employees alike wondered whether the still shaky Nanking 
regime could actually maintain peace and preserve the 
area's economic prosperity. It was reported in early 
October, for example, that "a number of merchants 
already dispatched money elsewhere while many salt m e r ­
chants sent their supplies to Japan before the rendition. 
Even the local hawkers who sold lace, needlework, and
stockings to summer tourists thought it unlikely that
80
many foreigners would return there in 1931, There was
also talk of bandit raids into Port Edward and a possible
81
invasion by Liu Chen-nien's troops. On the day before
rendition those in favor of the British withdrawal made
their feelings known with posters bearing such slogans as
"sovereign rights," "China for the Chinese," and "down with
imperialism" which were attached to all the electric light
poles in Port Edward. It was reported that some of the
students from the Ch'i-tung Middle School produced the
82
most' extreme of these posters.
On this same day, however, sentiments of a different 
nature were expressed at a special public gathering attended 
by district headmen and "representatives of all classes 
of the Chinese and foreign communities" in honor of the 
retiring Commissioner Johnston. After delivering a fare­
well address, he was thanked for his many years of service 
at W e i h a i w e i , given the traditional bowl of pure water to
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symbolize the purity of his administration, and presented 
with scrolls from the community at large, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Educational Association,®^
On the following day, 1 October, there were no signs 
of unrest and the formal transfer of power took place 
without incident, Commissioner Johnston himself had care­
fully planned the rendition ceremony to include parades 
of full dress military guards accompanied by buglers and 
two bands, as well as the firing of two fifteen-gun salutes, 
and, of course, appropriate receptions for the Chinese 
and foreign dignitaries present. He also insisted that 
both flags be flown together until sunset when the Union
QJIi
Jack would be discreetly lowered.
Again, there was ample opportunity for speech-making. 
The chairman of the Chamber of Commerce referred in glow­
ing terms to British officials as having "loved the people" 
(ai min) during the course of their administration at W e i ­
haiwei. In a somewhat different vein, the new Chinese 
commissioner noted that these same people had been under 
foreign control against their will for thirty-two years.
He also admitted, however, that the British had ruled 
wisely and well and that it would be his desire to build 
upon their record if possible in order to achieve even 
greater prosperity under the Chinese flag. In addition,
Hstl took the opportunity to issue his first proclamation 
as high commissioner warning that some "evilly-disposed 
persons" might use the transition period to create diffi­
culties. He promised that his administration would strive 
to preserve peace and to govern all nationalities under 
the equal protection of the law. He also specifically
31?
asked for the obedience of merchants and an end to need-
8 *3
less alarm throughout the community, D All that remained 
then in order to complete the rendition procedure was to 
fire the final salutes, lower the British flag, and turn 
over the yamen keys to the new staff. When this was accom­
plished the former British commissioner sailed out of 
Port Edward harbor to a well-earned holiday at the Empress 
Hotel in Victoria, British Columbia.
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8 . . .Some of the more famous individuals who either sought
or were actually granted refuge at Weihaiwei included Yttan 
Shih-k'ai's eldest son, Ytian K*o-ting? Wellington Koo (b. 
1887) who was there during 1925 and again in 1928? Admiral 
Ts'ai T'ing-kan (1861-1935)* formerly Sir Francis Aglen's 
Chinese associate as head of the Maritime Customs? Hstt 
Shih-ch'ang (1855-1939), who served as president of China 
from October 1918 until July 1922? and even the deposed 
Emperor P'u-i himself (1906-1967). See CO 521/^2, Johnston 
to Colonial Office, 2 July and 18 October 1928. Johnston 
had a particularly close relationship with the former em­
peror since he had served as his personal tutor from 1919 
to 1925. In spite of their friendship, or perhaps because 
of it, however, he discouraged P*u-i from coming to Wei­
haiwei as he was afraid his relatives and attendants were 
likely to make him the focus of further political intrigue 
there.
^C0 521/^2, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 August
1928. See also, USDS, 893* Webber to MacMurray, Chefoo 
Political Report for August 1929.
^See, for example, two entire files which deal with 
this problem during the period 1928-30? CO 873/752 and 
778. See also, CO 521A 5 and CO 228/3712, Johnston to 
Colonial Office, 30 June 1928.
£
In general, deserting soldiers seeking refugee 
status were required to hand over their arms to the Brit­
ish authorities who then, in some cases, provided them 
with a small amount of money and clothing and permission 
to remain as long as they caused no trouble. See CO 873/ 
7 6 3 , Johnston to Jennings, Zk February 1929. Those who 
entered with arms and captured loot seem to have had both 
confiscated and were then sent out of the Territory with 
a small amount of money and clothing. See CO 873/765.
^CO 521/^2, Johnston to Colonial Office, 9 February
1928. See also, Lockhart Papers, vol. 10a, Johnston to 
Lockhart, 22 February 1928, Abandoned temples had long 
been used by criminal elements in China as convenient shel­
ter. See an eighteenth-century comment to this effect 
cited in Hsiao, Rural China, p. ^58.
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CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 9 February
1928. Relations between British soldiers and local vil­
lagers during this difficult period, with a few exceptions, 
remained quite good. See CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial 
Office, lo January 1928 and CO 873/747. On one occasion 
in early 1929, however, a group of bandits from Wen-teng 
hsien did cross into Weihaiwei and kidnap four people play- 
m g  mahjong. The arresting group was a local * self-defense 
association" or pao-wei-t'uan which brought the gamblers 
before a kind of people's tribunal and fined them $150 which 
they paid. The commissioner observed that these local de­
fense groups existed in many parts of Shantung and were 
ostensibly designed to protect people against bandits. In 
many cases they received semi-official recognition from the 
provincial authorities and were independent of magisterial 
control. They were also suspected of being in league with 
powerful secret societies, such as the Ta-tao-hui, which 
were flourishing at this time. When Weihaiwei" officials re­
ported this incident to the Wen-teng government they received 
a polite response but no action against the guilty parties.
As the commissioner remarked, "The truth of the matter prob­
ably is that they are more afraid of the pao-wei-t'uan and 
its affiliated societies than they are of the British gov­
ernment, and dare not take the decisive action desired by 
us." See CO 521/59* Johnston to Colonial Office, 28 January 
1929* By March, however, as a result of orders from Liu 
Chen-nien, the extortionists were finally brought to justice. 
See CO 521/59* Johnston to Colonial Office, 5 March 1929*
For information on other instances in which Weihaiwei vil­
lagers were kidnapped, see CO 8 7 3 /7 6 9 and 770. In the lat­
ter file the commissioner urges that the traditional insti­
tution of village guards or watchmen be reestablished as a 
defense measure. See S.D.O. to Johnston, 12 October 1929*
^C0 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 9 February
1928.
1 0Ibid.
1 1
CO 521/56, Enclosure, Pratt to Lampson, 14 June 1929, 
in Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 June 1 9 2 9 . Regarding the 
activities of the Red Spears, see also F0 228/3826, Chefoo 
Intelligence Report for Half Year Ended 30 September 1928;
F0 228/4005* Chefoo Intelligence Report for Half Year Ended 
31 March 1929; and USDS, 893, Webber to MacMurray, Chefoo 
Political Reports for January, February, June and August I929. 
The officials who wrote these reports had mixed feelings 
toward the Red Spears, stating that in some areas they func­
tioned in place of government and as an anti-bandit force, 
while in others they had degenerated into a kind of Mafia 
using terrorist tactics against villagers and officials.
12C0 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 15 August 
1930. Although there were relatively few major crimes com­
mitted in the Territory during the late 1920s, commercial 
expansion, as well as the influx of refugees, and a large 
annual contingent of fishermen from neighboring areas in­
creased the workload of the police force so that it was 
necessary to increase it to 160 men by 1928. See CO 873/
612, Whittaker to J.D.0., 30 March 1928.
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^C0 873/710, Johnston to J.D.O., 13 June 1927; 
Jennings to Johnston, 13 June 1927; and Johnston to 
Whittaker, 22 June 1927.
*^See Chapter 4, p. 164.
521/42, Confidential, Johnston to Colonial 
Office, 28 March 1928, In this same document the commis­
sioner expresses his reluctance to offer protection to 
anyone except those living within the official leasehold 
boundaries. When various villagers living just over the 
border within the British "sphere of influence" requested 
help against bandits they were told not to expect it as 
it had never been offered in the past and could not be 
given then either, especially with rendition becoming 
ever more likely. They were granted permission to enter 
Weihaiwei as refugees, however. This decision is similar 
to that taken by the former Commissioner Lockhart in 1911 
and 1912. See Chapter 4, p. 175* See also USDS, 893,
Webber to MacMurray, Chefoo Political Report for November
1928.
16
CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 7 August
1028.
1 7C0 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 25 Sep­
tember 1 9 2 8 ,
18
CO 521/62, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 Novem­
ber 1 9 2 8 .
"^Ibid, See also, CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial 
Office, 28 January 1029; 1 February 1929; and Colonial 
Office to Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, 16 February 
1929? and Colonial Office to Johnston, 25 February 1929,
2 0
CO 521/59,:Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 February
1929. Traditional Chinese magistrates frequently had to 
deal with troublemakers such as these mentioned by the 
British commissioner. Sometimes known as yu-min, or "weed 
people," they included unemployed ruffians or village 
bullies who engaged in petty crime during peaceful periods, 
but in times of general disorder often turned to banditry 
or even "full-fledged rebellion." See Hsiao, Rural China, 
p. 374 and pp, 454-62.
21
CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 February
1929.
22
CO 521/56, Johnston to Colonial Office, 12 July
1929.
2 ^F0 228/4005, Chefoo Political Report for Septem­
ber Quarter, 1929.
24
CO 521/43, Johnston to Colonial Office, 14 Septem­
ber 1928, See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 9, Johnston to 
Lockhart, 21 March 1928.
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2^See minutes on CO 521/^3 for all of 1928.
p £
CO 521/^3, Lampson to Foreign Office', 12 December 
1928 and CO 521/67, minute of interview, 11 January 1930.
27CO 521/55# Lampson to Foreign Office, 22 June 1929; 
Admiralty to Foreign Office, 1 July 1929 and 23 July 1929? 
and Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 8 July 1929. See 
also, CO 521/56, Johnston to Ellis, 12 July 1929 j and USDS, 
8^6h, Memorandum of MacMurray /Lampson Conversation, 11 and 
12 July 1929 and U.S. Consul, Nanking to U.S. State Depart­
ment, 26 June 1929.
p  Q
CO 521/55# Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 February
1929.
29It>id.
3°C0 521/55. Johnston to Colonial Office, 25 Febru- 
ary 1929. Enclosed with this letter is an article regard­
ing the telegram which appeared in the Peking and Tientsin 
Times, k February 1929.
^ C 0  521/56, Johnston to Lampson, 23 August 1 9 2 9 .
32
y See Chapter 2, pp. 8 8 - 9 8 for a discussion of the 
legal system administered by the British at Weihaiwei-.
*^F0 371/1^696, Johnston to Colonial Office, 6 Decem­
ber 1929. See also, CO 521/79# Johnston to Colonial Office, 
31 July 1930. For a discussion of KMT legal policy, see 
Meredith P. Gilpatrick, "The Status of Law and Lawmaking 
Procedure under the Kuomintang, 1925-^6," Far Eastern Quar­
terly , 10,1 (November 1950):3§-55.
-^CO 521/66, Enclosure in Johnston to Colonial Office, 
20 August 1929, including article from Shanghai Morning 
Post, 9 August 1°29.
■^CO 521/56, Johnston to Colonial Office, 12 July
1929.
3 6Ibid.
37CO 521/66, Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 Febru­
ary 1930.
3^F0 371/1^696, Enclosure in Affleck to Johnston,
9 October 1929.
39
J It should be noted here that beginning in 1927 
the government had established a new education surtax of 
one tiao (1 0 0 coppers) per unit of land assessed but ob­
viously this brought in only a small amount of additional 
revenue. See CO 521/52, Financial Returns, 1927-28, 10 
September 1928.
^°C0 521/65# Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 August
1929. In this document the commissioner observes that 
some of the subscribers to the school building fund were
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residents of neighboring hsien who had taken refuge in Wei­
haiwei during the civil war and wanted to "demonstrate their 
goodwill towards the people of the Territory in a practical 
way." Perhaps as a means of ensuring future good relations 
with Weihaiwei*s merchant community* as well as the British 
administration there, General Liu Chen-nien himself had also 
made a personal contribution to the fund. See FO 371/1^697» 
Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 January 1930. The general was 
ostensibly interested in "freeing China from the shackles of 
foreign education" and his contribution to this school estab­
lished by Chinese in Weihaiwei was in line with his educational 
policies in Chefoo. See FO 228/4005, Chefoo Intelligence Re­
port for Half Year Ended 31 March 1929- Missionary schools 
experienced considerable difficulties at this time in Chefoo 
and elsewhere in Shantung as a result of KMT activities. See 
Pratt to Lampson, 28 December 1929 which includes a transla- 
tion of an article appearing in the Chefoo Chung-sheng pao 
of 26 and 27 December. This article describes the anti- 
Christian activities of the local Eighth Middle School Student 
Society and quotes the pamphlets distributed by the students 
in the "streets and markets of Chefoo" condemning foreign 
religious activities as a means of ruining the country and 
extinguishing the Chinese race. See also, FO 371/1^697, 
Johnston to Colonial Office, 18 February 1930» and FO 371/ 
14696, Johnston to Lampson, 8 November 1929*
CO 521/^8, Johnston to Colonial Office, 21 November
1928,
4?
CO 371/1^696, Johnston to Lampson, 8 December 1929*
At the same time that the British were being pressured by 
party activists locally, they were also being pressured by 
the Shantung provincial authorities to treat Kuomintang per­
sonnel "with respect." The commissioner's response was to 
ask his police force to act with "circumspection," but to 
report any suspicious circumstances involving possible agents. 
See CO 873/772, Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 December 1929-
^ F 0  371/1^*697, Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 January
1930. Boys from the Ch*i-tung Middle School had been in­
volved in political activities of a different nature on an 
earlier occasion as well. In June 1928 the commissioner re­
ported that a few students there were eager to make the school 
into a center for anti-Japanese protests following the Tsinan 
incident. The firm disciplinary action taken by the head­
master at that time, however, prevented any serious trouble. 
Most of the boys pressing local merchants to initiate a boy­
cott of Japanese goods and shipping were, in fact, from the 
Anglican Mission School. Those from the Roman Catholic and 
Chinese schools played only a minor role. See CO 228/3712, 
Confidential, Johnston to Colonial Office, 29 June 1928, It 
will be remembered that pupils from the Anglican Mission School 
had also been active in earlier anti-Japanese activities at 
the time of the May Fourth and May 25th Movements. It is un­
clear from available sources exactly why this pattern of acti­
vism should have developed, although the varying attitudes of 
the respective headmasters undoubtedly was a factor. See ibid, 
and FO 371/2215^, Burdett to Shanghai, 4 March 1938.
44
Ibid. See also FO 371/14697, Johnston to Teichman,
25 January 1930.
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^ F O  3?l/l^697, Johnston to Colonial Office, 25 
February 1930.
^ F O  371/146Q6, Cable, Johnston to Colonial Office,
22 January 1930.
^ C O  521/68, Johnston to Teichmann 25 January 1930.
hQ
CO 521/68, minutes of interview, 7 May 1930; and 
Orde to Colonial Office, 11 July 1930, This file also 
contains a copy of the actual rendition agreement.
^ C 0  521/68, terms of rendition, 18 April 1930.
^°C0 521/68, Lampson to Foreign Office, 29 April 
1 0 3 0 ? and minute of interview, 7 May 1930. It is interest­
ing that the British should have given so much weight to 
naval considerations both in the original 1898 leasing 
of Weihaiwei and in its return to China in 1930. The Ad­
miralty at one point argued that the port was "indispensable” 
as a sanatorium and recreation area for the fleet. See 
CO 521/55* Admiralty to Foreign Office, 1 July 1929. The 
key British adviser throughout these negotiations, Sir 
Eric Teichmann, later commented! " . . .  naval considera­
tions are with Britain always paramount . . ." See his 
Affairs of China (London, 1938)* P. 197. As in 18Q8, when 
attempting to persuade a reluctant Ch'ing court to grant 
them the lease of Weihaiwei, the British in 1930 once again 
offered to help train and advise the Chinese navy in re­
turn for continued use of Liu-kung Island. The offer was 
accepted on both occasions. See CO 521/67, Lampson to 
Foreign Office, 11 January 1930.
-^C0 521/68, Johnston to Colonial Office, 7 April 
1930; and articles from North China Daily News and The 
Times of 5 May 1930, enclosed in Johnston to Colonial 
Office, 19 May 1930.
-^CO 521/69, Johnston to Clark, 8 September 1930; 
and Clark to Johnston, 9 September 1930.
53CO 873/678, A. H. to Johnston, 12 May 1930; and 
Johnston to A. H. , 22 May 1930. In the course of dis­
cussions with the commissioner about various legal options 
oDen to them, the Chamber's representatives accused the 
newspaper of receiving "hush money" from officials in the 
walled town for not disclosing their corrupt activities. 
Clearly neither the British nor the merchants, however, 
desired further difficulties with the local KMT organiza­
tion and no legal action was taken against the newspaper.
CO 873/678 contains the following issues of the Wei-hai 
jih-pao: 28, 2 9 ,  30 April and 1, 2, 3, 5* 9, and 12 May
1030.
'^C0 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 August
1930. Although it is unclear who was behind these rumors, 
the technique of using unfounded newspaper stories for 
political purposes was a favorite one in China at this 
time. In September of the same year the Chefoo Chung sheng
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pao had reported that Britain was about to give way on 
TTRe issue of naval facilities in the Weihaiwei negotia­
tions. The commissioner suspected then that Nanking 
might have been trying to create an atmosphere of optimism 
among the public so that if the discussions failed the 
disappointment that would result could be used for anti- 
British propaganda. See GO $21/59. Johnston to Lampson,
3 September 1929.
^'Ibid, In fact, the British themselves had fore­
seen in May 1930 the undesirable political repercussions 
which could result if there was any hint of their involve­
ment in a delay of rendition. It was suggested that if 
the Nanking regime was not in control of Shantung in the 
late summer it would be best to wait for the Chinese to 
suggest a postponement. Presumably, if anti-Chiang forces 
were in control of Shantung, Nanking would then have wel­
comed a continued British presence at Weihaiwei anyway.
See CO 521/68, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 May 1930.
^ C 0  521/6 9 , Johnston to Lampson, 12 July 1930.
57C0 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July
1930.
*^C0 $21/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1$ August
1930. It was also Johnston's opinion, as expressed in 
this document, that Britain had no choice but to leave 
the leasehold regardless of who controlled the area and 
that protecting the remaining British citizens afterward 
would not be a problem in view of Weihaiwei*s coastal posi­
tion. He added* "If asked the question, what specific 
British interests are served by our retaining our terri­
torial jurisdiction over the mainland of the Leased Terri­
tory of Weihaiwei, I should feel obliged to reply that I 
am aware of none." The minutes of some Colonial Office 
staff indicate considerably greater reluctance to imple­
ment rendition. "G. G." observed, for example; "One can 
but be sorry for the Chinese inhabitants of Wei-hai-wei, 
but with our own Commissioner against us, it seems hope­
less to try to postpone rendition for their sake." See 
CO 521/69, minute of G. G., 10 September 1930, and of 
Walter D. Ellis, 10 September 1930,
5 9C0 521/69, minutes of interview, 10 September IQ3 0 .
^ C 0  521/69, Cable, Colonial Office to Johnston,
15 September 1930.
6l
Lockhart Papers, Box 6 7 , Annual Report, 1929,
Police Inspector Whittaker was not entirely satisfied 
with all the changes taking place at Weihaiwei, however, 
as he indicated in a letter to his old friend, Stewart 
Lockhart:
The villagers are about the same, but in 
the town we are getting a new class of 
Chinese, not at all nice. All young 
bloods, apeing foreigners, mostly Yankee
325
style, goalies and plus fours and hor­
rible caps, and they are most insolent* 
it's a treat to get into the country 
amongst the old style of Chinese, These 
youngsters pose as officials and appear 
to have a half-baked American education 
and all call themselves graduates, not 
school boys.
See Lockhart Papers, vol. 6, Whittaker to Lockhart, 21 
April 1929. Regarding the decision to lift a long-standing 
prohibition of motor cars at Weihaiwei, see CO 873/727.
For a Chinese view of Weihaiwei at this time, see En Ytian, 
"Wei-hai-wei i p'ieh," Kuo-wen chou-pao, 7.^0 (October 
1930), non-consecutive pagination. See also, Yang Wen- 
hsttn, "Wei-hai-wei hsing-cheng ch'ti," Shan-tung wen-hsien 
k.U (March 1979)*130-^.
62Another indication.of.Weihaiwei*s prosperity was 
the.degree to which land values had risen. It was reported 
that sites on the outskirts of Port Edward which were sold 
in 1902 for $20 per mou, in 1921 for $200-800 per mou, 
and in 1927 for $1 , 3 0 0  per mou, had skyrocketed to $^-,000 
per mou in 1928, See CO 873/759» Departmental Reports,
1 9 2 8 .
It is also interesting that some villagers living 
just over the border in Jung-ch'eng hsien actually peti­
tioned the commissioner in 1928 for permission not to pay 
their onerous Chinese taxes. When it was explained that 
the British had no jurisdiction over these levies and 
that the penalties for non-compliance could be high, the 
villagers decided to pay. See CO 873/726.
^ F O  371/13899, Annual Report, 1928. See also, 
Lockhart Papers, Box 6 7 , Annual Report, I9 2 9 ,
6k Lockhart Papers, Box 6 7 , Annual Report, 1929.
6  *5
-These included the five markets which were in ex­
istence in 1898, Ku-shan-hou, Feng-lin, Ch*iao-t'ou, Ts'ao- 
miao-tzu, and Yang-t*ing, and four additional ones: T'an-
hou-chia, P*o-i-chia, Pei-chiang-hsi, and Hsiao-yen-t'an.
See CO 873/759, Annual Report, 1928,
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Lockhart Papers, Box 6 7 , Annual Report, 1929.
See also, CO 873/759» Departmental Reports, 1928,
^Ibid. It was noted in the 1929 Annual Report, 
for example, that those making items from silver and 
pewter, as well as model junk builders, had a steady de­
mand for their wares. For a general description of con­
ditions in the Territory in 1930, see also Reginald F. 
Johnston, "Weihaiwei," Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society, 18,2 (April 1931):175-93 J En, "Wei-hai-wei i-p'ieh" 
and Yang, "Wei-hai-wei hsing-cheng ch'tt."
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CO 521/56, Johnston to Lampson, 15 November 1929, 
with enclosure by G. H. Jennings, 9 November 1929. See
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also CO 521/66, Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 February 
1030; and CO 521/44, Minutes of R, Johnston, 22 and 23 
February 1928. Commissioner Johnston noted on 19 February 
1930, that the sharp rise in revenue from shipping dues 
beginning in 1928 was due to the growth of trade, the 
issuing of revised regulations in that year, and also 
the creation of a new revenue collecting department "under 
close European supervision."
^Lockhart papers, Box 6 7 , Annual Report, 1929.
7®C0 521/56* Johnston to Lampson, 15 November 1929, 
with enclosure by G. H. Jennings, 9 November 1929.
7^F0 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 8 October 
1931i and CO 521/ 6 9 , Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July 1930.
72C0 521/73, Archer to Lampson, with enclosure,
21 November 1930. This entire file deals with these pro­
jects. See also CO 521/60; CO 521/55, Johnston to Colonial 
Office, 1? December 1928, and Johnston to Lampson, 29 May
1 9 2 9 .
78Ch*ti, Local Government, pp. 168-9 and I8 3 .
7 4.
For a general discussion of the rise of the mer­
chant class in China at the end of the Ch'ing and the be­
ginning of the Republican periods, see Marie-Claire 
Berg&re, "The Role of the Bourgeoisie," in Wright, ed.,
China in Revolution, pp. 229-95.
75C0 521/73, Johnston to Ellis, 19 March 1930, and 
Johnston to Colonial Office, 29 April 1930.
76CO 521/66, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 June 
1930; CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 15 August 
1930; and CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 29 Octo­
ber 1929. See also "Wei-hai-wei shou-hui chih hou," Ta 
kung pao, 7 October 1930,' reprinted in Kuo-wen chou-pao,
7740 (October 1930), non-consecutive pagination.
77CO 521/68, Cable, Lampson to Foreign Office, 8 
July 1930, and minute of interview, 21 April 1930. See 
also, CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July
1930, and enclosure in Ingram to Ambassador, 9 October
1930.
78C0 873/777, J.D.0. to Johnston, 3 July 1930, and 
J.D.O. to Johnston and Johnston to J.D.O., 4 July 1930.
See also J.D.0, to Johnston and Johnston to J.D.0,, 5 July 
1°30; and Lockhart Papers, vol. 72, Whittaker to Lockhart,
8 October 1930.
7QNorth China Herald, 7 October I9 3 0 , p. 3.
8QNorth China Herald, 14 October 1930, p. 39.
8lF0 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October
1930.
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Lockhart Papers, vol. 72, Whittaker to Lockhart,
8 October 1930*
83-po 371/1 5/4 4 8, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October
1930.
Q2l
00 5 21/7 6 , complete file.
371/15^8, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October 
I0 3 0 , with enclosure of Commissioner Hstt's first proclama­
tion, For a discussion of the speech delivered by Reginald 
Johnston on this occasion, see North China Herald. 7 October 
1930, p. 4. For the complete speech, see Lockhart Papers, 
Vol. 6h.
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Chapter 8
Hstt Tsu-shan and the Early Years of Chinese Rule
The Transition to Chinese Rule
Although the Nanking authorities were regarded by the 
British as being in sufficient control of Shantung in Octo­
ber 1930 to allow the retrocession of Weihaiwei to take 
place, there were many other parts of the country where the 
Kuomintang's position was anything but secure. In spite 
of Chiang K ' a i -shek’s avowed intention to unify China and 
consolidate his own rule over the entire nation, the period 
1930-37 brought a whole series of threats to his political 
survival from the left and right wings of the Kuomintang, 
from various regional militarists, from the Communists, 
and from the Japanese. There was hardly a month in which 
war was not raging in some part of the country at this time. 
This fact helps explain the difficulties which so many 
Chinese administrators, including those at Weihaiwei, faced 
when attempting to obtain funding or other forms of assis­
tance from the central government for their own local pro­
jects. Even though the recovery of Weihaiwei had been r e ­
garded by the government as an issue of considerable national 
importance, its attention following rendition was soon drawn 
to other matters and the problems of administering the area 
within a changed set of economic circumstances became the 
responsibility of the somewhat beleaguered new Chinese com­
missioner.
In many ways Hstt Tsu-shan (1890-19??) was an ideal 
choice to head the new government at Weihaiwei. A native 
of Kiangsu province, he had graduated at the top of his
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class from the Nanking Naval Academy in 1908, served in the 
Chinese navy from 1908 to 1910, and then studied naval con­
struction at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where 
he received a master's degree in 1915. After working two 
more years in American naval yards, Hstt was deputized by 
the Chinese government to observe European war operations 
and was attached to the British, French, and Italian fleets 
during which time he received the Distinguished Service 
Order. He then served as assistant naval attache to the 
Chinese legation in London following the war and was an ad­
viser on naval affairs at the Paris Peace Conference. Upon 
his return to China, Hsti held posts in the naval ministry 
and aeronautical bureau and in 1922 was placed in charge of 
harbor affairs at Tsingtao. With his resignation from the 
navy in that year he retained his post at Tsingtao and was 
also appointed superintendent of customs at Tientsin. In
1927 he became a military adviser to Chiang K'ai-shek and
1in 1929 director of the Lung-hai railway. His naval back­
ground, service in Europe, and varied administrative exper­
iences certainly seemed the perfect combination to equip 
him to govern the former British leasehold. But, as will 
be shown in this chapter, there were many circumstances 
which made the chances for his success at Weihaiwei unlikely 
from the very outset.
In spite of the fact that rendition of the leasehold 
had been discussed at the highest levels of government over 
a period of several years, the actual transfer of authority 
on 1 October 1930 occurred without adequate preparation on 
the part of the Chinese. This was at least partly due to 
the struggle which was going on for control of Shantung at
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this time between the Nanking regime and Feng Ytt-hsiang.
Hstt Tsu-shan told the British consul that he had not even
received definite orders to go to Weihaiwei to assume his
new position as high commissioner until 25 September. The
"advance" party from the Chinese foreign ministry did not
arrive there until 29 September and Hstt himself only reached
Port Edward on the morning of 1 October, barely in time for
2 . .the rendition ceremony itself. British sources indicate 
that the new administration was most reluctant to even take 
charge of the government storeroom and its supplies the fol­
lowing day. The former commissioner, therefore, thought it 
essential that some key British personnel, such as the 
financial secretary and chief of police,be kept on as con­
sular assistants in order to complete important transitional 
functions which had not been carried out earlier. It is 
npt surprising, in view of this lack of planning by the 
Chinese central government, that Commissioner Hsti soon 
found himself without adequate revenue to support his new 
regime.
Problems of Government Finance, 1930-31
It will be remembered that Hstt had expressed his con­
cern to Reginald Johnston as early as July 1930 that it 
would not be easy to ensure adequate funding for his admini­
stration as most revenue raised at Weihaiwei would inevitably
k
be forwarded to Nanking. Following the British withdrawal 
in October there was a good deal of confusion as to whether 
or not a customs office would be established, whether it 
would simply be a branch of the Maritime Customs Service 
or include a native customs office, and whether the new
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commissioner could expect to receive at least a portion of 
local shipping dues or customs levies as well as a supple­
mentary grant-in-aid from the central authorities. It 
should be noted that the commissioner and his staff were 
appointed by and directly responsible to the Executive Yttan 
in Nanking, but many of the decisions regarding financial 
affairs were taken by the Ministry of Finance under T. V. 
Soong. Commissioner Hstt was, therefore, forced to present 
his appeal for operating funds and special consideration 
of Weihaiwei's financial situation to the latter who held a 
differing view on the subject.. While the commissioner 
would have preferred for his grant to have come out of 
customs duties and for the area to have had only a gradual 
introduction of these and other taxes so as to provide for 
a transitional period from its former duty-free status, T. V. 
Soong's ministry and the Customs Service which reported to 
it were loathe to grant any locality control over these 
sources of revenue or special dispensation from national 
finance policy. Disputes between Hsti and the Customs S e r ­
vice in fact delayed the appointment of a customs official
c
for Weihaiwei until 28 October.
The customs issue was one which also worried many of 
Weihaiwei's citizens and led to a street demonstration 
against the establishment of a customs house on 3 October, 
only two days after rendition. Nanking's vice-minister for 
foreign affairs was visiting Weihaiwei at this time in order 
to discuss the matter of financial support with Commissioner 
Hsti and three hundred protestors took advantage of his 
presence to publicly express their views. In an "orderly" 
march through the streets of Port Edward they positioned
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themselves first in front of the main government offices 
and then at the vice-minister's hotel to shout anti-customs 
slogans.^ The vice-minister promised to appeal personally 
to the central government to provide adequate funds for W e i ­
haiwei, hut a decision was nevertheless taken by the Ministry 
of Finance on 9 October to open a customs house at port 
Edward. This new establishment was designated a sub-office 
of the Chefoo Maritime Customs under the Chefoo customs com-
7
m i s s i o n e r.1
At the same time, a concession was made to those 
opposing customs levies at Weihaiwei when it was decided 
to abolish the old native customs office in the walled town 
which would have charged duty on junk-borne cargo. Accord­
ing to the new arrangement for Weihaiwei, all duties were 
levied by the Maritime Customs office. Cargo coming from 
or going abroad was charged according to Maritime Customs 
rates while goods coming from or going to other places in 
China were charged according to the tariffs levied at the 
Chefoo native customs office. Revenue derived from both 
junk- and steamer-borne cargo coming from or going abroad 
was retained by the Maritime Customs Service while native 
customs receipts were forwarded to the Chefoo native cus­
toms office. Although local merchants were no doubt pleased 
that there was no separate native customs office in Port 
Edward, Commissioner Hstt found himself receiving no share
Q
in any of these new taxes.
There were many in Weihaiwei who felt that no customs 
duties of any kind should be levied there and peaceful pro­
tests took place once again on 12 October against the pro­
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posed opening of new customs and salt administration offices. 
This time a group of about four hundred people presented a 
petition to a visitor from the Ministry of Finance. It was 
reported that the petition was signed only by Weihaiwei*s 
less important businessmen such as "ehicken-dealers, the 
hotel-keepers' association, and the rickshaw-men*s guild.
By December, however, even the wealthier merchants of the 
area were feeling the financial pinch and petitioned Nanking 
to either make the port once again a duty-free zone or, for 
a time at least, reduce the rates of duty being charged so 
as to allow for adjustments to the changed trading environ­
ment.*0
As noted in earlier chapters, Weihaiwei during the
British period had served primarily as a transshipment area
for foreign goods or goods from other parts of China. With
the loss of the duty-free advantage, traders naturally chose
to ship from the port located nearest them. Thus, the ground
nut and piece goods trade soon declined and a number of
Chefoo firms with branches in Weihaiwei recalled their staff
11to the home offices. Making matters still worse for local
people was the fact that, in addition to the new customs
h o u s e , there were now also at Weihaiwei several new tax
bureaus under Nanking's control which imposed levies on
cigarettes, flour, stamps, liquor, and tobacco, as well as
a "consolidated commercial" tax. By December 1930 it was
reported that over thirty firms had been forced to close
12down as a result of all the new exactions,
As one might expect, it was not only the business 
community which was suffering at this time. Commissioner 
Hstt's administration also found itself hard-pressed for funds.
33^
With trade declining and so much of locally-raised revenue 
ear-marked for Nanking's coffers, there was, as Reginald 
Johnston had predicted, bound to be a large operating deficit 
for the new regime, Hstl's resources immediately following 
rendition consisted primarily of the land tax, collected 
at the existing relatively low rates, the old shipping dues, 
and a new 50 percent surcharge on the land tax for educa­
tional expenditures.
It should be noted that government expenditures at 
Weihaiwei rose in the post-rendition era because there were 
ambitious plans for developing the area, but much of the 
outlay went for official salaries. Modeled on the Tsingtao 
municipal model, Weihaiwei*s new government structure 
allowed for a staff of approximately fifty people spread 
over five major departments* General Affairs, Financial 
Affairs, Public Works, Public Safety, and a Secretariat. J 
This large number contrasted sharply with the British per­
iod in which there were only about a dozen foreign officials
i jLl .
to administer the entire leasehold. In order to maintain
the elaborate new arrangement, the Chinese commissioner was
forced to plead with his Nanking superiors for a subsidy,
even asking permission to resign when he did not receive
13
one, but this request too was denied,  ^ Finally, however, 
in January 1931 the central government issued a policy direc­
tive on Weihaiwei which called for "moderate" taxes in line 
with the area's "peculiar conditions," special efforts by
the local administration to reduce expenditures, and a sub-
16
sidy from the central treasury to make up any deficit.
By October 1931, on the first anniversary of Weihai- 
wei's rendition, the commissioner was able to report a
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balanced budget but only because he had received a subsidy
of $120,000 from Nanking. Hsh estimated that if the British
had remained at Wei h a i w e i , they would have collected revenue
amounting to approximately $420,000 in the financial year
1930-31 * as compared to his total of $207*000. Expenditures,
he estimated, would have been approximately the same*
$295*000 for his government and $298,000 for the British.*'*
Without a regular subsidy from Nanking, therefore, it seemed
impossible for the new administration to remain solvent.
The only other option was a significant increase in taxation
18
and to this Commissioner Hstt was strongly opposed.
It is hardly surprising, given all of the other tax 
bureaus already at Weihaiwei, that the commissioner did not 
welcome the opening of new salt administration offices in 
late January 1931* . The Shantung district inspectorate of 
the central salt administration decided, in fact, that there 
should be five collection offices established in the former 
leasehold in order to tap this potentially lucrative source 
of revenue. Once again local merchants and salt producers 
were unhappy that there would not be a gradual introduction 
of the new taxes. The salt tax formerly imposed by the Brit­
ish had been relatively low and had thus provided a competi­
tive advantage over other salt-producing areas in China. 
Although in 1931 the demand for salt in Japan, Korea, and 
Hong Kong was quite good, and the new tax in that year easily 
absorbed, the market was highly volatile and it was feared 
that Weihaiwei might eventually lose ground to its rivals
19
in Tsingtao and elsewhere without its former tax advantage.
Another perhaps more disturbing feature of the new 
salt administration offices at Weihaiwei was the way in
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which they were policed. When the salt magistrate arrived 
in the area he was accompanied by thirty of his own salt 
guards who were promptly refused entry into the former lease­
hold by Commissioner Hstt until direct orders to do so were 
received from Nanking* Hstt undoubtedly regarded the salt 
police as a threat to his authority at Weihaiwei, but the 
British consul noted that even the local inhabitants were 
"strongly opposed to /them/ being stationed at the producing
centres, owing to their well-known corruption and methods
20of extortion . . . "  Eventually, however, they had to be 
admitted to their posts. As will be shown below, the new 
system of salt taxation and its accompanying security system., 
were to cause increasingly serious problems for the people 
of the area and Hstt Tsu-shan himself.
Commissioner Hstt and the Kuomintang
Financial pressures were not the only difficulty 
faced by Weihaiwei*s Chinese commissioner. Equally serious 
was the stormy relationship he soon experienced with a newly- 
organized local branch of the Kuomintang. Although Hstt 
had been a firm supporter of the revolution, he had also 
been abroad for several years after 1911* and, as a native 
of Kiangsu, was somewhat out of touch with the younger poli­
ticians further south when he returned. His strongest loy­
alties seemed to lie with Dr. C. T. Wang, the foreign minis­
ter who had negotiated Weihaiwei's rendition, and the Chi­
nese navy which was controlled by Chang Hstteh-liang's Man-
21
c h u n a n  faction.
Understandably, then, the establishment of a party 
office in Weihaiwei in early 1931 was not welcomed by Com­
337
missioner Hstt, especially since he had already been criti­
cized by KMT activists in Wen-teng hsien for modeling his
22
administration too closely on British procedures. C o m ­
plicating the matter further was a dispute between officials 
of the central party headquarters in Nanking and those of 
the provincial branch in Tsinan as to who should control 
KMT affairs in the former leasehold. By March 1931 the 
issue was finally resolved in favor of Tsinan and the auth­
orities there appointed several directors of the local party 
organization, including Mi Yi-shan, a wealthy Weihaiwei 
building contractor. Commissioner Hstt for a time, however, 
claimed that he had received no instructions from Nanking 
and refused to grant the organization a monthly subsidy of 
$600 or provide a building for its use. It was impossible 
to keep the Kuomintang out of the area for long, of course, 
and Hstt was to find himself frequently at odds with local 
activists throughout his administration. Although the duties 
of the party branch were never clearly d e f i n e d , it was never­
theless given "wide powers of criticism, interference, and 
censorship combined with the right to make independent r e ­
ports to the capital through the provincial tang-pu head- 
23
quarters.H J
One example of the type of problem caused by the local 
party organization occurred in March 1932 when news of the 
anti-Japanese disturbances in Shanghai reached Weihaiwei.
A large protest meeting was held by students from Port Ed­
ward's five largest schools and the local Chamber of Com­
merce to discuss ways to end the importing of Japanese pro­
ducts from Dairen at Weihaiwei as well as the promotion of 
nationally-manufactured goods. A fight soon broke out between
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some of the more radical students and merchants whom they 
considered to be traitors for dealing in Japanese merchandise. 
This incident was followed by a further riot during the court 
hearing on the matter the next day. A force of five hundred 
police and marines was said to have merely looked on while 
their superiors refused to give orders to disperse the mob 
which then broke windows and looted shops selling Japanese 
goods. The commissioner was finally able to restore order 
and to get local shops reopened by persuading the students
O il
to apologize for their actions.
While too afraid of offending either the students or 
the tang-pu to take direct action themselves, many of Wei­
haiwei* s business community resented the fact that the gov­
ernment had not reacted swiftly enough to prevent either 
incident. Commissioner Hstt explained to the British consul 
that the local KMT organization was actually responsible
for inciting the riot and seemed determined to embarrass
2*5
his administration. ^
On another occasion in early 1933 two members of the 
tang-pu were accused of encouraging some local villagers 
not to cooperate with the government's new road repair pro­
gram. It will be remembered that the British, after en­
countering opposition to a system of road maintenance based 
on village labor, by 1903 decided instead to levy a tax for 
this purpose and found the people quite willing to pay. The 
Chinese administration, however, with its severe financial 
problems returned to the much-hated corvee labor system and 
expected the villagers to pay a road tax as well as to pro­
vide necessary materials. In the court case which followed 
the villagers* refusal to cooperate, the charge against the
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tang-pu members was dismissed but the judge also ruled that 
further opposition to the government would be considered 
illegal. In order to counter the strong resentment felt 
by the local people it was necessary for the government to 
hold several meetings of village headmen to explain the 
financial situation which compelled the use of corvee labor.
Security
Although faced with serious economic and political 
problems, the new administration was in a somewhat more for­
tunate position with regard to security matters. In addi­
tion to a marine garrison of three hundred well-trained men, 
a group of fifty salt guards, and Admiral Shen's north­
eastern fleet, Weihaiwei also enjoyed the continued presence 
of its British-trained police force which was rehired en 
masse following rendition. Thus, in spite of the fears of 
many local residents that the British withdrawal would mean 
a greater threat from bandit gangs, the combination of navy
and police was apparently sufficient to deter most criminals
2 7from entering the former leasehold. In one incidence of 
kidnapping carried out by a former notorious subordinate 
of Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang the death penalty was recommended and 
such a severe sentence may have served as an added deterrent 
to others.^®
Nor was Weihaiwei*s new administration threatened by 
the neighboring warlord regime of General Liu Chen-nien.
On the contrary, when ordered to do so by Nanking the general 
peacefully handed over control of the walled town of Weihai 
to Commissioner Hstt. Liu's behavior may perhaps be explained 
by the fact that after 1930 he found himself at odds with 
Shantung's Governor Han Fu-ch'tt and no doubt wished to avoid
3^0
a simultaneous confrontation with Admiral Shen Hung-lieh
2Q
who was responsible for Weihaiwei*s defense# 7 By October 
,1932 any possible threat from the warlord general was r e ­
moved altogether as Governor Han finally succeeded in oust­
ing him and his troops from Shantung. Although much of the 
promontory at this time suffered heavily at the hands of 
pillaging soldiers, both Chefoo and Weihaiwei were largely 
spared the effects of the violence.-^0
In order to further protect the citizens of Weihaiwei 
from criminal elements and as part of his effort to make 
the former leasehold a model of good government, Hstt Tsu- 
shan planned to rid the walled town of its notorious brothels 
and thirty-nine opium dens. As soon as funds allowed, he 
also hoped to integrate Weihai more fully into the surround­
ing area by pulling down its ancient walls and building two 
modern roads through it.*^ Thus, the old town was soon 
assimilated into the Chinese-controlled territory of Wei­
haiwei and no longer served as a convenient sanctuary for 
either political or criminal conspirators. In fact, the 
entire Weihaiwei area throughout most of the period 1930-37 
retained its reputation as a generally peaceful district.
As in the days of British rule, this situation contrasted 
sharply with conditions in neighboring hsien and led some
villagers there to request that their areas also be governed
32by the Weihaiwei authorities.
It should also be noted that although the reputation 
of the police force with regard to honesty and discipline 
remained fairly high among local residents, there was some 
dissatisfaction that the police now "meddled" too much in 
their private affairs. As elsewhere in China at this time, 
it was government policy to make ever greater use of the
3*U
police in all aspects of law enforcement. They were engaged 
for example, in such tasks as maintaining census records, 
making investigations into school attendance, enforcing the 
anti-foot-binding campaign, and ensuring payment of taxes. 
The policeman was, therefore, in much closer and more fre­
quent contact with the daily lives of ordinary villagers 
than he ever had been under the more loosely-structured Brit 
ish system of administration which was in turn modeled on 
the traditional Chinese pattern. It is not surprising, then 
that there were complaints of interference from some of the 
inhabitants.-^
Administrative Divisions and Local Self-Government
There were other ways in which Weihaiwei residents 
found their new administration playing a more active role 
in their lives, especially with regard to the establishment 
of local self-government. Sun Yat-sen himself had regarded 
this as one of the most important aspects of his program of 
political reform for China and there were many directives 
from Nanking in the 1930s to local administrators on how to 
implement it. If Weihaiwei was to be seen as a model of 
good government it was clear to Hstl Tsu-shan and his dili­
gent staff that these directives should be carried out immed 
iately.
One of the first steps to be taken was the establish­
ment of internal and external administrative divisions. It 
was decided to retain the former leasehold boundaries as 
laid out by the British, Just prior to rendition a survey
was carried out and only five of the original seventy-six 
stone markers were moved slightly. To emphasize that Wei-
3^2
haiwei was once more under Chinese jurisdiction* however* 
all English words were removed from the stones and Chinese 
inscribed in their place.
With regard to internal divisions it was thougirt neces­
sary to make some changes in order to bring Weihaiwei more 
closely into line with national policies. Thus, after a 
meeting of headmen in February 1932, a careful survey was 
carried out of all villages and new ch*tt and fang boundaries 
determined. Whereas the British had established twenty- 
six districts averaging about twelve villages apiece, the 
Chinese divided Weihaiwei into eight larger ch*ti which con­
tained between thirty-two and forty villages, and were fu r ­
ther sub-divided into smaller fang with about four villages
in eaoh.36
Although the British system of district headmen was 
eliminated in this administrative realignment, it is sig­
nificant that the new government did not attempt to remove 
the traditional village headmen. The official explanation 
for this was that the ts* un-tung system had been in exis­
tence a very long time and had functioned quite effectively 
at Weihaiwei even under the British. It was also noted 
that the former leasehold was still very much a rural area 
where distances between villages were often considerable 
and where local customs and historical development varied 
accordingly. Furthermore, since Chinese jurisdiction had 
only recently been restored at Weihaiwei, there were special 
circumstances there which made it impossible to implement 
national laws on local government without some modification. 
The major modification in this case was to retain the village 
headman system under the supervision of the new fang and
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ch*U officials. Commissioner Hstt does indeed seem to have 
been impressed with the effectiveness of village headmen 
at Weihaiwei and no doubt retained them as a useful admini­
strative tool. But his decision was clearly also taken to
ensure the political cooperation of a very important segment
37of the local population.
It was expected that in matters affecting an entire 
fang all of the ts*un-tung concerned would meet for discus­
sions, but the opinion of the fang-chang, or fang head, was 
to take precedence. Likewise, in matters affecting an en­
tire ch*d all of the fang-chang involved would meet but the 
view of the ch*tt-chang, or ch*tt head, was to take precedence 
Each village was further sub-divided into neighborhoods of 
lin and ltt. Individual ltt-chang were expected to meet and 
choose from among their ranks a village headman.^ It is 
not clear whether those chosen were in every case the same 
men who had previously served as village headmen, but one 
can guess that they would be in the most advantageous posi­
tion to influence their fellow villagers.
According to this new system, both fang-chang and ch*tt 
chang were eventually to be elected by the population at 
large. It is not clear whether or not ch*&-chang elections 
were ever held, but in August 1933 seventy-five fang-chang 
were selected through local balloting. The right to vote 
was enjoyed by all men and women over the'age of twenty sui 
who had sworn an oath of loyalty to the government and regi­
stered with their respective fang offices. Those eligible 
to serve as fang-chang included "qualified" school-teachers, 
but not those actually teaching, middle school graduates, 
past and present ts*un-tung who had passed a government exam
yt4
ination, and members of local merchant associations (shang- 
h u i K 39
Chinese and British sources of this .period are vague 
as to what the duties of all these local officials were or 
how they were distinguished from those of the existing vil­
lage headmen. As was mentioned in an official government 
report of 1931* however, there were far too many new tasks 
for either the former village or district headmen to be able 
to handle them on their own. Much of this work consisted 
of information-gathering (regarding such things as opium 
addiction, grain surveys, school attendance, foot-binding, 
the wearing of the queue, etc.) and the active promotion 
of government programs (tree planting, mass education, road 
construction, self-government, etc.). The fang-chang, accord­
ing to British sources, were quite poorly paid and were 
assisted in all their duties by a local "self-governing 
council," whose manner of selection is not specified. Both 
the fang-chang and the councils took their orders from the 
commissioner, the tang-pu, and the police, which at times 
led to considerable confusion as to who had the highest 
authority. In fact, it finally became necessary by 1933 
for the commissioner to assert himself in this regard in
order to prevent the party organization from completely con-
•^0trolling the self-governing councils.
Although the Chinese regime may have hoped that those 
serving as ch* d-chang would function as a liaison between 
'the fang-chang, the people of their area, and the commis­
sioner's office, it is clear that ultimate control over who 
filled these positions was retained by the government. Only 
those who had completed a training course and examinations
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were eligible to become candidates for the office. The dif­
ficulty with this cumbersome three-tiered system was that 
it led to more officials and paperwork but did not stimulate 
true self-government. If anything, the greatly increased 
contact between the people and officials was largely viewed 
by the former as interference. It might be said that at 
Weihaiwei, as elsewhere in China, the Nationalists spoke a 
great deal about the importance of mass political participa­
tion but tended to stifle it with their over-bureaucratic 
institutions and procedures. One observer implied that the 
true motivation behind these elaborate structures was not 
so much the encouragement of self-government as the facili- 
tation of greater government control at the local level.
In his article, "Local Self-Government under the Republic," 
Kuhn has noted that "the intensification of control through 
the proliferation of bureaucratic infrastructure in local
society" was a technique employed by the Nanking regime through-
Llo
out China at this time.
The Mediation of Disputes
One important task which the fang and ch*tt officials 
were responsible for was the mediation of disputes. As the 
British consul observedi "In all civil cases litigants are 
compelled first to attempt arbitration out of Court, under 
the guidance of an official of the Court, and no Court fees,
regular or irregular, are demanded unless the arbitration
I13
fails and a formal judicial hearing has to take place." 
Initially, the new system did not come in for much public 
criticism, according to the consul, but neither were there 
crowds of civil litigants to be seen as used to appear out-
346
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side the British senior district officer's headquarters.
Local people who were always suspicious of outsiders and 
change of any kind were no doubt hesitant to avail themselves 
of a new system staffed by officials unknown to them. Those 
disputes which were handled by the court, as in the pre- 
1930 period, were mainly concerned with land, debts, and 
property in the form of houses.^
By the latter half of 1933* however, there was real 
dissatisfaction with the way in which the new law court func­
tioned. Complaints were heard not about dishonesty but 
against its rules and delays, the increased cost of litiga­
tion, the indecision of the judge, and the number of appeals 
46allowed. The court at Weihaiwei was not responsible to 
Commissioner Hstt but, as a branch court of Fu-shan hsien, 
was answerable to the Shantung provincial high court at 
Tsinan and ultimately to the Ministry of Justice in Nanking. ^  
Local people unhappy with legal proceedings at Weihaiwei, 
however, may not have been aware of this administrative 
separation of powers and no doubt blamed government in general 
for their difficulties. The commissioner also had the mis­
fortune of not receiving any of the legal fees and fines
48levied by the court to supplement his meager resources. 
Education
One area of reform in which the government enjoyed 
considerably more success was that of education. Having 
been severely critical of the British for their lack of 
attention to this matter, it was incumbent upon the new re­
gime to take action almost immediately. A key feature of 
educational policy at Weihaiwei was, in Hstt Tsu-shan's own
3^7
words, "to forcefully stop the running of private ^village/ 
schools** in order to ensure that government regulations re­
garding both teachers and curriculum were observed.^ Al­
though local residents were generally in favor of greater 
educational opportunities for themselves and their children, 
there was **much dissatisfaction** regarding the removal of 
teachers who had not been through officially approved teacher 
training courses and were, therefore, in the government's 
view not properly qualified.
Nevertheless, one British observer in March 1932 com­
mented that the most noticeable progress at Weihaiwei since 
rendition had been in the field of education. With revenue 
from the new surcharge on the land tax and half of the ship­
ping dues, Hstl's administration had reorganized or established 
nearly two hundred elementary schools in the rural areas, 
taken over and expanded the Chinese-run middle school in Port 
Edward, as well as the middle school for girls, founded a 
teacher training school, provided scholarships to needy stu­
dents, published a weekly educational journal, opened a free 
public library, and instituted licensing of all teachers. 
Special attention was also given to the promotion of female 
education which was offered free of charge in the villages. 
Five girls were even employed in the government offices as 
copyists which, the consul remarked, was considered a "revo­
lutionary** innovation in such a conservative district as 
Weihaiwei.
Social Reform
Another aspect of government plans to improve condi­
tions for women in the former leasehold was a vigorous anti-
3^8
f o o t - b i n d i n g  c a m p a i g n .  A t  t h e  t i m e  o f  r e n d i t i o n  i t  w a s  o b ­
s e r v e d  t h a t  w o m e n  a t  W e i h a i w e i  g e n e r a l l y  h a d  b o u n d  f e e t .
In order to emphasize his personal opposition to this custom, 
Commissioner Hsti sent his own wife to address several pub­
lic meetings of women on the subject. He then appointed a 
number of female "social workers" to campaign against the 
practice in Port Edward and finally issued a notice that 
after 15 January 1931 no girl with bound feet would be per­
mitted to work in any factory. It was remarked that: "This
last move . . . achieved some success, as considerable num­
bers of girls ^/wer©7 employed in embroidery and other fac­
tories at fairly high wages." The plan was to carry the 
campaign to the villages and eventually to fine any offend­
ers.-*2
Equally contrary to Kuomintang policy was the wearing 
of the queue which in 1930 could still be seen among 50 per- 
cent of Weihaiwei*s male population. ^ Eradicating it, how­
ever, was a relatively simple matter, at least in the Port 
Edward area, where police were stationed at the town en- 
trances armed with scissors.
Combating opium addiction, though, was not so simple. 
The government decided first to abolish the British system 
of licensed smoking as well as the many opium dens in the 
walled town. According to the consul in March 1931» how­
ever, some of these dealers continued to exist there and in
5 5Port Edward as well as in the rural areas.
In October 1932 yet another social reform took place 
when the central government directed that all nu-pei, or 
"slaves," should have their status legally changed to a 
non-servile one. There were fifty-two women at Weihaiwei
3^9
in this category and the directive was implemented immedi­
ately.^^
Continuing Economic Problems for the Government. 1931-33
If the former British commissioner, Sir James Stewart 
Lockhart, and the first Chinese commissioner, Hstt Tsu-shan, 
had ever had an occasion to discuss their respective exper­
iences at Weihaiwei they might have been surprised to learn 
that inadequate financial resources were as much a problem 
in 1930 as in 1901. It will be remembered that one of Lock­
hart's primary tasks upon arrival at Weihaiwei was to en­
courage outside investment in the area so that the British 
grant-in-aid could be reduced. Likewise, when Commissioner 
Hstt realized how unreliable Nanking could be in forwarding 
his monthly subsidy, he decided to try to find other means 
of developing Weihaiwei independently,*^
Hstt himself even edited three volumes of detailed 
plans which were presented to a visiting delegation of busi­
nessmen from Shanghai on how to carry out such development. 
The first volume deals with Weihaiwei's potential as a major 
producer of seafood. In addition to its regular fishing 
trade, he thought certain products could also be profitably 
cultivated in coastal areas. Seafood processing plants and
a ship repair plant would create new jobs, as would an ex-
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pansion of existing harbor and storage facilities. In the 
second volume extensive consideration was given to Weihai­
wei' s farming and forestry potential. Like the British be­
fore them, the Chinese believed the area was well suited to 
fruit and nut production as well as poultry raising and seri­
culture. An excellent climate and low wages were viewed as
59
good reasons for attracting investors. 7 The third volume
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deals with the development of hotels and a tourist industry 
at Weihaiwei, including detailed schemes for new water sup­
plies.^0 In all of the volumes it is clear that those formu­
lating the plans had been trained in Western techniques of 
accounting, management, engineering, and agriculture.
There were other ways in which the government sought 
to "modernize" Weihaiwei so as to provide the proper condi­
tions for commercial expansion. As well as introducing the 
metric system of weights and measures to the area, for e x ­
ample, there were considerable efforts to improve the mone­
tary system by prohibiting small shops from issuing their 
own paper notes and by substituting the uniform national 
currency for the wide variety of money in use at Weihaiwei 
at this time.^*
In order to draw attention to the area's potential 
value as a trading center, a large exhibition of national 
products was held in August 1933* Partly in response to 
the threat of Japanese economic aggression, the exhibition
drew participants from all over China and generated a good
6 ?
deal of business for local people as well. A permanent 
display of national goods was also maintained in the Chamber 
of Commerce building from which orders could be placed, J 
In spite of all these efforts, however, Weihaiwei*s 
economic growth remained largely confined to the blueprint 
stage. China was, of course, by 1932 experiencing the effects 
of the world-wide depression and, as an agricultural pro­
ducer, Weihaiwei was dependent on perpetually unstable in- 
ternational markets for commodities such as ground nuts. 
Another serious difficulty was the continuing uncertainty 
of government revenue which made the financing of long-range
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development programs, or even day-to-day administration, 
nearly impossible at times.
Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Weihai­
wei' s monthly subsidy from Nanking was suspended indefinitely 
and Commissioner Hstl was compelled to place his government 
on an austerity budget with cuts of 10 to 40 percent in 
official allowances and spending on public works. Even then, 
however, he soon accumulated a deficit. When the grant was 
resumed in October 1932 it had been reduced to half the ori­
ginal amount and left Hstl once again in great d i f f i c u l t y . ^
By late 1932 the British consul, G. S. Moss, felt the 
situation was becoming so serious that he should personally 
inform his friend, Finance Minister T. V. Soong. In his 
letter to Soong he noted that since the suspension .of W e i ­
haiwei's subsidy many projects were suffering, including 
roads, the telephone cable, and harbor facilities. Moss 
also warned Soong that if services continued to deteriorate 
the public would undoubtedly direct its criticism at the 
minister. In spite of the fact that the total amount of 
tax revenue at Weihaiwei was now nearly double that col­
lected at the end of the British period, the new Chinese 
administration was only allowed to spend two-thirds of the 
sum the foreigners had. With the suspension of its sub­
sidy from Nanking the government had soon gone into arrears.
Moss suggested that a possible solution to the prob­
lem would be to expand Weihaiwei*s territorial boundaries 
to include neighboring Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien so as 
to have a much larger tax base to support the newly-established 
"municipal" government. As the consul observed, the Weihai­
wei administration was inappz&priately modeled on the Tsing-
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tao precedent. Thus, a small territory of approximately 
200,000 poor farmers was being asked to support an urban- 
style government with many specialized departments, central 
government tax offices, and separate law courts. Moss con­
cluded* "As it is now run the Municipal Government machine 
suggests to the disinterested observer a high-powered motor­
car running at 10 m.p.h., the highly capable Driver and 
Mechanics being under the compulsion of events." Unfor­
tunately, however, the consul's advice was not taken and 
Commissioner Hstl began to experience serious political prob­
lems in addition to his financial ones.
The Removal of Hstl Tsu-shan
As has been mentioned, Commissioner Hstl from the out­
set of his career at Weihaiwei had frequently been at odds 
with members of the local party organization. By 1933 he 
had apparently made so many enemies within this group that 
he was forced to defend himself against their complaints to 
the Nanking authorities that he had been neglectful of his 
duty, was too pro-British, and that he was even an opium
smoker. Hstl was exonerated of these charges and his offer
67
to resign was rejected, but the matter did not end there.
In November 1933, while ostensibly on a visit to 
Peking for medical treatment, the commissioner was suddenly 
summoned to Nanking to answer his critics again. And to 
the surprise of many at Weihaiwei, he was removed from his 
post in December. The chairman of the local Chamber of Co m ­
merce confided to the British consul at the time that*
. . . Hstl had the confidence of the m e r ­
chants and farmers who felt generally that 
any change would be for the worse. He had, 
however, made bitter enemies in the ranks
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of the tang-pu officials and the school­
teachers, and had been so unfortunate re­
cently as to estrange the Law Court offi­
cials needlessly and tactlessly . 68
The commissioner's difficulties consisted of more than 
a clash of personalities or a power struggle with local poli­
tical enemies. In Hstl's own view of the situation his many 
protests to Nanking over the Weihaiwei subsidy, the excessive 
tax burden levied in his area, and his refusal to increase 
taxation provoked many at the Ministry of Finance and con­
tributed to his own dismissal.^ Nor were his enemies con­
tent to let him leave Weihaiwei without further recrimina­
tions. Although Commissioner Hstl attended several farewell 
lunches and dinners in which there were genuine expressions 
of regret at his departure, the commander of the marine gar­
rison nevertheless felt it necessary to arrange extra mili­
tary patrols in case of demonstrations organized by the tang- 
pu against him.^° Two days before Hstl left Weihaiwei, fif­
teen members of this group published an open letter in local 
newspapers accusing him of financial irregularities. Accord­
ing to the British consul, these charges were groundless 
and were the work of the local deputy to the Shantung pro­
vincial party organization and his colleagues, eight of whom
. . . 71had been jailed during Hstl's administration.
The marine commander was especially bitter about the 
commissioner's treatment at the hands of the KMT members, 
noting that they had spent $2 0 , 0 0 0  in the campaign against 
him and that they would definitely expect to have more power 
in local affairs under his successor. When representatives 
to the Chamber of Commerce were asked why they had not stood 
up for Hstl, they replied that, while recognizing him as their
35^
"champion," they were at the same time very afraid of the
72tang-pu "who were like wolves."
Just prior to his departure the commissioner himself 
observed that, while he was glad to at least leave behind a 
credit balance of a few thousand dollars for the next ad­
ministration, he had had to cut his budget to the bone and 
to reduce his staff considerably. In view of Weihaiwei*s 
poor trade position and a tax burden which was already mak­
ing conditions "deplorable" for local people, he wondered 
how the new commissioner could possibly raise sufficient 
revenue to attend to such basic tasks as keeping the roads 
repaired, paying and clothing the police, and maintaining 
schools.^
The British consul had mixed feelings about Weihaiwei*s 
present situation and future prospects. In late 1933 he had 
observed that there was considerable local interest in some 
of the government's new programs, especially adult education, 
and that younger people were even inclined to appreciate the 
public meetings, uniforms, and bands provided by the tang-pu. 
And, while admitting that "of its kind" the present admini­
stration was "fairly good," the consul also thought it was
ok,
costly in terms of its numerous personnel. Unaware of the
extent of Hstt's political difficulties, the consul remarked
only days before the former was fireds
It is currently an advantage for him, and 
for the Territory that he has many close 
friends in high places. His prestige and 
the confidence derived from his former ad­
ministrative appointments give him an ad­
vantage over an official with only an aca­
demic and civil service career. Such a 
one would be more liable to be a mere tool 
of the politicians•75
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It remained to be seen whether the new man with just such a 
background would prove the consul correct.
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Half Year Ending 31 March 1933*
FO 37l/l6025» Moss to Ingram, 5 November 1 9 3 2 j and 
Moss to Soong, 4 November 1932. In the first document Moss 
notes that Soong had asked him to write occasionally regard­
ing Weihaiwei. In the actual letter to Soong which is en­
closed in the second document Moss addresses him as "T.V."
Moss had been in the consular service in China since 1902 
and by 1931 was the Acting-Consul General in Nanking where 
he no doubt had had dealings with Financial Minister Soong 
before being posted to Weihaiwei. See Who Was Who, 1951-oQ 
(London, i960), p.' 794.
^ F O  371/17070, Weihaiwei Political Report for Sep­
tember Quarter 1933*
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FO 371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 1^ November 1933, 
and Ingram to Simon, 13 January 1934.
69p0 371/ 18092, Moss to Ingram, 28 December 1933*
^°Ibid, See also, FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram,
3 January 1934.
"^FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 3 January 1934.
?2Ibid., Moss to Ingram, 28 December 1933*
^^Ibid. In this document it is also stated that where­
as the British had raised a total of about $^00,000 in 1930, 
Chinese tax revenues in 1933 had reached $1.5 million of which 
only $260,000 was retained by the local administration. It 
is not surprising that Nanking refused to give up its control 
of the highly lucrative customs duties and salt taxes at W e i ­
haiwei which made up the bulk of revenue there. Hung-mao 
Tien has observed that throughout China during the years 1928- 
37 customs revenues accounted for 48.5 percent of the central 
government's total income, while salt levies accounted for 
32 percent. See Tien, Government and P o l i t i c s , p. 78. ,
^ F 0  371/17070, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for 
Half Year Ending October 1933*
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^ F O  371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 11 December 1933.
Moss was also concerned that anyone replacing Hstl Tsu-shan 
might not he as pro-British as he had been and even suggested 
that a "reminder" of his government's confidence in Hstl 
might be decisive with the Nanking regime in determining 
his future at Weihaiwei. See ibid., Moss to Lampson, 14 No­
vember 1933*
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Chapter 9 
Weihaiwei and the slide Towards War
Hstt Tung-fan
Although many people assumed in early 193^ that a 
change of commissioners would mean an entirely new staff 
of officials and perhaps major shifts in policy at Weihai­
wei as well, it soon became apparent that such dramatic 
events were not to take place after all. It was reported 
that many residents backed by the local tang-pu as well as 
fifty other people from as far away as Chefoo and Tsingtao 
who had come to Weihaiwei in the hope of finding employment 
with the new government were disappointed to learn that most 
of the old staff was to be retained. The commissioner-to-be 
in fact brought with him only three new secretaries upon 
his arrival at Port Edward (now known as Ma-t'ou) on 15 Janu­
ary.1
The commissioner himself had a background in many 
respects quite similar to that of his predecessor. , Hstl 
Tung-fan (1887-19??) was born in Chekiang and completed all 
of his university education abroad, receiving a B.A. from 
Birmingham University in 1916 and also pursuing doctoral 
studies in international law, political science, and public 
finance at the Universities of London, Lausanne, and Zurich 
from 1916 to 1918. He then served as chief diplomatic 
secretary to the civil governor of Shantung from 1919 bo 
1920 and in 1921 was a councilor to the Chinese delegation 
at the Washington Conference. In 1922 HsU was a member of 
the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission for the Settlement of 
the Shantung Question and from 1923 to 192^- served as a 
rendition commissioner at Tsingtao as well as a member of
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the National Financial Commission and the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, From 192^ to 1929 he held a number of civil 
service posts dealing with foreign affairs and from 1929 
to 1933 increased his knowledge of Shantung provincial
2matters as commissioner for foreign affairs at Tsinan,
Like Hstl Tsu-shan, the new commissioner was a firm 
supporter of the former foreign minister Dr, C, T, Wang, 
described himself as an "anglophile," and had considerable 
expertise as a government official in dealing with foreign-
3
ers. Unlike Hstl Tsu-shan, however, he had retained close 
political links with Nanking and was not a naval officer 
but rather a scholarly diplomat, "by nature a cautious man 
, . . /who7 had learned not to quarrel with the Party men."^ 
The British consul at Weihaiwei observed that local tang- 
pu officials wasted no time in asserting the importance of 
their organization in Hstl's presence, even as early as the 
inaugural ceremony held in the new commissioner's honor.
And Hstl Tung-fan seems to have governed in a manner less 
likely to alienate the party than had his outspoken prede­
cessor, The British consul made the following commenti 
"As might be expected there is a subtle change in the bureau­
cratic atmosphere. It is now definitely more 'Chinese' and 
more Kuomintang, more evasive and potentially more hostile, 
though polite on the surface."^ Nevertheless, relations 
between the British and the commissioner during his two
and one-half years at Weihaiwei remained cordial and there
7
was no outbreak of anti-forelgnism.
Anti-Salt Tax Agitation
Commissioner Hstl's first major problem at Weihaiwei 
was how to deal with those who were violently opposed to
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the high level of taxation on salt. By December 1933 the 
salt gabelle had raised the tax in all districts of Shantung 
from $1,50 to $ 2,50 per picul on ordinary salt and from 
$0.30 to $1,00 per picul on salt used for preserving fish. 
Since salt production was at this time the second largest 
industry in Weihaiwei, such a large increase in the tax 
rate was bound to cause considerable resentment. Adding 
to the problem was the fact that local people were "oppressed 
by multiple taxation," suffering the effects of world-wide 
economic depression, and in general "much less prosperous"
Q
than they had once been. In spite of these conditions, 
however, the revenue derived by the salt inspectorate at 
Weihaiwei and forwarded directly to Nanking in 1933 was so 
large that it exceeded all other municipal taxes of the local 
government, While deriving no benefit from the salt levies, 
the Weihaiwei administration was forced to deal with the
Q
rising level of violence in opposition to them.
Theft from salt stocks was a particularly serious 
problem and in one incident in early 193^ a captured thief 
was shot and killed by a salt guard in what were described 
as "peculiarly brutal circumstances." A riot then ensued 
in which angry villagers looted salt heaps and so intimi­
dated the unpopular guards that they refused to carry out 
further patrols. Commissioner Hstl handled the matter rather 
effectively by first turning the offending guard over to 
the court and then sending representatives from the marine 
garrison, the police, the court, and the Chamber of Commerce 
to a meeting of "village elders" from the area involved. At 
this gathering the villagers were told that if robbery from 
the salt stocks ceased no further action would be taken by
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the government. For a time the disturbances did come to an 
end, although it was necessary to reinforce the discredited 
salt guards with a number of marines in order to maintain 
o rder.
Commissioner Hstt's troubles with the salt administra­
tion were by no means over, however. Riots broke out again 
in the Lu-tao-k'ou western coastal region of Weihaiwei in 
June of the same year when "agitators" were said to have 
circulated pamphlets announcing a free issue of rice. When 
the rice did not materialize villagers robbed the salt pans 
of some 70,000 piculs of salt. The Ministry of Finance 
then demanded that the commissioner forward the tax revenue
lost as a result of this incident. Hstt successfully resisted
11
the demand but only after a personal visit to Nanking.
"Development" Fro.jects and Continuing Financial Difficulties
The commissioner found it necessary to travel to the 
capital again in late 193^ in order to request that the r e ­
duced subsidy to his government be restored to its former 
level so that he could eliminate a deficit of nearly $^0,000. 
Hstt must have been able to exercise at least a modicum of 
influence in Nanking at this time since he returned to Wei­
haiwei with the necessary funds and a promise of more to 
come. As in the past, however, the promises proved unre­
liable and by October 1935 the government had again accumu-
12
lated a large deficit. The continual shortage of revenue 
for even basic operating expenses made it impossible to 
carry out very many of the commissioner's long-term develop­
ment schemes for Weihaiwei, although some projects were ini­
tiated during the brief periods when cash was available to 
13
finance them, J
Once again education seems to have been among the
government*s highest priorities. A new vocational school
for horticulture and sericulture was opened in late 193^
and by that time compulsory primary education had been ex-
14tended to all of Weihaiwei*s eight ch*tt divisions. By
April 1935 fifteen special schools had been opened for the
illiterate aged between seventeen and forty-five and en-
15rollments reached seven hundred, J In a continuing effort
to improve teacher training a summer school for elementary
teachers was held at Weihaiwei in August 1935. About this
time a special health education committee was also formed
consisting of health workers and teachers for the purpose
of providing hygiene instruction in local s c h o o l s . ^  other
measures taken to improve public health included a program
of mandatory vaccination in rural areas, the covering of
wells, and the inspection of local factories for sanitation.
As their British counterparts had done before them,
the Chinese administrators at Weihaiwei made many attempts
18
to encourage the planting of trees throughout the area.
A "model orchard" of 1800 fruit trees and a government-
sponsored vineyard were also established in the hope of in-
19
creasing and diversifying Weihaiwei's agricultural output. 7
Another important local industry was aided by a special
training school for masters of fishing vessels in July 1935
20
which was attended by 140 people. Less welcome to the 
area*s many seamen, however, was the establishment in March 
1934 of a new KMT-sponsored union which all were obliged to 
join. According to British sources, local seamen felt that 
such a compulsory organization, in spite of its stated ob­
jective of improving working conditions, was simply another
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21means of extracting revenue.
One might suspect that many of Weihaiwei's residents
also questioned the wisdom of constructing new law courts
at Port Edward in 193^ or the need for a $10,000 park and
open-air cinema at a time when roads in the area were rapidly
22falling into disrepair. One can only conclude that at a 
time when budget deficits would seem to have called for care­
ful spending, Weihaiwei's ambitious new administrators appear 
to have emphasized a certain number of "prestige" projects 
which were not of vital long-term importance but which gave 
the area a more "modern" appearance. The decision taken in 
1930 to develop Weihaiwei along the lines of the Tsingtao 
municipal model continued to influence successive admini­
strators there in spite of the fact that the former lease­
hold remained fundamentally a rural area.
Economic Conditions at Weihaiwei, 193^-36
It should also be noted that the mid-1930s were far 
from prosperous years for the people of Weihaiwei or for 
China generally and this fact in itself was a serious ob­
stacle to any plans the government might have hoped to carry 
out. Not only was it a period of great political instability 
and civil war which drained off both human and material re­
sources, but there were external pressures as well from the 
ever more menacing Japanese and from a world-wide economic 
depression. The Chinese found themselves especially hard 
hit by the fluctuating value of precious metals which led 
to an enormous outflow of silver in 193^~35* This in turn
undermined the new national currency introduced in 1933 and
23
led to an extremely tight money market. ^ The dampening
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effects of these conditions certainly contributed to the 
difficulties faced by Weihaiwei's ground nut dealers. Even 
though the crop itself was quite good in early 1935» there 
was a general lack of international demand for the product 
and many nuts remained unsold. This was especially serious 
to the large number of people at Weihaiwei who had gambled 
on prices and demand remaining at high 193^ levels and had 
become speculators in the commodity. As one British observer 
remarked in April 1935s "• • • unfortunately practically
everybody in this place have tried their luck in the ground­
nut trade -- shoemakers, tailors, piecegoods dealers, com- 
prador shops, carpenters, etc." The downturn in the
market and the inexperience of many of these people com-
2 5b m e d  to cause many bankruptcies. ^
Conditions were also not very favorable at this time 
for tourism which both Commissioners Hstl Tsu-shan and Hstl 
Tung-fan had hoped would become a real growth industry at 
Weihaiwei. There was no doubt a good deal of uncertainty 
among foreign investors as to the ability of the Chinese 
to adequately defend and administer the former leasehold 
when it was returned to them in 1930. It was stated, for 
example, that land around Port Edward which had sold for 
$2,000 per mou before rendition would not even fetch $600  
per mou in late 1933. There may have also been concern 
among Chinese and foreign investors alike that, as had been 
suggested in the rendition negotiations, the Nanking author­
ities would suddenly decide to close the port in order to 
use it exclusively as a naval base. It seems, then, 
that neither British nor Chinese administrators were able to 
provide the kind of guarantees about Weihaiwei's future
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which were needed to attract large-scale investment.
Further Administrative Changes
Another factor that may have discouraged potential
investors was the rate at which commissioners were replaced
at Weihaiwei following rendition. While Hstl Tsu-shan served
for only a little over three years, his successor, Hstl Tung-
fan, left after less than two and a half, ostensibly due
to illness. British sources note, however, that the primary
reason for replacing the latter in May 1936 may have been
in order to partially satisfy Governor Han Fu-ch'tl's desire
2 7for a larger role at Weihaiwei.
The governor's struggles with the Nanking authorities 
and with Chiang K'ai-shek in particular for greater control
o Q
of Shantung's resources in the 1930s are well known. Per­
haps less well known is the fact that after ousting the war­
lord Liu Chen-nien from his satrapy in neighboring Chefoo 
in late 1932, Han was said to have turned his attention to 
Tsingtao and Weihaiwei, the two special administrative areas 
in Shantung whose revenues primarily benefited Nanking, In 
November 1933 when it seemed possible that Hstl Tsu-shan might 
be removed from office at Weihaiwei, the chairman of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce told the British consul he had 
heard that Governor Han was "intriguing" for control of the 
two former leaseholds and that a proposal had even been made 
to separate Port Edward from its rural hinterland with the 
latter returning to the administrative jurisdiction of Jung- 
ch'eng and Wen-teng hsien.2^ This did not occur but Han did 
ask in 1936 that Weihaiwei be placed under the authority of 
the provincial government. Although his request was denied 
by Nanking, it was decided as a compromise to appoint a
373
30provincial official to the post of commissioner. This 
move was to bring a number of changes in local administra­
tive policy.
As on other occasions when the administration had been
replaced, there was at this time considerable apprehension
as to what the new regime would mean for Weihaiwei. One
observer commented:
The local residents are divided between 
hopes that the new High Commissioner will 
display greater zeal in improving local 
conditions (the roads are disgracefully 
kept at present) and fears that the well- 
behaved Marine Garrison, to which they are 
accustomed, will be replaced by soldiers, 
who may prove here, as so often elsewhere, 
a source of untold trouble and e x p e n s e .31
Fortunately for the people of the area, there were no major 
changes in the garrisoning arrangements at Weihaiwei through 
1936 and for a good portion of 1937» nor was there a need 
to augment the marine forces at this time as neither ban­
ditry nor internal disturbances posed a threat to the new 
regime,-^2 There were, however, many other changes in the 
style of governing which soon led to great dissatisfaction 
among a wide cross-section of the population.
The new commissioner, Sun Hsi-feng, or Dr. Georges Sun 
as he was also called, came to Weihaiwei with a considerably 
less prestigious set of credentials than either of his pre­
decessors. At forty he was relatively young for the post, 
although as a graduate of a French university he had at least 
had some experience in dealing with foreigners toward whom
he was said to be extremely friendly. Sun's only previous
/ /
administrative experience as a protege of Han Fu-ch'tt had 
been to serve as president of the military court in the pro­
vincial government at Tsinan and he soon demonstrated a
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33strong tendency toward militaristic methods at Weihaiwei. J
After only two months one observer summarized his approach
and its results as follows:
Dr, Georges Sun has up to the present 
proved more remarkable for energy than 
tact. He has antagonised the local gen­
try, who are of a conservative and bucolic 
temperament, by his disregard of their 
opinions, his ultra-drastic treatment of 
venial gambling and drug-taking offences 
and his openly expressed dislike of the 
unsystematic methods of administration 
which he found in operation at the time 
of his arrival. The popular sentiment of 
the moment is an ardent hope that his energy 
and zeal for reform will lead him into some 
major indiscretion, which will bring about
his downfall. 34*
It should be noted that Commissioner Sun was in most 
matters acting under direct orders from Han Fu-ch'd with 
whom he kept in constant touch. The severe penalties meted 
out for gambling and drug violations, including public flog­
gings of both male and female petty offenders and the imposi­
tion of heavy fines on persons of means, reflected the gov­
ernor's own well-known attitudes on questions of public 
3 3morality. ^ So intensive was the campaign at Weihaiwei 
against drug-taking that by the end of March 1937 it was re­
ported there had been 19 executions, 650 cases dealt with 
by the court, and 700 people cured of their addiction. Anti­
opium posters were widely distributed throughout the area 
and many public meetings were held to warn people of the 
punishments they would face if they violated the law. The
commissioner himself toured the countryside and delivered
3 6
lectures on the subject in all the larger villages.
Helping Sun Hsi-feng to implement all of the policy
changes at Weihaiwei was an entirely new staff of department 
37h e a d s . P e r h a p s  it was felt by this administration that
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with so many other "reforms" coming into effect it was also 
a good time to tighten up the system of labor conscription 
for carrying out road work. According to this program, each 
household was to provide one man for every five family mem­
bers as needed by the government. The result was some im­
provement in local roads, although it was noted that such 
an unpaid "volunteer" labor force was not very careful in 
its work and repairs tended to be "slipshod,"^®
The new commissioner also desired reforms in the ad­
ministration of Weihaiwei's land taxes which were still 
charged at 1921 British rates and were largely based on long 
out-of-date Ch'ing registers. Since the land taxes were con' 
sidered quite low in the former leasehold, there must have 
been some alarm among local residents that any change in the 
status quo could only bring higher taxes. Nevertheless, the 
government proceeded to train an entire team of land sur­
veyors chosen from the middle school with the intention of 
remeasuring all titled land and recertifying all deeds of 
ownership under the supervision of village headmen. One 
British observer remarked that the administration seemed un­
aware of the difficulties it was about to encounter with 
this project, including long-standing boundary disputes, 
questions of inheritance rights, and many other extremely 
complicated matters.^9 Given the chronic shortage of funds, 
however, it may have been that the government did not mind 
facing these problems knowing that it would in the end prob­
ably bring in additional revenue. It must also be said that 
Sun's new regime did manage to show a surplus in its budgets
for 1936 and 1937 without a subsidy, largely through drastic
40cuts in the salaries of government employees.
The tax registers were not the only item to come up
376
for closer scrutiny. The Public Safety Bureau also carried 
out a census in order to help detect Hundesirables" among 
the local population. Included in this category, no doubt, 
would have been persons either unknown to local residents 
with no fixed address, or those regarded as potential trouble­
makers for one reason or another. Other police measures in­
cluded the removal of stray dogs, the control of patent med­
icines, the inspection of goods hawked on the streets, the 
examination of well-water, and the licensing of barbers and
kl
doctors.
The atmosphere of increased regimentation at Weihaiwei
also extended to government employees who were ordered in
December 1936 to do a certain amount of calisthenics and
drill work each week. This policy was probably copied from
Han Fu-ch'tl's similar program for all government workers in 
lL2
Tsinan. Weihaiwei's government clerks found a good deal 
more of their time taken up in 1936 with the onerous task 
of registering all of the area's eligible voters and then 
counting ballots in an election for a delegate to the national 
congress. The electoral machinery for this purpose was so 
complicated that even the commissioner considered the pro- 
ject a complete waste of his staff's time.
Other government measures which were no doubt of much 
greater long-term importance to Weihaiwei's residents were 
in the area of education. As had the two previous Chinese 
administrations, Sun Hsi-feng's regime placed special em­
phasis on improving school facilities and ensuring that more 
people, children and adults alike, made use of them. By Sep­
tember 1936 it was reported that twenty-six new primary 
schools and a library had been opened and that another sum- 
mer session has been held for 260 male primary teachers.
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Not surprisingly, given the keen interest of both Han Fu-ch'ti 
and the Nanking authorities in physical fitness at this 
time, J the main focus of attention during the summer school 
was on athletics. One British observer felt that the atten­
tion given to military drill in Weihaiwei's primary schools 
was "amateurish" and "useless," but that the encouragement 
of sports and games was of definite value and was enthusias- 
tically received by local people. They were a good deal 
less enthusiastic in 1937» however, when some of the boys 
attending Weihaiwei*s schools were conscripted for military
Ilo
training at Tsinan, 1
In addition to raising educational standards, Commis­
sioner Sun's government was also eager to improve the quality 
of local agricultural products and hopefully thereby increase 
market demand for them. One problem which was brought to the 
commissioner's attention by the Chamber of Commerce concerned 
recurring complaints of ground nut dealers that some rural 
producers were soaking their output with water before sell^ 
ing it in order to increase its weight and their profit. Ul­
timately, of course, the dealers were left with a product 
which had to be dried before reshipment and was thus more 
expensive. If allowed to continue, this practice would cause 
considerable damage to the reputation of the entire nut in­
dustry at Weihaiwei, The government, therefore, decided to 
assign police the duty of inspecting nuts before they were 
sold and of returning any wet ones to the producer. Repeat
JL Q
offenders were to be fined. In a related move, fruit 
growers were strongly urged to spray their crops in order 
to improve their quality but this measure proved too expen­
sive for the area's small growers to adopt. As so many
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earlier administrators, Chinese and British alike, had recom­
mended, this regime too hoped to further develop scrub-oak 
silkworm production and to expand the variety of seafood 
products exported from Weihaiwei, 7 In the end, however,
Sun Hsi-feng*s government was in office for too short a time 
to realize very many of its objectives.
One great commercial hope, the tourist trade, proved 
especially disappointing. It was reported in the spring of 
1937 that Weihaiwei*s mainland hotels could only depend on 
a profitable working period of two months per year where for­
merly this had extended to four months. The reasons given 
for the change were improved living conditions in Shanghai 
and Hankow from which many foreign tourists had once been 
drawn, as well as the general tightness of money in China.
Nor did prospects for the future look very promising, as 
noted in the following comment* "It is doubtful whether, 
when money becomes easier, the old habits will return, as 
visitors have learnt to expect more from a holiday resort
than Weihaiwei can provide, and have found out that health
<0does not require the longer change of air."-' It seems un­
likely that such an unpopular commissioner as Sun Hsi-feng 
could have eventually led the people of Weihaiwei into more 
prosperous times even if economic circumstances had been more 
favorable. In late 1937» however, events quite beyond his 
control were dramatically to bring about the demise of his 
regime and the beginning of one of Weihaiwei*s most unhappy 
periods.
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The Japanese Occupation of Weihaiwei
After the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Peking in 
July 1937 Japanese forces began to move on a number of fronts 
in China and it appeared that the nation would soon face full- 
scale invasion. Although Shantung remained mysteriously un­
molested until very late in 1937» perhaps due to a secret 
arrangement negotiated by Governor Han Fu-ch'ti,^1 prepara­
tions were nevertheless being made at Weihaiwei for a pos­
sible Japanese attack during the summer of that year, in 
spite of objections from both the foreign community and the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Commissioner Sun called for and 
received a brigade of provincial troops, ostensibly to save 
face whenever the Japanese decided to take the port. One 
British commentator, however, observed that these soldiers 
also helped to free Weihaiwei, and its government, from com­
plete dependence on the Chinese navy for its defence. Since 
Sun was frequently at odds with the local naval commander, 
he probably had good reason to doubt the personal loyalty 
of his men should an emergency arise. In any event, by Sep­
tember the navy had withdrawn its remaining marines to Liu- 
kung Island,^2 and it appeared that Weihaiwei would have to 
rely on other forces for its security.
Some advance preparation for this situation had already 
been made during the summer months as six hundred local men 
were conscripted at Port Edward and given military training 
by instructors from Tsinan. From October to December a fur­
ther five hundred were trained and the entire force, as with 
similar groups elsewhere, was known as the Peace Preserva­
tion Corps (Pao-an Tui).^3
After the fall of Nanking on 12 December 1937• and
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Han Fu-ch'ti's retreat from Tsinan in the face of advancing 
Japanese troops, the people of Weihaiwei began to brace them­
selves for the inevitable enemy attack. It was widely ex­
pected that Commissioner Sun and his staff would flee at the 
earliest possible opportunity. There was some hope, however,
that the chief of police, Lieutenant-Colonel Cheng Wei-p'ing, 
who was not on good terms with Sun, might remain behind with 
his two hundred armed police, all residents of Weihaiwei, to 
assist in the event of Japanese occupation.^ At this time, 
Admiral Shen Hung-lieh had ordered the destruction of Japa­
nese property at Tsingtao as well as part of the city's har­
bor and public service facilities and no cables were being 
accepted at the Weihaiwei telegraph office for despatch there. 
The telegraph wires to Chefoo had also been cut in November 
and Weihaiwei was virtually dependent on British coastal 
steamers and radio for any communication with the outside 
world.-^
The general collapse of the central government was 
further evidenced locally by the mutiny in January 193$ of 
three hundred salt revenue guards stationed at various points 
along the promontory coastline. The majority of these men 
then marched into the interior, reportedly to form anti- 
Japanese guerrilla units. Others came into Port Edward to 
extract funds from the salt administration office and some 
became common criminals, murdering and robbing local vil­
lagers or forcing them to loot the salt pans. Conditions 
in Weihaiwei's border areas became particularly dangerous 
as over two thousand armed men, consisting of either former 
soldiers turned guerrillas or bandits, were said to be in 
hiding there.
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Given this alarming situation and distrusting the Chi­
nese commissioner's intentions and commitment to the people 
of Weihaiwei, members of the Chamber of Commerce soon found 
themselves thrown into a difficult new leadership role.
Their first response to the emergency was to request British 
help* both in forming a new committee of local residents to 
supervise the maintenance of peace and order and to provide 
a larger naval force to defend the area. The consul re­
sponded that he would not approach the Admiralty for addi­
tional help unless he was convinced that local authorities 
were completely unable to discharge what he considered to 
be "a purely Chinese responsibility."-^ In the meantime, 
however, the Chamber of Commerce was able to come to an 
agreement with a Chinese marine commander in the area that, 
if paid, his 250 men would assist Weihaiwei's police force.
Commissioner Sun's reaction to the crisis consisted 
mainly of measures to ensure his own personal safety and an 
escape route from Weihaiwei well before the Japanese arrival. 
Upon receiving orders, ostensibly from Han Fu-ch*tl, on 1 
January to resist the enemy, destroy all means of communica­
tion, and then withdraw any armed forces from the area, Sun 
flatly refused to comply, saying that to do so would be "folly" 
and that the command was probably not from the governor any­
way. Instead, he began to pressure local residents to pay 
all of their annual taxes immediately and to insist that 
the British allow him to take refuge in the consulate or on 
a warship. This request was denied by the consul who offered 
to evacuate him from Port Edward when the Japanese had actu­
ally arrived. The commissioner accordingly stepped up the 
training of the remaining Pao-an Tui forces and made alterna­
tive plans.^
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On January the Chamber of Commerce became suspicious 
that Sun was about to leave and, fearing a complete break­
down of law and order, made arrangements for their marine 
force to enter the outskirts of Port Edward. They also guar­
anteed the police that they would continue to receive their 
salaries and made a $3,000 payment to the Pao-an Tui on the 
understanding that it would disarm and disperse when the
commissioner left. The British consul called for a party
59
of sailors to guard the consulate. Two days later on 16 Janu 
ary the commissioner, his brother, and two officials of the 
finance department made their escape on a Chinese ship bound 
for Hong Kong, the Pao-an Tui having cleared the streets of 
Port Edward for them just prior to departure. This latter 
move was no doubt especially important to Sun as he and his 
staff took with them all available government funds. His 
brother, who was the commanding officer of the Pao-an Tui, 
also pocketed the $3,000 his men were to have received from 
the Chamber of Commerce. As a result many of them went on 
a looting rampage in Wen-teng hsien. Matters became even 
worse when the magistrates of both Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng 
hsien fled to Port Edward with most of their police forces 
as did many of the remaining salt revenue guards.^0
Fortunately, in cooperation with the Chinese marines 
still at Weihaiwei, the local police were able to disarm 
the more unruly elements among all of these armed men and re­
store order.^ Upon the departure of the marine commander
soon afterward, his 250 men were reorganized as a "Merchant
62Volunteer Corps" paid by the Chamber of Commerce. The
latter organization was no doubt also the driving force be­
hind a new "Assembly of People's Delegates" formed to tem­
porarily administer Weihaiwei in the absence of any repre-
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sentative from the Chinese central government. On 29 Janu­
ary the authorities at Hankow appointed the chief of police, 
Cheng Wei-p'ing, as acting high commissioner but the assembly 
was determined to continue functioning under him. For his 
part, Cheng agreed to work in close consultation with the 
new group to maintain order until the inevitable arrival of 
the Japanese. The British consul at this time believed the 
new assembly to be absolutely essential to the maintenance 
of peace in Weihaiwei, He also stressed the loyalty of its 
members to the central government which seems at least ques­
tionable given their determination to continue functioning 
in spite of Cheng's appointment to the post of commissioner. 
Having experienced so much trouble at the hands of previous 
officials, local leaders were ho doubt eager to have a say 
in administration at such a critical time,^ Their anxie­
ties were intensified even further when news arrived that
69-Chef oo had been occupied by the Japanese on 3 February.
Several emergency meetings were soon held at the Brit­
ish consulate which included the acting commissioner, the 
executive committee of the people's assembly, and Captain 
Chang Chu-ts'ai, a member of the former marine garrison at 
Weihaiwei. Captain Chang, who was married to a Japanese, 
volunteered to negotiate personally with the enemy at the 
border in order to ensure a peaceful occupation. It was 
also decided to rename the people's assembly the "Peace 
Maintenance Commission" and to move the Merchant Volunteer 
Corps away from the Chefoo Road along which Japanese troops 
would certainly approach the area.. Captain Chang and the
acting commissioner, however, were both concerned that the 
presence of at least one thousand armed bandits and self­
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styled guerrillas in a mountainous region between Chefoo 
and Weihaiwei could nevertheless give the enemy an excuse 
for attacking the former leasehold, The acting commissioner, 
therefore, worked out a special agreement with various bandit 
leaders that they would not invade until after the transfer 
of control had been effected.^
One serious problem which developed as soon as actual 
negotiations began to take place between the Japanese naval 
authorities and some of those participating in the meetings 
mentioned above was the eruption of considerable hostility 
directed at the latter by many of the local population. For­
mer teachers at the now closed Government Middle School who 
had previously staged anti-Japanese protests, some junior 
staff members of the former administration, and even some 
policemen threatened to execute as traitors Captain Chang, 
members of the Chamber of Commerce, and any others who had 
dealings with the enemy.^
The acting commissioner, Cheng Wei-p'ing, in a show 
of patriotism attempted to persuade the police force to co­
operate with him in making a stand against the Japanese, 
then kidnapping the wealthy merchants, and fleeing to the 
mountains to join the guerrilla forces there. Not surpris­
ingly, many members of the Chamber of Commerce chose this 
time to escape to Liu-kung Island and then tried to enlist 
the security services of those in the police force who were 
opposed to Cheng's plan. It became nearly impossible under 
these circumstances to even convene a meeting of the peace 
Maintenance Commission to make further contingency plans 
for the occupation. Captain'Chang, in the meantime, decided 
that as he was not a local man and as no one had the courage
385
to support him any longer his best course of action was to 
depart which he did by steamer on 22 February along with 
two hundred other residents of the area.^
In the few remaining weeks before the Japanese took 
Weihaiwei conditions continued to deteriorate* The acting 
commissioner, Cheng, who also served as chief of police, 
found himself with almost no support among community leaders, 
The few wealthy men of Weihaiwei were seriously considering 
leaving before the Japanese moved in and the Peace Mainte­
nance Commission was meeting only sporadically and in secret. 
Meanwhile, the entire police force was said to be demoral­
ized and the attitude of the Merchant Volunteer Corps un- 
6 8certain. On 3 March, however, just five days before the
arrival of Japanese troops, it became quite clear that the
people of Weihaiwei could not depend on the latter group to
protect them. On that day a mutiny took place in which the
commanding officer of the corps was shot and wounded in the
presence of his own officers who then led the entire force
out of Port Edward, it was said, to join a bandit gang camped
6 9only thirteen miles away. 7
Fearing that he would be labeled a traitor if he re­
mained at Weihaiwei, Acting Commissioner Cheng finally de­
cided just prior to the Japanese arrival to lead the remain­
ing security forces out of Port Edward to join guerrilla 
groups. At the same time, he took along all communications 
equipment which could be used by the enemy. The British con­
sul praised Cheng highly for his handling of this difficult 
situation and noted that by leaving at the last moment he 
prevented much of the looting which might otherwise have 
occurred.^0 On 7 March Japanese ships arrived in Weihaiwei
386
harbor and seaplanes began dropping leaflets which suggested 
the occupation would be peaceful as long as the Chinese 
offered no resistance. And the next day as four hundred
71marines came ashore that was exactly what they encountered.
Not surprisingly, given the presence of so many armed 
men in the surrounding countryside, however, the peace was 
not to last for long. On 12 March the first guerrilla raid 
into Port Edward took place with about three hundred men 
from the Weihaiwei police force and Merchant Volunteer Corps 
participating. The plan was for a fire to be set at the 
power station followed by a larger attack on the town. Un­
fortunately, the first group was discovered at the power 
plant with the loss of around thirty men. The Japanese re­
sponded the next day by landing one hundred additional marines 
ashore and by bombing villages in the northwest and south­
west foothills around the town. This pattern was repeated 
following a second guerrilla raid on 16 March in which sen­
try posts were attacked and the Japanese suffered a number 
of casualties,^ The occupying army at first made no attempt 
to penetrate further into the territory than Port Edward it­
self, the outskirts of which were not even under its control. 
They preferred instead to send daily search parties out into 
the villages to carry out reprisals. When the Chinese de­
stroyed bridges over the roads on which they traveled, the
Japanese responded by executing a headman and eight vil- 
73lagers.1^
As was the case in so many other parts of China, the 
new conquerors of Weihaiwei found it impossible to get any 
local residents to accept office in their regime. Thus, on 
23 March seventeen Chinese officials and forty armed police
38?
were sent to Port Edward by the puppet administration at
nL
Chefoo. Theirs was certainly not an enviable task. As
one observer remarked at the end of March*
Not since the Sino-Japanese War of 189^ 4- 
can this district have suffered such 
misery as has overwhelmed it during the 
past six months. The fishermen are starv­
ing, most local industries are moribund 
or dear, the cost of living rises from 
week to week, and only the export of ground 
nuts brings any money into the territory.
Perhaps the saddest fact of all was that these conditions
were not to show much improvement until 19^+5.
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Conclusion
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Weihaiwei's much-heralded return to Chinese control 
lasted only a little over seven years, from late 1930 to 
early 1938 • after which the residents of the former lease­
hold found themselves once again subject to the dictates 
of a foreign power. The long wartime occupation of Weihai­
wei was, by all accounts, a period of extreme deprivation 
with trade disrupted, food costly and in short supply, and 
continual fighting in the nearby rural areas between Japa­
nese and guerrilla forces. Nor did the hardships end in 
19^5» for war with Japan was immediately followed by a long 
and bloody civil conflict between Communist and Nationalist 
forces. During these years the relatively tranquil days of 
British rule must have indeed seemed a thing of the far 
distant past for the people of Weihaiwei.
Since the officials appointed by Nanking in the post­
rendition era had such a limited time in which to administer 
the area, it may in some respects be unfair to compare their 
experiences with those of the British who governed for thirty- 
two years. And yet because the British had chosen to rely 
largely on traditional institutions at Weihaiwei rather than 
to institute far-reaching changes there, it is possible with 
such a comparison to highlight the difficulties which faced 
so many Chinese administrators in rural areas throughout the 
country in the 1930s*
Those in official circles, in academic communities,
and in private agencies in China at this time showed great
interest in the problem of defining and implementing "good 
government" at the local level.1 Within these groups there
was a strong conviction that the vast majority of the Chinese
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population» the rural masses, needed to identify their in­
terests much more closely with those of the central govern­
ment if the nation was to solve its enormous economic and 
social problems and at the same time become a more unified 
political entity. The notion of local self-government, or 
ti-fang tzu-chih, was seen by politicians and intellectuals 
alike as the key to resolving many of these difficulties, 
especially as a means of eliminating the mistrust Chinese 
peasants often felt toward the state and its officials.
When Hsti Tsu-shan succeeded Reginald Johnston as 
high commissioner at Weihaiwei he was eager to prove that 
the Chinese could manage their own affairs by making the 
former leasehold a model of prosperity and sound administra­
tion, It is clear from the lengthy reports he prepared for 
his superiors at Nanking, however, that he recognized the 
impossibility of implementing national regulations on such 
matters as self-government without considerable attention 
to local conditions. Weihaiwei was in his view a "backward" 
and somewhat neglected area as a result of the "minimalist" 
policies of its former foreign rulers. He found it diffi­
cult, for example, to locate enough "qualified" people, either
in terms of literacy or experience, to take on the roles of
2
ch*tt-chang or fang-chang as required by law. The govern­
ment, therefore, first established training centers for ch'tt- 
chang candidates who had been recommended by former district 
headmen. As has been mentioned, it was only after success­
fully completing an entrance examination, three months of 
training, and a final examination that these people were to 
be considered eligible to be ch'tt-chang.^  There were special 
requirements for those wishing to become fang-chang as well.
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One question which arises at this point is if local 
people were as unprepared for the task of self-government 
as Hsti and the authorities in Nanking believed, how had the 
British managed to run their administration for over thirty 
years by relying so heavily upon them? Hsti himself, in fact, 
was clearly of two minds on this issue. In explaining why 
it was necessary to retain the village headman system along­
side the new self-government structure, he noted that it 
suited Weihaiwei*s geographical distribution of villages 
and had functioned well in the past as a simple and inexpen-
Ll
sive method of maintaining order at the local level. While 
recognizing the merits of this traditional institution and, 
no doubt, the political difficulties which could arise if 
he were suddenly to remove it, Hstt was also compelled by law 
to establish a new and more modern system for the promotion 
of self-government. He remarked that the British had, after 
all, retained the village headmen as a matter of convenience
and that they had not been interested in stimulating mass
. . . . Sparticipation m  government.
One can certainly agree with Hstt that economic effi­
ciency, simplicity, and a minimum of political disruption 
were high among British priorities in administering the 
leasehold of Weihaiwei, What he perhaps did not realize, 
however, was that colonial administrators such as James 
Stewart Lockhart and Reginald Johnston took a conservative 
approach to governing the Territory in part because they per­
sonally valued much about the Chinese social and political 
tradition.
They were especially impressed by the degree to which 
villagers at Weihaiwei succeeded in managing their own affairs.
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As Commissioner Lockhart remarked in 1904-* "Regarded im­
partially from an administrative point of view, the China­
man is a most desirable person to govern for being a great 
believer in home rule, his chief desire is to be left alone 
to govern himself and his family. Another British ob­
server even described Weihaiwei's villages as "self-contained 
republics" and added*
Nearly every man has his few acres of arable 
land and his share in the common pasture 
land; everyone is responsible to someone 
else for his correct- behaviour, and all owe 
some obedience to the elders of his house or 
the village headman or ts* un-tung. . , ,
There is then a clear sense of mutual respon­
sibility, and a general obligation to cooperate 
for common ends,7
So strong was this sense of mutual responsibility within 
both families and villages that there was a remarkable ab­
sence of serious crime at Weihaiwei, The British, therefore, 
saw no need to station large numbers of security forces in 
the countryside, but preferred to rely primarily on village 
headmen to police their respective areas as they had tradi­
tionally done.
British admiration for Chinese methods of local govern­
ment took them beyond mere dependence upon village headmen, 
however. What Lockhart and Johnston consistently attempted 
to do at Weihaiwei was to model their own behavior on that 
of a conscientious hsien magistrate who was supposed to be 
nothing less than a fu-mu kuan, or "father and mother offi­
cial," to those entrusted to his care. Such an intimate, 
familial relationship implied wide-ranging moral obligations 
on the part of the magistrate and not simply the maintenance 
of peace or the collection of taxes. In ideal circumstances, 
the end result was the achievement of mutual trust and respect
398
between the official and his subjects. It is, therefore, 
to the credit of British commissioners at Weihaiwei that 
local people appear to have accorded them both the title 
and the respect due only to a Chinese fu-mu kuan in the full 
sense of the term.
Officials in Nanking in 1930 t however, regarded such 
traditional concepts and institutions as outmoded at best 
and at worst as obstacles in the task of stimulating local 
people to identify their interests with those of the nation 
as a whole and to participate more actively in true "self- 
government." Unfortunately, as the Weihaiwei case so vividly 
demonstrates, it was the tendency of these same officials 
to think that these tasks could be accomplished by official 
command from above operating through a multi-layered bureau-
Q
cratic structure at the sub-hsien level.
The establishment of this complicated system took con­
siderable time and effort on the part of a rather large ad­
ministrative staff working with local people, as has been 
shown, in the end, however, the lines of authority within 
the system remained confused and there were numerous com­
plaints from villagers that government representatives of 
one sort or another were "interfering" too much in their 
daily lives. At this stage at least they did not view their 
increased contact with officialdom or their new self-govern­
ment agencies as providing them a larger voice in managing 
their own affairs. There was, on the contrary, a good deal 
of resentment that the new system was resulting in far 
greater control over the individual, which of course it was. 
Many of the registration and surveying procedures undertaken 
by the government were designed to place strong pressure on
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villagers to participate in their modernization programs and 
to facilitate security by identifying "undesirables" in the 
community.
It is obvious from this discussion that the British 
and Chinese administrators at Weihaiwei held widely differ­
ing views as to their ultimate objectives in governing the 
area. The British had originally leased the territory for 
a limited time period, primarily as a counterpoise to Russian 
and German maneuvers in north China. Initial plans to fortify 
the area were soon abandoned and it was reclassified as a 
"flying naval base" to be used only as a training ground, 
sanatorium, and recreation center for the fleet. Any possi­
bility of large-scale commercial development had been elimi­
nated with the promise given to Germany in I898 that there 
would be no railroad built to connect Weihaiwei with its 
hinterland. Furthermore, the area was only a leasehold and 
not a colony. Its residents were Chinese, not British sub­
jects, and there was always the underlying assumption that 
someday Weihaiwei would return to Chinese jurisdiction. In 
short, the British commissioners who served there were act­
ing as temporary caretakers only whose function was not to 
make the territory more like Britain, or to "modernize" it, 
but simply to govern in as efficient and inexpensive a manner 
as possible.
Commissioner Hsti Tsu-shan and the officials who fol­
lowed him had a much larger task on their hands. Weihaiwei 
was to be assimilated into a political entity still itself 
in the process of construction, namely the modern Chinese 
nation-state. More than this, however, it was also intended 
that the former foreign leasehold would become a shining
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example of economic prosperity and social harmony under the 
enlightened leadership of its Kuomintang administrators.
And it must he said that the first two groups of officials 
in the post-rendition era, under Hsti Tsu-shan and Hsti Tung- 
fan, were well-trained and highly motivated civil servants.
The Nanking regime was no doubt anxious to ensure that a 
territory so recently under foreign control should have an 
especially competent local government qualified both to handle 
the area's unique problems and to bolster the image of Chi­
nese officialdom in general. Yet, even with this advantage 
at a time when such personnel were in short supply, the gov­
ernment's hopes for Weihaiwei were not fulfilled. Why?
One of the most striking differences between the Brit­
ish commissioners and their Chinese counterparts was the 
freedom of the former in decision-making. The British offi­
cial was at liberty to make policy choices for the area, 
after consultation with his staff and various leading repre­
sentatives of the Chinese community, based on local condi­
tions and within his financial limitations. There was little 
interference from the Colonial Office in far-away London or 
from other British officials in China. As we have seen, how­
ever, the Chinese commissioners who served at Weihaiwei were 
required to consult continually with their superiors in Nan­
king and then, under Sun Hsi-feng, with those in Tsinan.
In many cases the decisions they took were based less on the 
needs of the people of Weihaiwei than on the needs and atti­
tudes of those at higher levels of government. Hsti Tsu-shan's 
interminable battles with the Ministry of Finance over mat­
ters of taxation constitute a prime example of this problem. 
The decision to model Weihaiwei*s government apparatus on
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that of the urban center of Tsingtao is another. Once high- 
level decisions such as these had been taken it became nearly 
impossible for subordinate officials to get them modified, 
inappropriate though they may have been to local conditions. 
Flexibility in policy-making was often sorely lacking due
□
to authoritarianism in national and provincial bureaucracies.
In Weihaiwei, as elsewhere in Republican China, inse­
curity of tenure was also.a factor in the low quality of local 
administration during the 1930s.^ As was mentioned earlier, 
the long-serving British officials at Weihaiwei had a clear 
advantage over their Chinese successors in this regard. Con­
sidering the nature of the changes which the Nanking regime 
desired in the former leasehold and the way in which those 
changes often clashed with the community's traditional cus­
toms and practices, the time allotted to its commissioners 
for implementation seems especially short.
Moreover, in some respects the Nationalist administra­
tors at Weihaiwei enjoyed less authority over the district 
and its inhabitants than had officials such as Lockhart and 
Johnston. Neither of them was compelled to compete with 
representatives from a wide variety of central and provin­
cial government agencies within the territory in the way 
their successors were. This situation not only weakened 
the Chinese commissioner's personal authority, but, perhaps 
even more seriously, deprived him of the largest proportion 
of locally-raised revenue, The financing of local govern­
ment thus became ever more uncertain and dependent upon sub-
11sidies from the central treasury.
Another enormous difficulty left unresolved at Weihai­
wei and throughout Republican China was the uneasy relation-
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ship which existed between the party organization and the 
state. Patrick Cavendish has observed that: "By the end
of 1930 Sun Fo was speaking of the 'yamenization* of the 
/party7 branches, which had degenerated, so he claimed, into 
negative, destructive, and secretive * super-governments*
, 4 2
preying on the administration and confusing the people."
We have seen the extent to which lines of authority became 
confused at Weihaiwei, with party, police, and administrative 
officials simultaneously issuing orders to self-government 
offices. Commissioner Hstt Tsu-shan himself ultimately lost 
out completely to the party activists in his area and was re­
moved from office. One. wonders how frequently this sort of 
power struggle may have occurred in other localities.
It is particularly unfortunate that the Chinese were 
unable to capitalize on the economic progress which had been 
made at Weihaiwei under the British. One of the major reasons 
for this, of course, was their removal of the area's artifi­
cial though advantageous duty-free status. The implementa­
tion of this policy was part of the price which the former 
leasehold was forced to pay as it was reintegrated into the 
Chinese state. In another way, however, both the government 
and the people of Weihaiwei were simply unlucky that rendi­
tion took place at the same time as the effects of a world­
wide economic depression were beginning to be felt in China. 
While one could criticize the Nationalists for establishing 
an unnecessarily large and expensive bureaucracy at Weihai­
wei and for draining the area of locally-raised revenue, it 
would not be fair to blame them for international circumstances 
over which they had no control.
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In the final analysis the most important measure of 
success for any government is probably the degree to which 
it maintains the trust and confidence of those it governs.
As has been shown, the British were surprisingly successful 
in this regard at Weihaiwei, largely due to the efforts of 
a few individuals who chose to study and adapt themselves, 
as much as possible, to local customs. As one retiring com­
missioner observed to his Chinese audiences "So far from 
it being the case that we have turned you into Englishmen,
I am not at all sure that it would not be truer to say that 
you have turned some of us into Chinese."1^
Why did the Chinese administrators at Weihaiwei, some 
of whom were eminently well qualified for their jobs, find 
it so difficult to establish the same kind of rapport with 
local people? Part of the problem clearly was the speed with 
which the Nationalists attempted to implement their reform 
programs. Equally important., however, was the fact that Wei­
haiwei's villagers were being asked to support a government 
which was taxing them at record levels, which was compelling 
them to provide corvee labor, and which by 1936 was carrying 
out very severe punishments for what had previously been re­
garded as minor offenses. Furthermore, many of the officials 
who arrived following rendition were "outsiders" from distant
parts of China "who differed in thought, speech and tradition
14
from the natives."
British administrators, on the other hand, had carefully 
nurtured an-image of the accessible, "caring" official who 
took a personal interest in the lives of those he governed.
It was he who could be depended upon to mediate disputes, 
distribute relief, reward the virtuous, and punish the wrong­
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doer. When one recalls the terms of praise lavished upon 
these officials by the community after years of continuous 
service, it is the warmth of the relationship which seems 
particularly remarkable. Ironically, in attempting to extend 
formal government to an ever lower level within Weihaiwei*s 
villages, the Nationalist officials of the 1930s appear to 
have actually distanced themselves from the people. Govern­
ment was no longer represented by a single authoritative 
figure but was rather a multiplicity of offices and individuals, 
who seemed to demand,more from local residents than they were 
able to provide in return.
Among the government's most important demands was the 
expectation that the people of Weihaiwei would see themselves 
less as members of a particular lineage or village and more 
as citizens of China. That quality which Stewart Lockhart 
so admired in the Chinese villager, the belief in "home rule" 
for himself and his family, had been regarded by Sun Yat-sen 
as a major deficiency among his countrymen. It was his great 
ambition and that of those who followed him to somehow trans­
form an enormous "plate of loose sand" into a strong and co­
hesive nation-state. To achieve this, however, required a 
degree of trust and cooperation between the government and 
its citizens at the local level which, as the history of Wei­
haiwei in the 1930s perhaps indicates, the Nanking regime 
was not able to inspire.
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